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Abstract
The purpose of my dissertation is to give a philosophic defense of the so-called
“dead donor” rule (DDR) in transplant ethics, something that is sorely lacking in the
current literature on the topic. Part of my project is concerned with the rule’s correct
formulation: What exactly does it forbid? I answer that it is primarily concerned with
prohibiting the killing of the donor for his or her organs, and that it need not be concerned
with requiring that the donor be dead before surgery begins (as important as that might
be). What is morally important is that surgery not be the proximate cause of death.
Historically, this flows out of the concern to be in compliance with homicide law and the
longstanding norm that doctors should not kill their patients for any reason. As I see it,
homicide law and the norms against physician-arranged death is based on an overarching
norm that calls for the respect for human life, even in its waning form, because every
human life has a fundamental and ineliminable dignity. Hence, I defend the following
argument: (1) transplant protocols that would have us secure the donor’s death would
have us kill someone for their organs; (2) killing someone for their organs disrespects the
worth of someone; (3) no act that disrespects the worth of someone is permissible; (4)
therefore, protocols that would have us secure the donor’s death are impermissible. This
deductive approach to the issue indicates my intention to defend a moral absolute: It is
wrong for transplant surgeons to kill their donors always and everywhere — even with
their consent.
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I defend this argument in each chapter. I begin with an analysis of our nature and
our deaths. I contend that the answer to the question “What are we?” is the answer, “a
human organism” and that “death” marks the end of the biological life of a human
organism, not a psychological entity distinct from a human organism. I then defend the
currently accepted neurological criterion as being sufficient for determining death. Next,
I clarify what is meant by “transplant protocol” and “kills” and what it is to kill someone
“for their organs.” Along the way, I contend for a theory of intention that seeks to balance
out our first- and third-personal perspectives with respect to determining what counts as
an intentional action.
Moving to the second premise, I argue that the fundamental problem with lethal
transplant surgery, to which I assume the donor consents, is that it bestows more worth
on the organs than the donor who has them. At stake is the very basis of human equality,
which is an ineliminable dignity that each of us has in virtue of having a rational nature.
To allow mortal harvesting would be to make our worth contingent upon variable quality
of life of judgments that can only be based on properties that come in degrees. Thus,
rejecting the ban on killing donors comes at the expense of our egalitarian principles,
which require equal treatment insofar as protections from being killed are concerned. In
short, the ban on killing is a matter of respect.
I end by explaining why this respect and our egalitarian principles require this
treatment, and why it is at least “virtually” absolute if not categorically absolute (the third
premise). The fundamental problem with non-absolutist systems of morality is that they
only superficially differ from consequentialism, a moral theory most bioethicists are loath
to accept. I give some reasons why consequentialism is inadequate, and explore options
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for grounding the DDR as a moral absolute. Yet my case does not depend on the falsity
of consequentialism, since a rule-consequentialist could hold that the DDR is “virtually”
absolute because upholding it produces the best outcomes. I explore some of the reasons
why this may be so. In any event, we have good reason to think that protocols that would
have us secure the donor’s death are impermissible.
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Preface
Typically, whenever anything is written about transplant ethics, the stark
difference between the number of people in need of healthy organs and the number of
people who get them is noted.1 Then it is inferred from the tragic disparity between the
short supply and high demand of healthy organs that there is an urgent imperative to
increase their number. Various strategies are then explored to do this. Some say we
should allow organs to be bought and sold (Matas 2008). Others who want to stay within
the charitable giving model suggest that consent to donate should be presumed unless one
has previously “opted out” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, chap. 11). A more aggressive
strategy is just to conscript organs regardless of the wishes of those who are made to
supply them (Harris 2002). Still others, who resist changing our donation and consentgiving practices, advocate for revising the definition of death so as to include those who
have irreversibly lost consciousness as potential organ sources (Veatch 2010, 322). Those
who hesitate to further revise the definition of death reject the rule that vital organs
should not be removed from living patients and that “organ donation euthanasia” should
be permitted (Miller, Truog, and Brock 2010; Wilkinson and Savulescu 2012). While it is
routinely acknowledged that any one of these proposals would require a radical shift in
our understanding of transplant ethics, we are left with the impression that almost

1

At the time of this writing, the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network website of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services says there is over 120,000 people in need of a life-saving organ;
in 2015, there were 15,064 donors who supplied organs for 30, 973 transplants (accessed March, 21, 2016).
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anything is better than the status quo. So great is the imperative to maximize the organ
supply that no time-honored belief in medical ethics, whether it be concern for bodily
integrity, informed consent, economic fairness, the wrongness of killing, or even the
nature of life and death, is safe from critical scrutiny. While there is much to be said for
and against all of these proposals, it is the revision to the wrongness of killing that
concerns me the most: I do not think there is anything wrong with the status quo’s
prohibition against donors being killed for their organs.
For the last twenty-five years the so-called “dead donor-rule” (or DDR) has been
the object of an increasingly intense scrutiny. While the content of the rule is not always
precisely understood, the rough version is that retrieving organs for transplant should not
come at the expense of the donor’s life, and so vital organs like the liver, heart, or lungs
should not be extracted unless the donor is dead. A chorus of discontent with the rule has
been voiced by a small, but growing group of doctors, lawyers, and philosophers who
believe it is permissible for transplant protocols to be the cause of death for donors of
vital organs. The reasons for this are many and varied, as we shall see, but all who reject
the DDR have in common the concern for harvesting the healthiest organs possible, the
reasonable assumption being that living donors at the margins of life are a healthier
source of organs than freshly dead ones. My twofold aim is to first challenge those who
believe that the moment of the donor’s death is not morally important in the context of
organ donation, and that the donor’s death can be licitly secured by transplant surgery
protocols, and secondly to defend a version of the DDR that specifically forbids killing
the donor as a sound moral policy. The reasons for this will unfold, but to prime the
pump a bit, I shall begin by illustrating them with a sad but thankfully untrue story.
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An infant boy named Joey, who was dying from causes related to birth asphyxia,
could not be saved. Hoping to lessen the tragedy of the situation, Joey’s grief-stricken
parents quickly made provisions for Joey to become an organ donor so that they might
spare the life of another little one in need. As it happened, there was such a little one in
need named Tommy who was at the same hospital at the same time. The transplant team
decided to use a donation-after-circulatory-death protocol to retrieve the tiny heart, which
could be promptly transplanted into Tommy the same day (similar to the one of Boucek
et al. 2008). Life support was withdrawn from Joey, and fifteen minutes later he flatlined.
The doctors waited an additional seventy-five seconds, and then began the delicate
surgery to retrieve the heart; they successfully extracted it, and transplanted it into
Tommy. The heart was restarted and Tommy made a full recovery and showed signs six
months later that he would continue living a healthy life. Joey’s parents found solace in
their grief that the surgery was a success — their son’s short life made a lifesaving
difference to another.
Unfortunately, Joey’s parents later met a bioethicist who told them that Joey was
not dead at the time of transplant. Seeing that he had stunned the parents with this bold
assertion, he went on to explain that death is an irreversible event, and since Joey’s heart
was able to be restarted, it was not the case that Joey’s circulatory function had
irreversibly ceased, and therefore the criterion for cardiac death named in the Uniform
Determination of Death Act was not satisfied.2 Indeed, the heart could not have saved
Tommy’s life if it could not been restarted. The cause of death, the bioethicist argued,
2

The Uniform Determination of Death Act states that an individual who has sustained either (1)
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions
of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.
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was not the effects of birth asphyxia; no, death occurred during transplant surgery.
Profoundly disturbed by these claims, Joey’s parents asked, “You mean we consented to
our son being killed on the operating table? We were not informed of that.” “Of course
not,” the bioethicist huffed, “But don’t worry, what you did was unquestionably right.
What we should really be worried about is this silly rule that says donors should not die
as a result of their surgery — that is why you weren’t properly informed.”
While we might agree that the bioethicist should be more sensitive to the parents
and their situation, there are many who agree with his argument. I do not. I intend to
defend the claim that the bioethicist is simply wrong to think that the cause of Joey’s
death is morally irrelevant to the act of organ donation, and that he is wrong to blame the
DDR for undermining trust in the transplant enterprise. Conversely, Joey’s parents are
right to worry about whether the surgery killed their son, because they rightly recognized
the value of his life even in its waning state. They do not suffer from some irrational
moral bias that fools them into thinking that his life is sacred, nor are they victims of
some conspiratorial legal fiction that makes taboo the killing for organs with patient or
proxy consent. Finally, it is right for us to wonder whether Joey’s parents were
misinformed about the nature of death or what the specific protocol used on their son
entailed (or both), and that those things, and not the DDR, should be singled out for
scrutiny. This is because Joey was a human being, who was lovingly carried by his
mother for nine months and would have slept in a room his father helped prepare for him.
In their eyes, to use the tired jargon of moral philosophers, Joey was a member of the
moral community, and ought to have been treated as such.
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But what if Joey’s parents didn’t value him so much? Suppose they were like the
parents in the infamous “Who Should Survive?” movie, who forbid the attending
physician to operate on their newborn son (who was diagnosed with Down’s syndrome3)
to correct an intestinal blockage. They want Joey to die, and instead of waiting
impatiently for him to starve, they consent to the transplant surgery knowing that their
troubles will soon be over and that someone else will be benefitted. Is Joey still a member
of the moral community and should his life not be taken by the transplant surgeons
regardless of what his parents think? I answer in the affirmative to both questions. Joey’s
parents are wrong not to value him, and that killing him for his organs does not respect
his worth, and therefore is bad medical practice. But why? Fundamentally, the answer
lies in the failure of the parents to acknowledge the innocence and helplessness of Joey as
a small dependent human being, who, as such, is inherently valuable. That they are
indifferent to their special obligation as parents to care for him also matters, but this is
less fundamental; Joey would still be worthy of protection even if his parents were dead.
Likewise, good medicine shows a proper respect for the worth of human life when it is
sensitive to our dependence and does not seek to take advantage of it as it would if it
were to permit killing people like Joey. In short, they would fail to care for him. Joey’s
worth derives from the kind of beings he is, and is respected when our institutions care
for such beings whether they are young, old, or infirm. Even in his injured state, he ought
to be treated as an end, not as a means to an end. It is simply a matter of respect, which is
both a matter of justice and good medicine.
3

I am aware of the spelling dispute between “Down” and Down’s” and while I generally prefer
“Down” I use “Down’s” in this dissertation, since those with whom I interact use “Down’s” and I prefer a
consistent usage that avoids having to write out “[sic]” every time after their spelling.
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This leads me to my argument in defense of the DDR, which rests on the premise
that someone, even at the margins of life, is valuable to such an extent that they should
not be killed for utilitarian purposes. As stated, it goes like this:
1.   Transplant protocols that would have us secure the donor’s death would have us
kill someone for their organs.
2.   Killing someone for their organs disrespects the worth of someone.
3.   No act that disrespects the worth of someone is permissible.
4.   Therefore, protocols that would have us secure the donor’s death are
impermissible.
As we shall see there are several objections to this argument. Some draw a distinction
between biological and mental life such that the loss of mental life is equivalent with the
death of the individual, and that the “someone” referenced in premise [1] is entirely lost
just if the capacity for consciousness is irreversibly lost making the killing of the donor’s
biological life a different sort of act with a different sort of consequence. Others might
claim that killing must be intended, and that the death of the donor could merely be a
foreseen, but unintended side-effect of a protocol that is only aimed at removing vital
organs for the sake of aiding the recipient, and therefore does not constitute an act of
killing. Against premise [2] one might appeal to a principle of autonomy as expressed
through informed consent that allows a donor to authorize the transplant team to intend
the donor’s death without any loss of respect. Along similar lines, some believe the
norms against disrespect can be reduced to norms against harm, and that vital organ
donors only need to be “beyond” harm, a point at which allegedly comes before death.
Still others think none of this matters and that premise [3] is ambiguous, and that we can
satisfy the demands of respect when we give everyone due consideration in a moral
calculus that requires us to maximize the good; perhaps under very special circumstances,
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one may be killed for the sake of the greater good and that this practice can be codified in
public policy. Each of these objections will be taken in their strongest form and
(hopefully) answered with the best possible reply.
What follows, then, is a formal defense of each premise of the argument. Chapter
One sets the stage of the topic and gives an overview of the DDR, it’s history, its correct
formulation, and why it is being challenged today. Chapters Two and Three are defenses
of the first premise by clarifying the nature of death and what it means to secure
someone’s death through the use of a transplant protocol. Chapter Four defends premise
two and Chapter Five clarifies what is meant by “respect” in premise three. The
deductive character of my argument is meant to leave no exceptions to its conclusion.
Therefore, I embark on a task of defending a moral absolute, that killing donors for their
organs is morally wrong, always and everywhere.
While the scope of my project is limited to explaining the wrongness of killing in
the context of organ donation, it has implications for other topics such as abortion,
embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, physician assisted suicide, the death penalty,
and the use of lethal force by the military and police. These I leave unexplored. The
argument I defend here is meant to be as specific as possible for the organ donation
context, because I intend to represent a philosophically worked out view in support of
traditional medical ethics against surgery-related killing, something that is lacking in the
DDR literature. Even as late as 2012, in what is perhaps the most systematic presentation
of the argument against the DDR, Franklin Miller and Robert Truog write that they “are
not aware of any systematic effort to justify this rule” (Miller and Truog 2012a, 114).
There are some good reasons for this. Historically speaking, a traditional medical ethic
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informed by the Hippocratic Oath and a religiously grounded sanctity-of-life doctrine
deeply shaped the ethics of vital organ transplantation when it first attracted ethical
attention some fifty years ago. But its inchoate premises were largely assumed without
argument, and the progressive nature of the mostly secular bioethics movement in
conjunction with technological advances over the last fifty years have led many to
scrutinize and reject the classical foundations of the DDR. Part of my task is to scrutinize
the scrutinizers by defending an argument that, in my view, contains premises that are
difficult to disagree with unless one is committed to more controversial prior
assumptions. It is those assumptions I would like to test; I am confident that the
plausibility of those assumptions is not greater than the plausibility of the premises of my
argument, which I will labor to develop in due course.
The astute reader will wonder if Christian belief motivates the direction of my
argument. I will not deny it. Nor do I feel guilty for doing so, since I do not believe it is
possible to be religiously neutral about of the value of life and the wrongness of killing.
What intellectual space is there that is both independent of assumptions for and against
religion, and sufficient for engaging in sound philosophic reasoning about matters of life
and death? Thinking about these topics from behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance is the one
serious candidate offered in recent times (Rawls 1971), but I believe it fails to provide
any firm ground for settling questions concerning the moral status of animals or human
beings at the margins of life. Do we know if we will be human or not under the veil? Are
we even human at all (perhaps all we are is a conscious brain)? The only way to settle
these issues is through philosophic argument from flesh and blood thinkers like
ourselves, culturally embedded as we are. Nonetheless, nothing I offer here will be
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religiously exclusive, meaning that one cannot rationally assent to my position unless one
shares my particular religious beliefs. Rather, I operate under the assumption that an
omnipotent and loving God would make us capable of discovering moral truth, and that
believers can make their beliefs rationally intelligible to non-believers by integrating
religious beliefs, on the one hand, with “secular” considerations, on the other. Since in
our stage of world history, more “publically available” reasoning is required to shape our
policies, I am happy to engage in this sort of reasoning if only to be more philosophically
persuasive. But that is not the only reason. I also see my project as helping to explain
why someone of a religious persuasion would hold my position. Appeal to divine
commands against killing and assent to doctrines that place an incalculable worth on
human life do not go very far in explaining the point of such commands or the properties
in virtue of which we have such a worth. Thus, the sort of project I am engaged in
assumes that there is a common good for human beings, and that, at least in the context of
organ donation, everyone who is interested in safeguarding and improving that common
good can speak to one another from whatever point of view they find convincing,
whether they be Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, or atheists. Of course,
disagreement will persist, perhaps because of ultimate prior commitments. Nevertheless,
finding out where those disagreements lie (and do not lie) is still a worthwhile exercise.
What follows, then, is an argument that is perhaps best at home in the Aristotelian
tradition, broadly construed. A teleological view of human life and human action is
defended in the coming pages. I stop short, however, of assuming a full-blown
teleological view of ethics as I retain a concept of “dignity” that may be thought to be
Kantian in character. I note the conflict between these two ethical traditions, but am
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unable to fully eliminate it. The reason for this is that I am unable to make sense of the
phenomenon of wronging something and not merely acting wrongly towards it, which is
why I frame things in terms of respect that must be owed, and not merely in terms of an
upright will towards the good. The character of justice seems to me to require a patientrather than agent-centered ethic that imposes inviolable side-constraints on our pursuit of
the good. I make no formal attempt at working out an ethical theory that would be able to
do this work, though I see myself following after Alan Donagan and his underappreciated
work The Theory of Morality (1977).
This project would not have been possible for the unfailing commitment of my
wife Rebecca, who for the past eight years has faithfully supported me through two
graduate programs in philosophy. It is hard to put into words how grateful I am to her for
allowing me to pursue this project. Not everyone has the opportunity to pursue their
calling and produce what they might proudly call their life’s work. Even if I do not
continue on in philosophy or bioethics, I will able to say that I was able to spend a tenth
of life (if I am lucky to live to 80) doing what loved to do largely because of her love and
her faith in me. I can only hope that I have done her proud.
A large debt of gratitude is owed to my supervisor Christopher Tollefsen who
carefully read over several drafts of this dissertation and made countless comments,
clarifications, and criticisms that made the argument much stronger than it otherwise
would have been. His guidance and support are especially noteworthy in his patience
with my mistakes and his welcoming of disagreement with his some of views. I
especially thank him for recommending me to study with him and his colleagues at
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Princeton University in seminars on medical ethics, public affairs, and Thomistic studies,
which greatly helped me work out my views.
I must also thank my committee members Jennifer Frey, George Khushf, and Jeff
Bishop for their help in this project. I particularly thank Jennifer for hiring me as her
research assistant for her Virtue, Happiness, and the Meaning of Life project in which I
was able to not only learn a great deal from her, but also her colleagues in formulating a
theory of action and assessing the merits of consequentialism. I especially thank George
for leading the (now defunct) bioethics reading group in my first years of graduate
school, which helped further my interest in brain death and organ donation ethics; he has
had no small impact on the content of my views, especially with regard to brain death and
its place in our public policy. Lastly, I thank Jeff for agreeing to be an Outside Reader on
my committee despite his busy schedule and his own supervising duties at St. Louis
University. The challenging feedback I received from him helped improve my historical
understanding of an area that should receive more attention from medical ethicists.
Indeed, the support I’ve received from these four could not have been better.
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Chapter 1: How (not) to think of the ‘dead-donor’ rule
Abstract: Although much has been written on the deaddonor rule (DDR) in the last twenty-five years, scant
attention has been paid to how it should be formulated, what
its rationale is, and why it was accepted. The DDR can be
formulated either in terms of a Don’t Kill rule or a Death
Requirement, the former being historically rooted in
absolutist ethics, while the latter in a prudential policy aimed
at securing trust in the transplant enterprise. I contend that
the moral core of the rule is the Don’t Kill rule, not the Death
Requirement. This, I show, is how the DDR was understood
by the transplanters of the 1960s, who sought to conform
their practices with ethics, unlike today’s critics of the DDR
who “rethink” our ethics in a question-begging fashion so as
to accommodate our practices. A better discussion of the
ethics of killing is need to move the debate forward.
Dr. Giertz spoke of taking organs from a dying person. I would like to make it clear that, in my opinion,
there has never been and there will never will be any question of taking organs from a dying person who
has “no reasonable chance of getting better or resuming consciousness”.
— G.P.J. Alexandre4

1.0 Introduction
In the past twenty-five years, much work has been published on the so-called
“dead-donor” rule (DDR) and the alleged problems it poses for organ transplantation.
Most of this literature is critical of the rule and calls for its abandonment, yet the rule’s
exact formulation is not always clear and the reasons for abandoning it are not always
sound. Indeed, as I shall argue in the first section, there are two distinct ways of

4

Quoted in (Wolstenholme and O’Connor 1966, 154)
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formulating the rule, each of which lend themselves to distinct ways of justifying them.
On the one hand, the DDR is interpreted as a requirement that the donor be dead before
surgery begins, a rule that appears to form a prudential policy essential for securing the
trust of potential donors in the transplant enterprise. On the other hand, it is interpreted as
a norm against intentionally killing the innocent via transplant surgery, a norm that is
historically rooted in the absolutist ethical systems of Kantian deontology, natural law
theory, and religious ideas embedded in Judaism and Christianity — not in principles of
utility.5 Hence, it is insufficient to argue from the premise that the DDR has negative
effects on donor trust (assuming this is the case) to the conclusion that it should be
rejected (e.g. Chaten 2014), since the validity of the norm against killing individuals for
their organs need not depend on whether the killing produces good consequences. As a
deontological constraint, the DDR forbids lethal transplant surgery as a type of action —
and this, as I shall defend in the second section, is the moral core of the DDR. While the
theoretical limits of this constraint are hotly debated today, it was originally received as
an absolute ban on lethal surgery. As will be shown in the third section, the early
transplanters of the 1950s and 60s had good reasons for understanding the rule this way,
and they labored to make their practices conform with the law and long-standing ethical
principles concerning the ethics of killing. Today, however, we see something of a
reversal of this pattern of thought; critics are eager to “rethink” the ethics of killing and
laws against homicide so as to permit lethal practices they assume to be acceptable. In the

5

Lest there be any confusion, the kind of “absolutism” I have in mind is the kind Anscombe described
when she spoke of there being “certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten” and “simply in
virtue of their description as such-and-such identifiable kinds of action…” (Anscombe 1958b, 10 emphasis
original).
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fourth section, I take issue with this assumption because the question is begged against
the traditional reasons that the DDR was adopted for in the first place. Since our medical
practices should conform with sound ethical principles no matter how much we may
desire for them to be acceptable, I end by calling for the continuation of a more thorough
and consistent discussion of the reasons why we should reject the norm against killing the
innocent in general and why it should be permissible for doctors to kill for organs in
particular. While this may be well-worn territory, it is “the only game in town” for
moving the debate forward. Let us now examine this case in greater detail.
1.1 What does the rule prohibit?
Careful thinking about the DDR requires a clear formulation of its content.
Surprisingly, this step is often glossed over. A sample of the literature reveals two
different ways in the DDR is formulated, one of which I will call the “Death
Requirement” and the other I call the “Don’t Kill” rule.
Table 1.1 Two ways to formulate the DDR
Death Requirement

Don’t Kill

1.   “It is thought permissible to
retrieve vital organs only from
dead patients.” (Miller and Truog
2008, 38).
2.   “A patient should be dead before
vital organs were [are] removed”
(Fost 2004, 249).
3.   “The donor must be dead before
vital organs are procured” (Bernat
2008, 670).
4.   “Multiple vital organs should only
be taken from dead patients”
(Coons and Levin 2011, 236).

1.   “It is immoral to kill patients by
taking their organs” (Koppelman
2003, 1).
2.   The DDR “requires that donors
not be killed in order to obtain
their organs.” (Robertson 1999, 6).
3.   “Individuals must not be killed by
organ retrieval” (Rodríguez-Arias,
Smith, and Lazar 2011, 36).
4.   “The DDR states that organ
donation must not kill the donor;
thus, the donor must first be
declared dead” (Bernat 2013,
1289).

3

As stated, the Don’t Kill rule is less demanding than the Death Requirement because it
permits vital organ procurement in cases where surgery is causally unrelated to death,
where the Death Requirement does not. While commonsense suggests that removing a
vital organ like the heart would cause the death of the donor, this is not necessarily the
case in practice. Astonishingly, the heart can be removed without killing the donor in
what is called a “domino donation.” In this protocol, a donor with a healthy heart, but
diseased lungs, can donate her heart to someone else, and receive a healthy heart and
lungs en bloc from a dead donor (Robert Sade, October 26, 2015, e-mail message to
author). To be sure, those who deploy the Death Requirement in their writings would
probably deem this practice as acceptable, and admit that the Death Requirement, as
stated, is imprecise.6 Critics of the rule have a point, then, when they say that the ethically
relevant question is not “When is the donor dead?” but rather “When is it permissible to
remove vital organs from the donor?” (Fost 2004, 251). However, death is still an
important part of answering this question if the donor’s death is not to be intended (Fost
1999).
The Don’t Kill rule, by contrast, says that it is impermissible to remove vital
organs from the donor if the donor would be killed by their removal, since the donor’s
death should not be intended for the sake of retrieving organs.7 Some critics and
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Or, as an anonymous reviewer suggests, they might even consider the particular organs harvested in
this specialized context as technically “non-vital.”
7
One should not interpret the DDR so narrowly as to think that it only forbids killing by removing
one’s, but not killing for obtaining organs (pace Coons and Levin 2011). The fact that one could consent to
be killed by the surgical removal of organs, but not for the sake of their removal is simply irrelevant in the
context of organ donation, the context to which the DDR applies (such a person isn’t a “donor” at all). In
that context, no donor is indifferent to the good of having one’s organs harvested for the sake of helping
others, and no transplant team is indifferent to the good of harvesting healthy organs for transplant.
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defenders of the rule agree that this is its morally relevant formulation, being a species of
the more general norm against harming patients.8 Critics of the rule, like Franklin Miller
and Robert Truog, recognize that it “is based on the seemingly unassailable principle that
it is wrong to kill (or cause the death) of an innocent person to save the life of another”
(Miller and Truog 2008, 38). Moreover, as George Khushf, a defender of the rule,
explains, the rule “excludes organ-harvesting practices that bring about mortality” (2010,
356n1), or put another way, “no person can be killed in order to harvest organs” (Ibid,
331). Therefore, the ill-named ‘dead-donor rule’ should be interpreted primarily as a
reference to the norm against killing donors for their organs, and not primarily as a
proscription against the removal of vital organs from living patients, as commonsensical
as that might be.9
What, then, explains the prominence of the Death Requirement? Although the
Don’t Kill rule is the essential moral core of the DDR, one might think that the Death
Requirement is the best policy to adopt to avoid risking abuse and to secure donor trust.
Obviously, transplant surgery is less controversial when the donor is dead. Technically,
however, the Don’t Kill rule allows vital organs to be procured so long as the donor is not
killed by the procedure, and these surgeries are much more controversial. For example,
under Paul Morrissey’s proposal, a surgeon may remove both kidneys from someone who
is irreversibly brain-damaged but does not satisfy neurological criteria for death

8

This would also rule out procurement procedures that would leave individuals in a diminished state
even if they were not killed.
9
Levin is one of the few writers on this topic who notes the difference between the Death Requirement
and the Don’t Kill rule, but he thinks that the Death Requirement is the “historically accurate” formulation
despite conceding that “the origins of the DDR are unclear” (Levin 2013, 2–3). Both of these claims I shall
contest below.
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(Morrissey 2012). Under this protocol, a designated proxy authorizes the removal of the
kidneys before life-support is removed; once the kidneys are retrieved, life-support is
withdrawn and the donor dies of respiratory complications. Assuming the cause of death
is related to the fatal brain trauma and not to the absence of kidney-functioning, the Don’t
Kill rule is not violated.10 Crucial to this proposal are the certainty of the diagnosis of
imminent death and the substantial cause of death.11 This is a demanding standard, and
any errors in diagnoses would be catastrophic for the patient, while implicating the
surgeon in the donor’s death. Even if the diagnosis is correct, doctors must still consider
the risk of the surgery’s being the proximate cause of death.12 To avoid any risk of
violating the Don’t Kill rule, then, the best policy is to satisfy the Death Requirement, a
standard Morrissey’s proposal does not meet. Thus, a precautionary approach that avoids
contravening the Don’t Kill rule gives the Death Requirement its normativity. The
normativity of the Death Requirement may also be reinforced with the belief that it best
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Some contend that the Don’t Kill rule is violated because withdrawing life-support is what “causes
death” not the underlying pathology (Miller and Truog 2012a, chap. 1). While this requires fuller treatment,
my quick reply is that framing human action in terms of its causal activity or inactivity is a poor way to
understand human action. Does a boy scout “cause the death” of his breathless and unconscious scout
master (imagine some accident out on the trail) when he ceases to perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation
after an hour? The fact that the scout master could have lived longer had the scout not given up is not
sufficient for helping us understand what the scout does — certainly he does not kill him. It seems that
there is at least a morally relevant distinction between being a cause of death (which may affect the timing
of it) and being the cause of death (which is the source of the fatal sequence) (Birch 2013). This is not to
say that someone’s death cannot be intended by withdrawing life-support, but doing so does not require
such an intention. For further treatment on this topic see Jensen (2011).
11
This is also the source of the controversy over so-called “donation-after-circulatory-death” protocols.
12
According to critics of Paul Morrisey’s proposal:
Midline laparotomy and bilateral nephrectomy [the procedures that remove both kidneys] after the
original brain injury is an additional iatrogenic (penetrating and blunt) trauma resulting in
extracranial tissue injuries and potentially hastening or causing death. Surgery can induce postoperative cardiovascular instability secondary to blood loss, intraoperative fluid shifts, and
intravascular hypovolemia. In the absence of optimal perioperative resuscitation, the final
common pathway is an early onset of hypotension and cardiovascular collapse. The latter becomes
the lethal pathophysiology and proximate cause of death upon WLS [withdrawing life-support]
(Wertin, Rady, and Verheijde 2012, 18).

6

protects the patient’s end-of-life care from being compromised and, therefore, better
secures donor trust in the transplant system. For these reasons, then, the stronger Death
Requirement might be preferable to the weaker Don’t Kill rule, which would help explain
its prominence.13 Yet if the risk of violating the Don’t Kill rule were shown to be
tolerable, and the patient’s end-of-life care were able to be safeguarded, Morrissey’s
proposal would be permissible insofar as the Don’t Kill rule is concerned. What is at
stake, then, is the suitability of certain protocols that do not meet the more risk-averse
Death Requirement: are they safe enough to practice or would we risk killing the donor?
How Morrissey’s proposal is adjudicated will depend not only on the answer to this
question, but also on the interpretation of the rule favored as a matter of policy. What is
important to understand for our purposes is that the moral core of the DDR is the Don’t
Kill rule, and the Death Requirement is the operational result of a precautionary approach
to complying with it. This framework has important implications for understanding its
purpose.
1.2 What is the rule’s purpose?
The DDR is commonly recognized to be a deontological constraint on our efforts
to maximize the number of transplantable organs, but the meaning of this notion is
unclear. In a broad sense, it means that, regardless of the consequences, we must not
instrumentalize donors to such an extent that they can be killed for their organs. Yet the
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This sort of thinking is captured well in DeVita and Snyder’s description of four cases in which
donation-after-circulatory-death protocols were used (1993). They report that, in the effort to standardize
these protocols, some transplant teams and procurement officials were concerned “that an overly liberal
policy might result in a public outcry that would jeopardize the future of organ donation” (Ibid., 135) I take
what they mean by an “overly liberal policy” to include removing vital organs from donors who have
satisfied neither neurological, nor circulatory criteria.
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limits of this constraint are up for debate. Can donors be killed for their organs if they
give valid consent? Or would such cases be ruled out because they involve killing the
innocent?14 The answer depends on which form of deontology is at work. If it is the
variety one finds in Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’ widely-read Principles of
Biomedical Ethics (2013), then exceptions to the Don’t Kill rule can be plausibly
formulated through the mechanism of voluntary informed consent. But if it is the
absolutist variety that derives from Kant’s ethical system, natural law theory, or JudeoChristian morality, then no exceptions can be made — the Don’t Kill rule is simply
meant to forbid this type of action. Rather than address this philosophical debate here
(see Chapter 5), I will just say that the historical understanding of the DDR in the 1960s
favored the absolutist sort (see below for details). The particular reasons for why this
understanding was favored depend on the tradition assumed, but a respect for the
inviolateness of innocent human life is the underlying concern. Interestingly, some critics
of the ban recognize that its character signifies society’s respect for human life (Cochrane
2011, 136), while some of its defenders pass over this entirely and emphasize its utility,
claiming that compliance with it is essential for securing the trust of those who might be
willing to donate (Chen and Ko 2011). Donor trust, it is thought, would be curtailed if the
rule were routinely violated (Bernat 2013, 1290). These two streams of thought are often
blended together in ways that make the purposes of the rule reducible to respecting
persons and avoiding harm (e.g. Collins 2010, 164). As today’s bioethicists tend to work
out their policies in terms of a quasi-rule-utilitarianism where principles of respect are
14

There is a question about the “non-innocent”—people on death row—which I leave aside, since such
a practice depends on the validity of the death penalty, an issue that needs to be resolved before any “deathby-transplant-surgery” proposal can be evaluated.
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“balanced” against principles of beneficence (e.g. Jonsen 2001, 44),15 the purpose of the
rule is thought to be twofold: (1) to protect the interests of the donor, and (2) to secure the
goods necessary to further the goals of transplantation. This more pragmatic
interpretation of the rule explains why some think the DDR “never really has been a rule,
but rather a guideline” (Fost 2004, 252). This, however, is an impoverished view of the
rule’s purpose. To see why, I shall examine two flawed criticisms of the rule that depend
on these assumptions.
1.2.1 Not about successful mediation
Critics of the DDR typically contend that the rule should be rejected if it is at odds
with respect for persons or if it fails to secure the trust it promises (Koppelman 2003;
Miller, Truog, and Brock 2010; Rodríguez-Arias, Smith, and Lazar 2011, 36; Sade 2011;
Chaten 2014). This contention is an instance of a more general strategy, which argues
against the rationality of accepting an absolute prohibition from the premise that perfect
compliance with it frustrates the purposes of the prohibition (Shafer-Landau 2015, 230).
Perhaps the best example of this critical framework comes from Elysa Koppelman, who
thinks the DDR ought to be discarded because it can no longer “successfully mediate” the
utilitarian goal of maximizing the organ supply with the deontological value of respecting
the wishes of donors who are irreversibly unconscious (2003, 2). Successful mediation of
these goals is what she believes characterizes the concerns of the transplant community.
While she formulates the DDR in terms of the Don’t Kill rule, she believes that
compliance with it requires a precise definition of death if the surgery needed for
15

Albert Jonsen is worth quoting: “To be more precise […], the ‘rule utilitarianism’ that combines
respect for rule and principle with the goals of human and social thriving is the dominant ethos of bioethics
at the level of public policy” (Ibid.).
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successful transplant would otherwise kill the donor. Since there is a lack of consensus on
the definition of death, she concludes that the DDR “cannot mediate the concerns of the
organ transplant community,” and if we assume that respecting persons and killing them
are incompatible, “we risk compromising the utilitarian goal.” To achieve a more optimal
balance between the utility of maximizing the organ supply and the deontological value
of respecting those who supply them, we ought to permit donors to negotiate their deaths
with their transplant surgeons.
There are two problems with this argument. First, it is doubtful that the purpose of
the DDR is to “successfully mediate” the delicate balance between the good of
maximizing the organ supply and the good of respecting those who supply them. Instead,
the DDR is meant to conflict with the utilitarian goal — it is not meant to identify a
neutral space of moral ground where the principles of beneficence and respect for persons
can meet.16 The rule just is meant to forbid a certain kind of action from being performed
on the donor’s body.
Second, there is no good reason why a lack of consensus on a topic is sufficient to
reject rules that involve the topic. Koppelman’s argument seems to be this:
1.   The DDR requires a precise definition of death.
2.   There is no consensus on the definition of death.
3.   Therefore, the DDR ought to be rejected.
I shall call this the No Consensus argument. Its general form goes like this:
1.   Rule R concerning Q requires that there be a precise definition of Q.
2.   There is no consensus concerning the precise definition of Q.
3.   Therefore, R should be rejected.
16

I take her language about “utilitarian” and “deontological” values to be indicative of a conflict
between the standard bioethical principles of beneficence and respect for persons, not utilitarian or
deontological ethics in a theoretical sense.
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Is her application of this argument sound? I think not. Consider this argument:
1.   Rules that protect the free exercise of religion require a precise definition of
“religion.”
2.   There is no consensus on the definition of “religion.”
3.   Therefore, rules that protect the free exercise of religion ought to be rejected.
Yet we have good reason to accept rules that protect the freedom of religion despite the
fact that there is no consensus on the definition of religion (Choper 1982).17 Some of
those reasons involve the principles of beneficence and respect for persons, or other
principles upon which any just society is based (Nussbaum 2012). The same is true of
rules protecting ideals like free speech or the freedom to marry, or rules that make use of
disputed concepts like race or gender. Yet the No Consensus argument would have us
believe that any term lacking a consensus definition is grounds for rejecting rules that
make use of them. There is simply no reason to believe this. One might reasonably
conclude the rules are problematic or in need of refinement, but the implication that they
should be rejected does not follow.
I will grant that perhaps I am missing something important about when and why a rule’s
terms need to be clearly defined. Nonetheless, it is not obvious that the DDR requires a
precise definition of death. Under the Don’t Kill formulation, at least, one is in need of a
good understanding of life, and the knowledge of how not to take it — not a precise
definition of death. But what about the Death Requirement? Is it not the case that a
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I should acknowledge that “religion” is not adequately analogous to “death” because there is a good
reason to leave “religion” vague: there are multiple forms religion can take that are widely different from
one another. Not so with death, which formally is just the cessation of life, and when that occurs is
something we should get right. To offer a better analogy I will replace the argument with one concerning
“disease”: (1) Rules that govern the control of disease require a precise definition of “disease”; (2) There is
no consensus on the definition of “disease”; Therefore, (3) rules that that govern the control of disease
ought to be rejected.
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precise definition of death is necessary to determine when we can safely remove vital
organs? Surprisingly, the answer is no; a precise definition of death is not needed when
people donate their brain to science. No one worries about satisfying rigid death criteria
when the brains of former football players are removed upon autopsy so that they can be
studied for the purposes of diagnosing chronic traumatic encephalopathy (popularly
known as CTE). Rather, the requirement is generated by procedures that intend to
retrieve the healthiest organs possible for transplant and that accept the DDR as a
constraint. Thus, it is the medical goals of organ transplantation in conjunction with the
constraint of the Don’t Kill rule that require a precise definition of death. Yet many
critics of the rule believe that either version of the DDR alone imposes this requirement.
This is an instance of a broader trend in the DDR literature, which I call “slanting” (for
lack of a better term): attributing things we do not like to a single factor, while ignoring
the relevance of other factors.
1.2.2 Not about creating virtuous activity or good consequences
A notable example of slanting comes from Frank C. Chaten (2014), who asserts
that the DDR has failed to perform its intended function, that is, to safeguard patient trust
in the transplant enterprise. According to Chaten, compliance with the DDR “leads
physicians to compromise many virtues essential to the excellent practice of medicine”
(Ibid., 496) Abolishing the rule will remedy this situation, says Chaten, because it “will
strengthen the doctor-patient relationship and foster trustworthiness in organ
procurement” (Ibid.). Chaten’s critique is interesting in that it is not merely
consequentialist; rather, he assumes the virtue ethics tradition as it is situated in medicine
by Edmund Pellegrino (2002). The virtues at stake include: (a) fidelity to the patient’s
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best interests with respect to the desire to donate; (b) intellectual honesty with respect to
the nature of death; (c) suppression of self-interest and the courage to support the good
with respect to the difficulty of diagnosing death while simultaneously promoting the
urgency of altruistic gifting; and lastly (d) compassionate care for the donor with respect
to failure to administer general anesthesia to newly declared dead donors for
precautionary reasons. Chaten’s consequentialist concern is that the application of the
DDR at the bedside fails to bring about desirable states of affairs, that is, ones in which
physicians accord with virtuous activity. Since transplant surgeons do not accord with
these virtues, says Chaten, their activity undermines trust in the transplant system. To
safeguard trust, then, we ought to reject the DDR.
Supposing for a moment that the primary purpose of the DDR is to safeguard trust
(which it is not), Chaten’s argument fails to isolate the DDR from other relevant factors
in cases where the rule is applied so that the DDR can be properly blamed for
undermining trust. For example, he believes the DDR disrespects donors by limiting their
ability to donate healthy organs in cases where the donor does not die quickly enough.
However this problem only arises in donation-after-circulatory-death (DCD) cases, not in
brain death cases where the donor’s body is artificially ventilated. As for brain death
cases, Chaten believes that the DDR sometimes forces physicians to impose brain death
on donors and their families who for religious reasons do not agree that brain death is
death. He cites an example in which he cared for a Muslim child whose parents rejected
brain death, believing that death occurs when respiration expires. What goes
unmentioned, however, is that these same parents would probably not allow their child to
be killed on the operating table either. Hence, it is the medical and legal establishment’s
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commitment to brain death that creates a burden for cultural and religious values, not the
DDR. As unfortunate as it may be when DCD donors fail to die quickly enough to donate
healthy organs, it does not follow that the donor’s autonomy is disrespected if the acting
transplant surgeon refuses to perform lethal surgery. Doctors are autonomous agents too,
and by virtue of the respect they are due, they reserve the right to not intend the death of
their patients — even in a world without the DDR. Perhaps then we should examine
whether our protocols fail to exemplify virtuous activity; maybe they, and not the DDR,
are to blame for undermining trust in the transplant system.
Chaten might reply that protocols like those currently used for DCD are the
“offspring” of the DDR (2014, 497). If by this is he means that such protocols are the
product of a marriage between transplant medicine and the DDR, then so be it — this
position is compatible with my claim that the DCD protocols in question may or may not
be consistent with virtuous activity. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that the
transplant surgeons of the early 1960s were uncomfortable with harvesting organs after
circulatory death. Thomas Starzl remarked that the complicated maneuvering required to
procure a healthy kidney after circulatory death led him and his colleagues to fear that
they were violating the “spirit” of the “law” — that is, the law against homicide — even
if they were following the “letter” of it (1992, 149). Should this discomfort not count as
evidence that the DDR had a virtuous effect on early transplanters? After all, the rule’s
spirit, if not its letter, revealed something important about the character of their actions,
which led them to rethink their practices in order that they be able to treat the donor with
greater respect. Chaten probably would not agree, however, because he sees the
commitment of the early transplant teams to the DDR as an “unexamined choice, not
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conceived by thoughtful analysis of alternatives or the result of wisdom obtained from
the bedside” (2014, 498). As such, he claims that the rule was put forward merely as a
pragmatic solution to the problems facing transplant surgery in the 1960s, and that the
pioneers of the discipline did not understand that they were creating the conditions for an
imprudent medical practice. Is this true? I think not, and, as I shall argue in the next
section, the acceptance of the DDR was the result of complying not only with the law
against homicide but also traditional norm against killing patients for any reason, a norm
that was stringently re-applied after World War II. This explains, in part, why Starzl and
his colleagues thought they were not complying with the “spirit” of the law in the days
before the legal recognition of brain death as death.
1.3 Why did the early transplanters accept the DDR?
Since the goal of organ transplantation is to replace an unhealthy organ with a
healthy one, the body from which the healthy organ is taken must be in good enough
shape to supply one. Assuming vital organ removal would bring about mortality, a
dilemma emerges. Either we identify some condition of the donor, which is compatible
with the donor being dead and allows for the relevant organs to be healthy enough for
transplant, and we remove them only when that condition is reached, or we identify a
level of health remaining in the donor at which point lethal surgery is judged permissible
and we remove organs only when that level is reached. The dilemma pressures us to
either define death precisely and determine reliably when it occurs, or to revise our ethics
of killing and precisely define the conditions under which a patient can be killed. In any
case, something must be precisely defined if transplantation is to occur.
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When confronted with this dilemma in the 1960s, law and medicine opted to
“update” the definition of death to include neurological criteria alongside traditional
cardiopulmonary criteria (Ramsey 1970, chap. 2).18 This move is explained in part by the
cultural upheavals of the time, which led some to advocate for the legalization of abortion
and euthanasia (Fletcher 1954; Williams 1957). What kept the broader transplant
community from becoming swept up into a more expansive view of physician-permitted
killing? At least some were open to it. Belding H. Scribner, a key innovator in dialysis
treatment, said in his presidential address to the American Society of Artificial Internal
Organs:
As far as death is concerned, I would like to be able to put into my will a
paragraph urging that when my physician felt that the end was near, I be put to
sleep and any useful organs taken prior to death. I wonder how many people feel
as I do? I think that ethical and legal guidelines should be devised to permit me
and others to volunteer in these ways (Scribner 1964, 211).
I too wonder how many felt the same way as Scribner. As far as I know, the attitudes of
early transplanters towards this question have not been empirically studied. Still, we
should ask: why did the transplant community lobby for a change in the definition of
death rather than in homicide law? This question has three answers, each of which is
explored in the next three sub-sections, respectively.
1.3.1 The concern over human experimentation
The first answer is found in the experimental nature of organ transplantation at the
time. The startling long-term success of Joseph Murray and others in kidney
transplantation highlighted the newfound awkward relationship between such practices

18
Paul Ramsey’s survey of how this “updating” process went about presents the best summary of the
relevant issues and events under consideration at the time.
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with existing medical, legal, and theological norms (Murray, Harrison, and Merrill 1955;
Barry and Murray 2006). It was not clear to anyone at the time how the risks involved for
both the donor and the recipient could be justified. Hence, the topic of human
experimentation was front and center at the first symposium on transplant ethics held in
London at the Ciba Foundation house (March 8-11, 1966). Starzl, who was invited to
participate, reported that:
The appropriate conditions for human experimentation was the foremost concern
because the medical atrocities of World War II were still fresh in the collective
mind. Three of the European participants (David Daube, Regius Professor of Law,
Oxford; Hugh Edward de Wardener, nephrologist at Charing Cross Hospital; and
Michael Woodruff, professor of surgery, Edinburgh) had experienced violations
of their own human rights almost beyond description during years spent in
concentration or prisoner-of-war camps (Starzl 1992, 146).19
The Nuremburg Code (1947) and the Helsinki Declaration (1964), both of which were
index documents for the symposium, call for the uncompromised protection of the life
and the health of the research subject. Experiments involving a high risk of death or
disabling injury to the subject are unacceptable according to these documents even if the
subject gives voluntary informed consent. This protection applied as much to the
recipients as to the donors in the early days of transplantation. Murray, who performed
the first successful kidney transplant between identical twins in 1954, saw with clarity
that the practice of live kidney donation involved risking the health of a well person so
that a sick person might be made well again (Murray et al. 1964, 550). Poor outcomes for
the first few liver recipients in 1963 led Starzl and his team to impose a moratorium on
the practice for more than three years (Starzl 1992, 105).

19
In fact, Daube, who fled Germany in 1933, did not spend time in a camp, though his father did
(Daube 2008, 9). Woodruff and de Wardener spent time in the notorious Changi camp in Singapore.
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Starzl’s ethical sensitivity is worth examining in detail. In a 1967 article, he
claimed that the dominant tradition of medical ethics required physicians to provide the
best care possible to their patients no matter what the circumstances. As he saw it, this
viewpoint “placed the concept of the sanctity of human life on a practical foundation,”
and it should not be abandoned “in the face of advancing technocracy” (Starzl 1967, 33).
At the Ciba symposium, he even questioned the practice of removing organs before the
cessation of circulation on the basis of neurological criteria and contended that the
surgeon and attending physician equally shared the responsibility to protect the lives of
potential donors in hopelessly terminal states (Wolstenholme and O’Connor 1966, 70).20
At the time, he felt that the act of removing a kidney from the body of someone declared
dead by neurological criteria constituted “an erosion of the historical medical creed of
responsibility to the patient” (Starzl 1967, 36). He even became uncomfortable with livedonation as reports came in about donor manipulation and coercion, and in one case, a
donor’s death (Starzl 1992).21 Although his views would change over time to
accommodate what is now commonly practiced in transplantation, this transition was not
without careful ethical reflection on whether or not longstanding principles of medical
ethics were being honored.
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Alexandre’s neurological criteria for death, which he used in nine separate occasions, included “(1)
complete bilateral mydriasis; (2) complete absence of reflexes, both nature and in response to profound
pain; (3) complete absence of spontaneous respiration, five minutes after mechanical respiration has been
stopped; (4) falling blood pressure necessitating increasing amounts of vasopressive drugs [...]; (5) a flat
EEG” (Wolstenholme and O’Connor 1966, 69)
21
It is worth mentioning that Starzl risked the well-being of prisoners in his initial experiments with
live-kidney transplants who were asked to donate a kidney in exchange for nothing. While it seems that his
consent practice was fair, he became concerned over the potential for abuse if the practice of procuring
organs from inmates spread to other prisons. In an addendum to the meeting’s minutes, Starzl noted that he
became convinced of this after privately conversing with David Daube about the matter, and the committee
agreed that the practice should be discontinued (Wolstenholme and O’Connor 1966, 75–77).
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Beyond Starzl, participants at the Ciba symposium took the deontic constraints on
lethal medical experimentation as given. When Michael Woodruff claimed that there
were “obvious limitations” on living donors as organ suppliers, the reason he gave was
this: “no one can donate his heart or liver and remain alive, and the same is true of a
person who wants to donate a kidney if he happens to have only one which is
functioning” (Woodruff 1966, 10). Looking ahead to heart transplants, G.E. Schreiner
curiously said,
I personally would find considerable ethical objections to transplanting a heart,
because no matter how certain the doctor is that he has to remove the recipient’s
heart, he has in effect to kill the patient in order to do the experiment, whereas if
he puts the heart in as an accessory organ at least he avoids this problem
(Schreiner 1966, 132).22
Even the Parisian physician Jean Hamburger, who thought medical practice should be
given wide latitude in shaping ethical norms, was committed to a Kantian framework in
which “an awareness of the value of human life” was essential to the training of virtuous
doctors (both quotes from Hamburger 1966, 135). Echoing this sentiment, the Italian
surgeon R. Cortesini claimed unequivocally that, “The right to life of every individual
must be respected up to the moment of death” when laying out his ideas for proposed
legislation in Italy regarding organ donation (Cortesini 1966, 174). On the matter of
refusing to use children in transplant experiments, David Daube was insistent: if by doing
so, medical progress would be hampered, then “it is regrettable, but medical progress
must then be hampered” (Daube 1966, 199).

22
It seems that Schreiner was committed to the odd view that life was essentially bound up with the
presence of a beating heart rather than the presence of adequate circulation.
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The early transplant community accepted the norm against risky experimental
surgery, and its members were anxious to make their newly devised protocols as safe as
possible both for the donor and the recipient. The American Medical Association echoed
this concern in its ethical guidelines for organ transplantation by including a clause
calling for equal protection of both donor and the recipient; in the Judicial Council’s
view, no less than the “respect for the dignity of man” was at stake (“Ethical Guidelines
for Organ Transplantation” 1968, 341–42). While the success of these efforts can be
debated, the guidelines do offer an answer as to why transplanters did not advocate for a
change in homicide law: effectively killing donors for their organs involved lethal, and
therefore forbidden, experimental surgery.
1.3.2 The concern over homicide
The second reason the transplant community advocated for a change in the
definition of death rather than homicide law is that doctors did not see themselves as
responsible for the deaths of the brain-damaged patients they disconnected from lifesupport. The diagnosis of death became especially pertinent in circumstances involving
homicide. The case of David Potter illustrates the problem well. In 1963, Potter suffered
extensive brain trauma from a brawl and stopped breathing fourteen hours after being
admitted to the hospital. He was subsequently connected to a ventilator so that one of his
kidneys could be harvested for transplant. Twenty-four hours later, the kidney was
removed and he was taken off life-support; no spontaneous breathing resumed. The
assailant who injured Potter was arrested and convicted of manslaughter by a jury, but his
charges were reduced to common assault, effectively absolving him of responsibility for
Potter’s death (Ramsey 1970, 71). The problem was that no one could agree on the
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moment when Potter died. The coroner thought that he was alive when the kidney was
removed, the evidence being his spontaneous heartbeat. The physicians argued that the
patient was “virtually dead” when he stopped breathing but “legally dead” when his heart
stopped. A neurologist contended that Potter was dead before the kidney was removed
due to the brain injury; a pathologist concurred and claimed that the removal of the
kidney played no causal role in the patient’s death (Halley and Harvey 1968). As a result,
it was not clear who was responsible for Potter’s death. Was it the assailant or the
physicians? While it may seem obvious to us today that responsibility lies

with

the assailant, the law of the day identified the presence of life with a beating heart. Under
this view, it is less obvious that Potter’s death was caused by the actions of the assailant
than by the actions of the doctors. Indeed, a legal commenter at the time suggested that
the termination of life-support was the “immediate cause” of death, going on to
generalize that “if S causes P’s death, a strong argument can be put up for saying that D,
the original imposer of the wound, did not and is not guilty of homicide” (Elliot 1964,
78).23 How this argument is supposed to go is not clear, but the point is that members of
the medical profession — people who were trying to save Potter’s life — became
implicated in his death in ways that made little legal sense.24
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Miller and Truog, who ardently believe physicians cause the death of their patients when they
remove life-support from them (Miller and Truog 2012a, chap. 1), are, in a sense, modern-day witnesses for
the defense in the trial of Potter’s assailant.
24
Potter’s case was not unique. In May of 1968, Denton Cooley came under scrutiny after procuring a
heart from a donor who also suffered severe brain trauma from a brawl. The Harris County medical
examiner worried that his autopsy investigation would be compromised if he were tasked with determining
the cause of death in someone who no longer had a heart. While he eventually ruled that the cause of death
was a result of the massive brain injury, the legal definition of death was thought to be in conflict with the
changing medical definition, and it provided the legal space for the defense to assert that it was Cooley, and
not the brawlers who were responsible for the donor’s death (J. C. Baker 1968, 88; Newsweek 1968, 68).
While he eventually ruled that the cause of the patient’s death was the massive brain injury, the legal
definition of death was thought to be in conflict with the changing medical definition, providing the legal
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The Don’t Kill version of the DDR, then, was put in place because homicide law
made physicians liable for the deaths of patients still alive at the time of transplant (Baker
1968, 98; Berman 1968, 751; Kutner 1969, 787; Woodside 1970, 96). Recognizing this, a
legal scholar at the Ciba symposium counseled the following:
In the present state of the law perhaps the only thing that one can be dogmatic
about is that if life still continues in the conventional sense — e.g. if there is still a
heart beat — then certainly any authorization [for transplant] from relatives is
meaningless. The living person, however unconscious and unable to express his
own opinions, has to be treated as a living person, and any authority from a
relative would be meaningless. The problem therefore becomes one of defining
the time of death for purposes of these removals. In the present state of the law I
could only advise a client that he would incur the danger of a possible charge of
homicide if by removal of an organ he causes death, if life still continues in the
conventional sense (Discussant David Louisell Wolstenholme and O’Connor
1966, 98).
Over time, the legal community came to accept brain death as death. It may very well be
that defining death in terms of neurological criteria was merely a pragmatic solution to
the legal problems faced by the transplant community. Enthusiasm for this solution was
evident at both the Ciba meeting, and the Cape Town Symposium (July 13-16, 1968)
where protocols for heart transplants were discussed. Yet it is implausible that the DDR

space for the defense to assert that it was Cooley, and not the brawlers, who were responsible for the
patient’s death. The conflict between medical examiners and transplanters came to a fever pitch when
Stanford University’s Norman Shumway retrieved a heart from the body of a homicide victim without the
examiner’s authorization. In this case, the defense attorneys succeeded in arguing that it was Shumway who
killed the victim, rather than the victim’s assailant (Jentzen 2009, 121). Similarly, in 1987, the assailant
who shot Pamela James in the head had his murder charges dropped, since his defense attorney discovered
in the coroner’s report that the time of James’ death coincided with the time when the transplant team
removed her heart. To bolster his case, the defense enlisted the aid of a neuropathologist who determined
James’ brain injury was of a “lower-grade” and did not preclude a chance at recovery. Since James was
denied the chance of recovering, his client was not responsible for her death (Marrison 1988; Munson
2002). In none of these cases was it ever suggested that homicide law should be changed to accommodate
lethal surgery, since homicide law was relatively clear, while the definition of death was not. For better or
worse, two concepts of death were emerging, which had far reaching implications for medical liability and
organ transplantation: medical death based on neurological or circulatory criteria, and legal death based
only on circulatory criteria. Doctors and lawyers struggled to articulate a unified definition of death that
would adequately represent the physical facts while serving the purposes of medicine and law, (the best
example comes from Capron and Kass 1972).
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was part of this solution; if anything, the rule was part of the problem that needed
solving, namely, how surgeons could avoid becoming implicated in the donor’s death.
It is important to acknowledge that there were determined individuals whose only
concern for the donor was to avoid transgressing the law or being charged with
wrongdoing. In his memoirs, Murray recalls that those who attended the International
Conference on Human Kidney Transplants in 1963 were “mostly young, aggressive, and
ambitious doctors” that eagerly wanted to move forward “unfettered whatever the cost”
(2001, 118). He even remembers certain doctors saying, “I’m not going to wait for the
medical examiner to declare the patient dead; I’m just going to take the organs.” Taking
on the role of “a mother hen,” Murray urged a “cautious optimism” that would result in
“slow and steady progress” — the “entrepreneurial zeal for rapid progress” of the young
attendants had to be reined in so that their experimental practices would not fall into
disrepute. Perhaps, then, the early transplanters were just being ‘prudential but not moral’
with the ethics of their discipline.
Worries about breaking the law do not fully explain the early transplanter’s
commitment to the DDR, however. There still remains the fact that no one directly
lobbied for a change in homicide law or at least an exception to it, something that should
have been a live option if medical pragmatism ruled the day. Norman Fost is correct
when he says, “If immunity was what was sought, or assurance that there would be no
liability for discontinuing life support or removing organs from a brain-dead patient,
there were and are ways of achieving immunity from liability” (Fost 1983, 722–23).
Statutes could have been rewritten to avoid violating the law, or new statutes could have
been created to grant immunity to physicians who operated on brain-dead patients. What
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explains the community’s reluctance to lobby for these changes is that many transplanters
were concerned with upholding the time-honored norm against medical killing, which, as
they saw it, flowed from a general respect for the value of human life even in its
diminished state. How many held to this view is unknown, but a sizable portion if not the
majority recognized that homicide law as well as the recent formulation of the
Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki was based on something more
fundamental, namely, the intrinsic worth of the human being. This concern over the
worth of human life is the third and final reason that a change in the definition of death
was preferred over a change in the law.
1.3.3 The intrinsic worth of the human being
The contribution of the Swedish urologist G.B. Giertz at the 1966 Ciba meeting is
of particular interest, since he recognizes the conflict between the traditional
inviolability-of-human-life doctrine and the expansion of legal killing in the medical
context (Giertz 1966). Commenting on the situation in Sweden after the legalization of
abortion in 1963, Giertz saw his country approaching a turning point where the
hegemony of Christian belief was yielding to a new uncertainty about the ultimate
foundations of morality. Despite the changing times, he observed that, “there is one
norm, however, to which everyone seems to adhere, namely, the worth of the human
being.” “The inviolateness of human life,” according to Giertz, “is based on the belief
that every human life, even the most wretched, has a meaning” (Ibid., 140). This belief
maintains its grip, not because it is rational to hold in a secular context (indeed, he thinks
it is not), but because we fear that without it, “respect for the value of the human being
and hence democracy is in danger” (Ibid.). The acceptance of abortion, which in his view,
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terminates a human life at an early stage and deprives someone of the chance to live a
long, beneficial life, lends credence to the morality of euthanasia, which presumably
terminates a human life at a late stage and only deprives someone of a short life filled
with misery. In either case, Giertz says we are forced to face the questions of “whether
we can establish the moment when life ceases to have any human value” and whether we
can draw a boundary that permits us to “disregard the obligation to protect life” (Ibid.).
After sensitively considering all of these points even under the auspices of voluntary
informed consent, Geirtz concludes,
It cannot be considered consistent with good medical ethics to use a moribund
person as a donor, for he has no possibility of giving permission or exercising his
freedom of choice. Moreover the procedure is in conflict with the widely accepted
rule of medical etiquette that personal integrity must be respected. A person dying
is still a person living, and he keeps his elementary human rights up the moment
when life becomes extinct (Ibid., 147).25
The chief purveyor of neurological criteria for death agreed. Alexandre responded,
Dr. Giertz spoke of taking organs from a dying person. I would like to make it
clear that, in my opinion, there has never been and there will never will be any
question of taking organs from a dying person who has “no reasonable chance of
getting better or resuming consciousness”. The question is taking organs from a
dead person, and the point is that I do not accept the cessation of heart beats as the
indication of death. We are as much concerned with the preservation of life in a
25

To be sure, when pressed about whether one could consent by an advanced directive to donate one’s
organs if one was in a state of irreversible unconsciousness, Giertz replied, “I think it would be better if we
were able to take organs from living persons while they are unconscious, but with their previous
permission” (Wolstenholme and O’Connor 1966). Later, however, he qualified his claim saying that he was
thinking of the kidneys only, not organs like the heart. These remarks were in reference to a Stockholm
case where a brain-damaged patient had a single kidney removed and then was taken off a respirator
twenty-four hourss later. As stated, his remarks are ambiguous, since they occur in a context about the
validity of Alexandre’s tests for brain death and whether brain-death was equivalent with death or not.
There is no evidence that suggests that Giertz had “higher-brain death” in mind, as if irreparable damage to
one’s cerebrum was sufficient for death. In fact, Giertz is aware of such an idea and deems it to be an
unacceptable gerrymandering of death; he says such a view would leave the “biological and medical frame
of reference ” (Giertz 1966, 148). Thus, it appears that he endorsed something like Morrisey’s previously
mentioned protocol over Alexandre’s brain-death-based protocol, because he did not agree with Alexandre
that the brain-damaged patient was nothing more than “a heart-lung preparation” — a description that
originates from the dissection laboratory rather than the hospital bedside (Jeffrey Paul Bishop 2011, 148–
49).
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dying person as with the preservation of life in a foetus […] (Wolstenholme and
O’Connor 1966, 154)
Thus, it seems that besides a concern for abiding by laws against homicide, there was a
strong commitment to respecting the value and integrity of human life, a commitment
that was probably a vestige of the Judeo-Christian value system that still haunts our postChristian culture today.26
This quasi-religiously-informed respect for life had another application, which is
all but forgotten in the DDR literature today: the total well-being of the patient could not
be reduced for a medical purpose which did not in some way benefit the patient. The
pedigree of this concern for the total well-being of the donor stretches back to the 1600s,
when surgeons were experimenting with tooth transplantation. In 1685, Charles Allen
complained that the use of human teeth from the living entailed ruining the health of the
one to restore the health of the other. As he wryly observed “it is only robbing of Peter to
pay Paul” (quoted in Hamilton 2012, 47). This same concern was raised by Joseph Fox in
1803, a time when tooth transplant was losing popularity. He wrote, “this operation
involved in it a defect of the moral principle, as one is injured and disfigured, in order to
contribute to the luxury and convenience of another” (quoted in Ibid., 48). Even as late as
1966 Italian transplanters were limited by a 1940 Civil Code that prohibited the removal
of any part of the body that would irrecoverably diminish the health and integrity of the
body (Cortesini 1966, 172). The recognition of this norm helps explain why both France
and Italy, at the time of the Ciba meeting, had banned the removal of a single kidney
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Evidence for the view that the law against homicide an artifact of the belief that life is sacred is
found in the legal history outlined in the U.S. Supreme Court case Wasthington v. Glucksberg (1997),
which ruled against the constitutionality of physician assisted-suicide.
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from a living patient. Not even operations like Joseph Murray’s transplant between
identical twins were legal in those countries, which is why Murray grasped for arguments
appealing to the avoidance of “psychic trauma” — which would result from losing a
loved one if one were prohibited from donating — to show that the donor’s total wellbeing was not necessarily reduced (Murray 1964, 55).
Given these ethical commitments, it is only natural that the early transplant
community became interested in a more precise and accurate definition of death. This
interest is especially evident at the more cautious Ciba meeting, which focused mostly on
renal transplants, and the more ambitious Cape Town Symposium, which focused
exclusively on heart transplants. Reading through the minutes of both meetings shows
that the skepticism of diagnosing death by neurological criteria greatly decreased in the
time between them. It is often claimed by “conservative” and “liberal” critics alike that
the adoption of the neurological criteria for death as outlined by the Harvard Ad Hoc
Committee (Beecher, Adams, and Barger 1968) was primarily motivated by a concern for
maximizing the supply of potential organ donors (Singer 1994, chap. 2 and 3; Giacomini
1997; Oderberg 2000, 87; Fost 2004, 249; Koch 2012, 59–60). This is not an
unreasonable criticism as Murray was on the Committee (posing a potential conflict of
interest) and the only citation the report makes is to a papal document, not any
neurological study (Giacomini 1997, 1475–77). While disputes over the motives and
methods of Henry Beecher and his colleagues are complex and ongoing (e.g. Bishop
2011, chap. 5; Belkin 2014), everyone acknowledged that, if valid, neurological criteria
afforded the perfect opportunity to remove healthy organs at the nearest point after the
time of death.
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While it may be true that by twenty-first century standards, a sizable portion of
the population is willing to permit vital organ procurement from those who are alive,
though permanently unconscious (Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner 2004), we should not
forget that these judgments are made with the knowledge that organ transplantation is a
medically successful enterprise. Of course, this luxury was not available in the 1950s and
60s when the first transplants were attempted. We have this knowledge because we came
to agree through the efforts of clinicians, lawyers, philosophers, theologians, and
legislators that “total brain failure” signifies death (President’s Council on Bioethics
2008).
It is unlikely that our progress in transplant science could have advanced as
quickly as it did without the ventilator-dependent brain-dead donor whose functioning
circulatory system kept transplantable organs bathed in oxygenated blood. Nonetheless,
the progress of transplantation has had the ironic effect of eroding support for the DDR.
1.4 Arguments against the DDR
Despite the fact that neurological criteria are widely considered suitable for
diagnosing death, two arguments against both versions of the DDR emerged from
scrutinizing the motivations that the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee gave for adopting
neurological criteria in the first place — specifically, the justification they offered for
removing life-support from hopelessly unconscious patients and the opportunity they
afforded to retrieve healthy organs from these patients. The first argument goes like this:
1.   If it is true that doctors should not cause the death of their patients (i.e. kill them)
for any reason, then withdrawing life-sustaining treatment upon patient request is
impermissible.
2.   But it is not impermissible.
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3.   Therefore, it is false that doctors should not cause the death of their patients for
any reason.
This latest iteration of James Rachels’ “bare difference” argument (Rachels 1975, 1986,
111–13) is defended by Franklin Miller, Robert Truog, and Daniel Brock (Brock 1992;
Miller, Truog, and Brock 2010; Miller and Truog 2012a; See also Collins 2010). While
Miller and Truog acknowledge that there is a structural difference between active
euthanasia and withdrawing life-support insofar as the latter can be grounded in the
common law right to bodily integrity and the former cannot (Miller and Truog 2012a,
29–30), they deny that any morally relevant difference in the doctor’s action depends on
the underlying pathology of the patient or on whether withdrawing life-support is an
“omission,” or on the death of the patient being a foreseen but unintended side-effect of
withdrawing life-support. Although this argument does not directly rebut the DDR, it
undercuts its ethical foundation, that is, the norm against killing patients for any reason.
If to withdraw life-support is to kill, and doing so is permissible on the grounds of poor
quality of life and patient autonomy, then the traditional rationale for the DDR fails
(Arnold and Youngner 1993, 270; Glannon 2013). Not surprisingly, this argument is
attractive to those who support voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
— it is likewise rejected by those who do not (Miller and Truog 2012a, chap. 2; W. J.
Smith 2013, 182–86).
The second brain-death-related argument against the DDR can be summarized
like this:
1.   If it is wrong to kill the donor, then it is impermissible to retrieve vital organs
from brain-dead donors.
2.   But it is permissible.
3.   Therefore, it is not wrong to kill the donor.
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The soundness of this argument, defended by Truog and many others, obviously depends
on the claim that brain-dead donors are not really dead (Truog 1997; Fost 2004; Collins
2010; Riley 2011; Sade 2011; Miller and Truog 2012a, chap. 3; Sade and Boan 2014).
Evidence adduced for this claim is that brain-dead bodies are warm to the touch, regulate
temperature, heal wounds, fight infection, expel waste, and in some cases even gestate a
fetus. Interestingly, however, the ablest defender of this claim and the scholar cited by
every brain death critic, D. Alan Shewmon (Shewmon 1997; Shewmon 1998, 2001), does
not agree that it is permissible to retrieve organs from brain-dead donors. To do so, in his
view, would be to harm the donor. Furthermore, Shewmon believes that the view of harm
assumed by the likes of Miller and Truog is inadequate because it is “Cartesian” in
character (Shewmon 2004, 292).27 The reason that so few follow Shewmon on this point
is that the shortage in the organ supply is deemed “deplorable” (Jox 2014, 39) and any
limitation on organ procurement would be “drastic” (Miller and Truog 2012a, 146),
‘needless’ (Nair-Collins and Miller 2016), signifying a “devotion to symbols ahead of the
real interest dying patients have in transplantation” (Arnold and Youngner 1993, 292).28
A similar argument against the DDR emerged from the dispute over the DCD
procedures that allow transplant surgery to begin two to five minutes after the time of
asystole (DeVita and Snyder 1993). In the case of heart transplants, there is an alleged

27
Robert Veatch likewise rejects the soundness of this argument, though he accepts premise (2), and
rejects premise (1), because in his view we can be considered dead if we irreversibly lose our “higher”
brain capacities for conscious experience (Veatch 1975, 1993). Even the famed euthanasia advocate James
Rachels agrees, since in his view it is appropriate to fix “the time of death at the point at which
consciousness is no longer possible” (Rachels 1986, 43). Still others defend the idea that brain-death is
equivalent with death, and that we should comply with the DDR (James L. Bernat 1998; President’s
Council on Bioethics 2008).
28
The idea that there might be a deeper concern about what those symbols signify and whether to have
an interest in transplantation is to have an interest in a lethal enterprise is not seriously considered.
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incompatibility between the act of harvesting a healthy heart from a “non-heart-beatingdonor” and the act of declaring death on the basis of circulatory criteria (Veatch 2008,
2010). Thus, the argument against the DDR can be summarized like so:
1.   If it is wrong to kill the donor, then it is impermissible to retrieve vital organs
from non-heart-beating-donors.
2.   But it is permissible.
3.   Therefore, it is not wrong to kill the donor.
The soundness of this argument has been defended by Don Marquis and others on the
grounds that irreversibility, which is thought to be a necessary condition for death, is not
satisfied (Don Marquis 2010, 2014; Miller and Truog 2012a, chap. 5; Arnold and
Youngner 1993, 267–68). Although some critics of the argument appeal to higher-brain
criteria that render premise (1) false (Veatch 2010), others reject premise (2) and demand
that the non-heart-beating protocol be revised if not rejected (Joffe et al. 2011; Shewmon
2010). Yet few of those who believe DCD donors are alive at the time of surgery believe
that “a procedure that saves many lives ought to be halted” (Marquis 2010).29
These arguments find their persuasiveness in the fact that no substantial change in
any of our widely-accepted practices is required to accommodate their conclusions. We
would only need to change the ethical justification for these practices and implement
better guidelines for informed consent. The motivation for doing this is to get around
longstanding ethical norms that would render transplant surgery (and withdrawing lifesupport!) impermissible. As Wilkinson and Savulescu say, “The cost of preserving those
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Other critics deny premise (1), Tomlinson (1993) and Robertson (1999) think the concept of
“irreversibility” can be satisfied if we include the donor’s do-not-resuscitate order within its scope, which
would make any attempt to revive the donor after asystole impermissible. In this view, the modality of
impermissibility is thought to be strong enough to satisfy the “irreversibility” condition even if there is a
patient in the next room who is in the same physical condition as the donor but wants to be and is able to be
revived. Still, others appeal to higher-brain criteria that render premise (1) false (Veatch 2010).
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norms will be the death or ongoing morbidity of many individuals,” that is, those in need
of a healthy organ, and “this may prompt us to consider whether those principles should
be revised or rejected ” (2012, 33). Similarly, Miller and Truog explain:
Honestly facing the situation of vital organ donation poses a critical ethical
choice. In order to honor the dead donor rule we can give up vital organ
procurement, with the drastic consequence that many patients whose lives could
be saved by organ transplantation will die. Alternatively, we can abandon the
dead donor rule and justify vital organ transplantation on different grounds
(2012b, 11).
Hence, critics of the DDR would have us tailor our ethical theories concerning the
wrongness of killing to fit our current practices, a pattern of thought that reverses the
cautious thinking behind the transplant ethics stemming from the 1960s in which practice
was tailored to fit with ethics.30
Answering the details of the critic’s arguments is another project, but for now I
only want to note that, even if we grant the (controversial) first premise in each argument,
they each still beg the question against the historic rationale for the DDR, that is, that we
ought not to intend the death of an innocent human being. To be sure, critics justify the
second premise in each argument with what I call the Disjunctive Theory of the
wrongness of killing. According to this theory, it is permissible to kill someone, S, if (1)
S is not (or is only minimally) harmed by death, and (2) S gives valid consent to be killed
by some humane means; it is wrong to kill S if one or the other of these conditions is

30

It is understandable why one might think this is false if one takes the development of the
neurological criterion of death to be a kind of legal and moral fiction to further the ends of maximizing the
organ supply and not a reliable guide to determining death. Nonetheless, those like Alexandre, who fiercely
advocated for the neurological criterion, seemed quite sincere in their belief that life ought to be protected
and that brain-dead bodies were dead bodies (for more details see Machado 2005). Perhaps they are wrong
about brain death, but that is another matter. The point is that practice was tailored to fit with ethics, not the
other way around.
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unsatisfied. Yet this theory is precisely what is under dispute and so it cannot be used as a
premise in an argument showing that the DDR ought to be rejected. A good example of
this question-begging tactic is deployed by Rodríguez-Arias, Smith, and Lazer in their
defense of lethal transplant surgery when they appeal to the moral relevance of informed
consent, which to their minds, is “the main moral condition justifying voluntary
euthanasia…” (Rodríguez-Arias, Smith, and Lazar 2011, 41). Yet voluntary euthanasia is
prohibited for the same reason that lethal transplant surgery is according to the rationale
for the DDR: the death of an innocent human being should never be intended (and death
need not be intended in the case of withdrawing life-support (see Sulmasy 1998;
Tollefsen 2008a for details).
Perhaps, though, the broader strategy of critics is to present a kind of reductio ad
absurdum argument against the DDR: if the rationale behind the DDR is true, then
transplant surgery is immoral; but it is not immoral, so the rationale is false and the
Disjunctive Theory is rendered plausible. But this argument form is not a reductio; rather,
it is a modus tollens. There is simply no formal contradiction involved unless one just
assumes that lethal transplant surgery or intending death by withdrawing life-support is
permissible, but that assumption is precisely under dispute. Even critics like Miller and
Truog acknowledge that accepting the implication that transplant surgery, as it is
currently practiced, ought to be halted is “rational” despite the “drastic” outcomes it has
(Miller and Truog 2012a, 146). No doubt this implication is hard to accept. But the
Disjunctive Theory has implications that are hard to accept too, since it allows for the
permissibility lethal medical experimentation. Are advocates of lethal transplant surgery
willing to go this far? If not, why not? If the answer is because the benefits from doing so
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are not likely to follow or are too remote, then we should admit that what motivates the
adoption of the Disjunctive Theory is some form of consequentialism that only adheres to
the practice of informed consent because of the good outcomes it produces, not because it
is the right thing to do.
A commitment to doing the right thing should compel those (like me) who accept
the longstanding rationale behind the DDR to call for a restraint on our zeal to perpetuate
life through organ transplant (e.g.(R. C. (Renée C. Fox 1993; R. C. Fox and Swazey
2013). That is, we should be willing to bite the bullet and curtail the practices of organ
transplantation if the case against our current practices succeeds.31 Yet risking this
unsavory outcome is not unique to this position, since the majority of donors consistently
indicate that they are willing to donate only if they are dead (DuBois and Anderson
2006).32 If the critics have their way, vital organ transplant will become a deeply divisive
practice much like abortion or euthanasia insofar as it will require physicians to kill in
order to achieve their beneficent goals. While Miller and Truog are optimistic that public
support for organ donation would not change for the worse if their policy
recommendations were implemented, they are willing to risk a net loss in the supply of
organs for the sake being honest with the public (Miller and Truog 2008, 44–45; Truog
and Miller 2014, 13). On this point, at least, they agree that medical practice ought to
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It should be noted that I think neither the case for equating withdrawing life-support with killing nor
the case against declaring death on the basis of total brain failure succeeds at all (see Jensen 2011; Lee
2016; Condic 2016; Moschella 2016 for some recent scholarship on these issues). I am currently agnostic
about our DCD protocols, however.
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To be sure, how death is defined is crucial in that there is some support for donating organs when
one criteria for “higher-brain” death is satisfied. Be that as it may, DuBois and Anderson report, “69%
agreed that they would only allow donation after the patient was taken off the ventilator and his or her heart
stopped beating, which would require use of a DCD protocol and reduce the number of procurable organs”
(DuBois and Anderson 2006, 69).
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follow sound moral principles even if they have negative effects on the organ supply, an
admirable quality that other critics should imitate.
1.5 Conclusion
As we have seen the DDR is not well-defined and its purpose is sometimes poorly
understood. I have argued that its essential moral core is the Don’t Kill rule, and not the
Death Requirement. Historically speaking, the DDR was (and still is) accepted out of an
effort to comply with the law against homicide and the traditional medical norm against
killing patients for any reason. Respect for the inviolability and dignity of innocent
human life even at its margins was (and should be) the underlying concern, though it is
unclear whether this is still the case. As organ transplantation has become a routine and
commonly prescribed treatment, discontent with the rule has arisen alongside a growing
dissatisfaction with our currently accepted death-criteria as well as an increasing
willingness to kill patients on the basis of their autonomous choice or their poor quality
of life (or both). What we see today is the opposite of what we saw in the 1960s: the
tendency to rethink our laws and ethical theories concerning the wrongness of killing to
befit our common medical practices. This should not be the case. Starzl’s advice is as
timely now as it was then: longstanding ethics recognizing the inviolateness of human
life, which require physicians to provide the best care possible to their patients no matter
the circumstances, should not be abandoned just because our “advancing technocracy”
has made great progress. What is needed is less debate about death criteria and (per
usual) more consistent, noncircular discussion around the question of what makes killing
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wrong.33 While this question is well worn and much discussed, a broader public
consensus is needed on its answer to move the debate forward.
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An admirably forthright discussion of the wrongness of killing as it relates to the DDR can be found
in the article by Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013); for a response to their ideas see Omelianchuk (2015)
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Chapter 2: What Dies in Mortal Harvesting?
Abstract: Chapter 2 begins the defense the first premise of my
master argument: transplant protocols that would have us secure
the donor’s death would have us kill someone for their organs.
Specifically, I am interested in the nature of the “someone” and the
“donor’s death.” There are three aims of this chapter. The first is to
answer the question “What are we?” with the answer, “a human
organism.” The second is to clarify what I mean by “death” and
contend for a definition that marks the end of the biological life of
a human organism, not a psychological entity distinct from a
human organism. The third is to defend the neurological criterion
as being sufficient for determining death.
We define death as the permanent cessation of functioning of the organism as a whole… The function of
the organism as a whole means the spontaneous and innate activities carried out by the integration of all or
most subsystems…
—Bernat, Culver, and Gert (1981)
I believe that the strongest justification for the brain death concept is not the integration rationale but the
cessation of the organism as a whole.
—James Bernat (2014)

2.0 Why talk about death?
Any defense of the dead-donor rue (DDR) must reckon with the nature of death at
some point. Since the concept of death is embedded in the rule’s name, some idea of it
must be referenced if the rule is to be applied. This holds true for either version of the
DDR, the Death Requirement (obviously) and the Don’t Kill rule. Some believe that what
dies if the DDR is violated is some entity distinct from the human organism lying in the
hospital bed. It is not always clear what this entity is supposed to be, but what matters is
that it alone has moral status (i.e. it is protected by a norm against being killed), and it
can disappear long before the organism disappears (which by itself, has no moral status).
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Determining the death of this entity usually involves some “higher” brain criterion
concerned with the capacities for consciousness or social interaction (or both). As a
result, anyone who is irreversibly unconscious can be classified as dead and the otherwise
healthy human organism that persists onward can be volunteered for transplant surgery.
Still others believe that the DDR is violated when vital organs like the heart are taken
from donors who satisfy neurological criteria. Advocates of this view contend that a
human being continues to function as an organism as a whole even after all brain function
is lost.
What does the controversy over the determination of death have to do with the
DDR? We might be tempted to think that the rationale behind the DDR and the rationale
behind the definition of death stand independently from one another. After all, one is the
province of ethics and law and the other the province of metaphysics and biology — or
more simplistically, one is concerned with “facts” and the other with “values.” This,
however, is too facile of a distinction. Death is not like photosynthesis, as if it were
merely a biological curiosity; rather, death has moral aspects that involve grieving rituals,
religious ceremonies, and legal changes in authority, property, and marital status. Death
is bound up with our notions of personhood and when the remaining body can rightly be
instrumentalized for medical and scientific purposes. The connection the DDR has with
the definition of death can be found in the formulation of a sound public policy that
aligns both our normative and biological concepts of death (Khushf 2010). As Khushf
explains “Such policy must integrate two countervailing tendencies, with one strand of
reflection pushing criteria to the far side [of death] and another strand pushing to near
side [of death]” (Ibid., 347). By this he means that our respect for an individual compels
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us to be confident that one has departed before we use the body for instrumental
purposes, and so we determine death on very clear and unambiguous evidence (e.g.
cardiopulmonary criteria, putrefaction); yet, our concern to optimize the instrumental use
of the body for medical and scientific purposes compels us to confidently determine the
time of death as soon as possible (hence the appeal to neurological criteria). Thus, the
DDR and whole-brain death criteria constitute “two pillars,” to use Khushf’s words
again, in a public policy meant to satisfy this twofold need for confidence in a way that is
both sensitive to the norms of respect and the facts of biology. Misalignment between our
normative and biological concepts of death results if we favor the normative concept at
the expense of the biological concept and we adopt a higher-brain criterion, which
expands the boundaries of instrumentality and contracts the boundaries of respect.
Likewise, if we emphasize the biological concept at the expense of the normative concept
and thereby reject any neurological criterion, the boundaries of instrumentality contract
and the boundaries of respect expand, which leave us with a difficult choice: we must
either curtail therapeutic practices like organ transplant, or we must make the case that
certain members of the living can be rightly instrumentalized for the sake of keeping our
therapeutic practices intact. While both of these options have ardent defenders, neither is
attractive to policy makers.
For these reasons, I believe it is prudent to address the controversies over the
definition and determination of death and offer a defense of the policy in which death is
diagnosed on the basis of neurological criteria. I will argue that we have good
metaphysical reasons to conceive of death as involving the end of a human organism as a
whole, rather than merely the loss of a special property of that whole, which is often
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called “personhood.” Along the way, I address the influential argument of D. Alan
Shewmon that neurological criteria are inadequate for determining death.
2.1 What is it that dies in mortal harvesting?
Let us assume that to act in accordance with a transplant protocol that would have
us secure the donor’s death is to kill someone for organs. On this there seems to be wide
agreement, though unfortunately it does not take us very far. We only need to revisit the
first heart transplant performed in the U.S. by Adrian Kantrowitz to see why. In that
historic event, Kantrowitz used an anencephalic donor whom he submerged in freezing
water to shock the heart into stopping so that death could be declared. What did he do?
Did he kill someone for the sake retrieving a healthy heart? According to Shewmon and
colleagues, the answer is ‘yes’ — infants with anencephaly are unquestionably living
human beings (Shewmon et al. 1989). Yet by the standards of Robert Veatch and John
Lizza, the answer is ‘no’ — since anencephalic babies appear to lack the capacity for
conscious experience, they cannot be counted as members of the moral community or
even the human community (Veatch 2010, 324; Veatch and Ross 2015, 91; Lizza 2006,
12, 2009b, 10). Hence, we must find out what it is that would die in a case of mortal
harvesting.
Obviously, one could appeal to the so-called “higher-brain” criterion for death in
order to reconcile Kantrowitz’s actions with the DDR. On this view, the DDR still
applies, but its scope is limited to those who retain the capacity for consciousness; those
who lack this capacity cannot killed by definition (Veatch 2003, 11). Traditionally,
however, the DDR has been tied to a definition of death that marks the end of the
biological life of a human organism, not the irreversible loss of human consciousness.
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The question to be settled, then, is whether the DDR should be tied to this particular view
of death. I contend that it should because the concepts of personhood assumed in higherbrain formulations are defective. Moreover, the DDR should be concerned with a view of
death that has to do with what ceases to be, not a view that is only concerned with
whether one is part of some socially constructed “moral community” or not. While it may
be that our definition of death is socially constructed, the phenomenon of death is not;
there is a real distinction between life and death that is independent of our concepts (or so
I shall assume).34 Therefore, in the coming pages, I will contend that this ontological
view is best construed in biological terms, that is, the loss of a human organism as a selfmoving whole. This is what happens in an act of mortal harvesting.
2.1.1 A really short history of our current definition of death
Why has the DDR been traditionally tied to a definition of death that marks the
end of a human organism? Part of the answer is found in a general strategy meant to
formulate a consensus position on death that could be codified in legal statutes, and be of
practical use in the determination of death.35 The most influential example of this strategy
is found in an article by Alexander Capron and Leon Kass in which they develop a
framework for establishing statutory definitions of death (1972). As they see it, there are
four levels of abstraction in play. The first is the basic concept of death itself, which at a
philosophical level is the highest sphere of abstraction. At this level, we might define
death as the permanent cessation of the integration of the organism as a whole, or when
personhood is irretrievably lost, or when the soul departs from the body. Common to all

34
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See Oderberg (2007, chap. 8; 2013) for my favored defense of this claim.
Here I follow the sound analysis of Khushf (Khushf 2010, 332–35).
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the choices is the concern over a metaphysical question: what fundamental change in
reality occurs when a human being dies? The second level concerns the physiological
criteria by which we determine the question of the first category: under what
physiological conditions does a human being die? To be sure, there is some overlap here.
It is at this level when medicine meets philosophy and the traditional cardiopulmonary
standard or the neurological standard (or both) become relevant as signs of death. The
President’s Commission report, Defining Death (President’s Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1981), was
instrumental in articulating the twofold statutory criteria stated in the Uniform
Determination of Death of Act:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in
accordance with accepted medical standards.
The third and fourth levels specify operational criteria and specific tests and procedures
to satisfy the conditions named in the second level. For example, an operational criterion
may merely be the cessation of circulation (level 3), and a test for “irreversibility” would
be to observe the lack of a pulse for some number of minutes (level 4).
While it was not made part of the statute, The President’s Commission favored a
basic concept of death involving the irreversible cessation of the integrated functioning of
the organism as a whole (level 1). The reason for this was to keep our ideas of death
within the empirical realm, subject to the “biological facts of universal applicability”
(Ibid., 8). Evidence for death could then be determined by satisfying either neurological
or cardiopulmonary criteria, both of which were taken to indicate an irreversible loss of
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integrated functioning. In this way, the President’s Commission sought to avoid the
pitfall of giving a disjunctive definition of death that creates the impression that there are
multiple definitions of death for multiple purposes (Ibid., 63). As things turned out, the
document achieved something close to a consensus among legal and medical
professionals. Those who favored a more psychological conception of human life were
placated by the, albeit conservative, standard of what became known as “whole-brain
death,” while those who favored the traditional cardiopulmonary criteria could retain
their long-standing and culturally significant death-declaring practices. The twofold
criteria quickly became adopted in statutory law throughout the Western world. This
explains why the DDR, which is parasitic on the definition of death, is tied to one that
marks the end of the biological life of a human organism.
2.1.2 The case for “higher” brain death
Despite this success, the statute has been questioned ever since whole-brain death
criteria were suggested. Critics rightly point out that Henry Beecher, the principal author
of the influential report drafted by Harvard Ad Hoc Committee on brain death (1968),
was of the view that death fundamentally involves the loss of the “individual’s
personality, his conscious life, his capacity for remembering, judging, reasoning, acting,
enjoying, and so on,” such that “when the brain no longer functions,” the patient, “no
longer exists as a person: he is dead” (Beecher and Dorr 1971, 121). Even more alarming
was his assertion that “At whatever level we choose to call death, it is an arbitrary
decision” (Ibid., 120 emphasis original). Hence, the common criticism that neurological
criteria were proposed, not because of the biological facts they indicated, but because of
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the social goals that were important to medicine at the time, specifically maximizing the
supply of organs for transplant.
For these reasons, Robert Veatch first proposed his revision to the definition of
death to be the loss of “that which is considered to be essentially significant to the nature
of man,” something he identifies with the capacity for conscious experience and social
interaction (Veatch 1975, 15; see also Engelhardt 1975). His chief complaint against the
whole-brain criterion is that we can never be confident that all of the brain’s functions
have ceased; what we really care about is whether the important functions have ceased,
and what makes for an important function is socially determined. Thus, he has
championed this so-called “higher brain” criterion on multiple occasions for the last four
decades (Veatch 1988; 1993; 2000; 2005; 2010; 2015). Nonetheless, Veatch does not
identify human persons with their cerebrums as he believes that it is possible for an
artificially constructed “brain” to support the life of an individual in the future (Veatch
1993, 19). What is essential is the preservation of what it takes to be a member of the
moral community: the capacities to think, feel, reason, and communicate; though
curiously, he denies that what matters is a loss of “personhood” — a concept he leaves to
the philosophers.
One such philosopher is John Lizza who provides a robust defense of the view
that human organisms “constitute” human persons, which entails that the person an
anencephalic infant might have constituted never comes to be, and those in a permanent
vegetative state (PVS) are literally dead (2006, 12). While he is ontologically committed
to a substantive view of persons, he agrees with Veatch that we cannot define death apart
from moral and social terms. Speculating about the status of a conscious, though
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artificially sustained severed human head, he writes, “Absent the identification of this
being as a locus of value in a network of conscious, social relations, there would be no
reason to consider the person to still be alive” (Lizza 2009c, 544). The core of his
complaint with the reigning view of death is that it is beholden to a “biological paradigm”
that assumes a reductive view of physicalism about human persons (Ibid., 545).
Both Veatch and Lizza are aware that judgments about what counts as death vary
widely, which is why they both advocate for a “conscience clause” regarding death: it
should legally be up to us to define what we think death is and if it should be determined
by higher-brain, whole-brain, or cardiopulmonary criteria (these pre-ordained options that
are apparently not up to us). Thus, two types of dualism are to be protected and enshrined
in the law: one that allows us to distinguish ourselves from the organism to which we are
related in a way that makes our organism older than us (person-body dualism), and one
that assumes that only beings capable of making this distinction merit the respect that
generates a norm against killing whatever it is they identify with (moral dualism).
Whatever we think of such a scheme, both Veatch and Lizza insist that there are two
ideas of death influencing our currently death-related practices.
2.1.3 The case against “higher” brain death
This “higher” brain proposal ought to be rejected for three reasons. First, it gets
things exactly backwards by moving from socially constructed moral properties to a
death-claim. By emphasizing the moral-existential concept of death at the expense of the
metaphysical-biological concept, the status of being a vital organ donor implausibly
becomes part of the definition of death. As Veatch recognizes, “Anyone who was
determined to be a legitimate candidate for potential organ procurement would be, by
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definition, dead” (2003, 11). Yet if we determine death this way, and on the basis of
losing what is “essentially significant” to human beings, then there is no reason why we
cannot classify those who have an ungoverned consciousness and cannot act or do things
as dead (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller 2013). Minimally conscious patients or even
those with severe Alzheimer’s disease could be classified as “dead,” which is hard to
believe. It is one thing to think our loved one is unrecognizable to us; it is quite another to
think our loved one is no longer there at all. The mistake lies within defining death in
terms of the loss of certain properties that make death bad; yet, the loss of these
properties should not be confused with the properties that bring death about. Moreover,
that which is taken to be “essentially significant” to human beings is ambiguous and a
matter of cultural and subjective individual opinion that varies widely beyond just the
loss of consciousness. This “slippery slope” worry has long been observed and never
adequately refuted (Bernat, Culver, and Gert 1981, 391); the looseness of this view
combined with a conscience clause makes death a wax nose. Consequences for
transplantation would include the inevitable conflict between surgeon and donor who
define death in different ways (Cochrane 2011, 149), not to mention contradictory death
declarations regarding donors in exactly similar physiological states. Only a definition of
death anchored in the facts of biology can keep it from being defined and applied in
arbitrary or prejudiced ways.
Second, higher-brain criteria are even more counterintuitive and harder to
empirically discern than our currently accepted “whole-brain” criteria. We already have
trouble thinking of brain-dead bodies as dead bodies (Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner
2004). What with their beating hearts, ability to heal wounds, regulate temperature, and

46

even in some cases, gestate a viable fetus, we find it difficult enough to believe that these
abilities do not signify life in brain-dead people (Shewmon 2001). Higher-brain criteria
would further remove such life-signs as spontaneous respiration, reaction to painful
stimuli, and having a sleep-wake cycle. Since the higher-brain criterion effectively hides
“the living” from the standard signs of biological life, it is all the more difficult to
develop a battery of reliable empirical tests that are capable of clearly indicating that an
individual — which is to be identified by a capacity for consciousness — is present. This
problem became acute when the American Medical Association temporarily endorsed
harvesting vital organs from anencephalic infants in May of 1995 (see Glasson et al. 1995
for the justification). Six months later, the Council reconsidered its position as it became
concerned with the lack of confidence in diagnosing a total absence of consciousness in
such neonates (Plows 1996). The same problem confronts diagnosing PVS patients. In
fact, there is some empirical evidence indicating a “preserved awareness” in those who
are deemed to be in a vegetative state by conventional diagnostic tests (Cruse et al. 2011;
Owen et al. 2006). Some who satisfy the tests for being in a PVS have even been found to
communicate with the aid of neuro-imaging technology (Fernández-Espejo and Owen
2013; Naci and Owen 2013; Monti et al. 2010). Under the Veatch-Lizza proposal such
patients could be declared dead and volunteered for organ donation provided consent was
obtained from an authorized proxy. The risk of such an outcome is plainly unacceptable
unless one further redefines death to include the minimally conscious, which leads to the
“wax nose” problem mentioned above (Peterson et al. 2014, 29–30). The painful irony
for this view is that the most reliable tests we have determining the irreversible loss of the
capacity for consciousness is the currently accepted neurological criteria.
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Lastly, identifying individuals with something that has a capacity for
consciousness leads to the bizarre, if not absurd, result that there are two individuals
residing in the same human head, each of which become aware of themselves in cases of
hemispheric commissurotomy (a position accepted by Puccetti 1973, 351 oddly enough).
Since each hemisphere is capable of conscious awareness, we should count two
individuals that die in normal death, or at least one that would be killed if we were to
successfully reattach the hemispheres (Liao 2006, 343). A better explanation of what
happens in the commissurotomy case is that an organism’s mental experience is
fragmented. Related to this point is the issue of what exactly it is that bears the capacity
for consciousness. There is good reason to believe it is the organism, not the person
(whatever that might be); if this were not so, then non-human animals likes dogs and cats
would not have the capacity for consciousness, which, if not absurd, is rather astonishing.
To avoid this result, we could accept the implication that dogs and cats are not really
organisms, but rather are “persons” (as suggested by Lizza 2009c, 539), though, this does
nothing to increase the plausibility of the view. If both the person and the organism bear
the capacity for consciousness, then there are two conscious subjects where we are, both
of which experience the same things. If this is the case, there is no way for us to tell
which one we might be (Olson 2001; 2009).
For these reasons, we should neither identify individuals with something that has
a capacity for consciousness, nor the loss of this capacity with death.
2.2 What dies is a human organism
What are we, then? It seems easy to say, but it is not. Perhaps we are wholly
material beings, or amalgams of body and soul, or an immaterial soul closely related to a
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body we somehow animate.36 Perhaps death is the end of us, or perhaps not; I will not be
so bold as to rule out the possibility that we survive our death in some way. What I will
contend for, however, is a broadly “biological approach” to human ontology, which takes
the normal condition of human life to be within the purview of the biological sciences.
From the biological point of view, those of us who are living fall under the category of
organisms, a common enough observation, though admittedly lacking specificity
concerning our metaphysical nature.37 Shewmon is not far off when he says that our
“philosophy of the organism” is currently underdeveloped and unable to furnish a bright
line between injured organisms and non-organisms along a finely-grained spectrum of
injuries (2010, 261). Nonetheless, the category of “organism” is sufficiently robust to
begin a philosophical investigation into our nature with a view towards answering
Shewmon’s claim that a human organism as a whole does not depend for its existence on
a functioning brain.
2.2.1 Addressing two objections to the organism view
I shall begin by addressing two objections to the idea that we are organisms to
better motivate what I take organisms to be. The first objection is against the idea that
organisms are essentially living beings, an idea which is thought to be incompatible with
our “commonsense” view of organisms. Jeff McMahan is right when he claims that it is a
matter of commonsense to view an organism undergoing a “catastrophic change” when it
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I leave aside the view that we might be four-dimensional space-time worms made up of temporal
parts, because I am not able to make sense of a temporal part. Either temporal parts have duration or they
don’t. If they do, then why do they need to be invoked at all? I could just as well be a single improper
temporal part on a standard eternalist view of time. If they don’t have duration (=0), then how could they
add up to anything temporally extended?
37
It may be the case that we cannot exist without being an organism, or it may be that the organism
cannot exist without us; I shall remain neutral on this question.
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dies a normal death, but he makes a more controversial claim when he asserts that one
changes from being a living organism to a dead one, i.e. we endure our death (2002, 30).
This, he believes, is more acceptable than four other alternatives: (1) a brand new entity
called “the corpse” comes into existence that exactly occupies the space previously
occupied by the organism; (2) there was a corpse-like hunk of matter that spatially
coincided with the organism before death whose persistent conditions apply after death
whereas the organism’s do not; (3) the property of being an organism is a phase of a
more fundamental hunk of matter which ends at death; and finally (4) there is no such
thing as “the corpse” that follows after death, just an unordered aggregate of particles.
Yet despite being superior to these four alternatives, McMahan thinks it is hard to believe
we could become dead organisms; he says, “unless one is a soul that bides awhile before
fluttering away to its celestial abode, one will no longer be present when one's organism
becomes a corpse” (Ibid.). Thus, we have no reason to believe we are organisms.
While McMahan does not think this is a decisive argument, it does motivate his
brain-transplant thought-experiment, which leads him to identify us with part of the brain
(which part?) that has a capacity for consciousness — a view I have already rejected.38
Do we survive death, then, as a corpse for a while and then go out of existence at some
stage of decomposition? I find this harder to believe than the view that eliminates corpses

38
On the brain transplant thought-experiment: the idea is that if surgeons removed your cerebrum and
placed it in the skull of your cerebrum-less identical twin, you would go with your cerebrum. I do not find
this to be compelling, because the psychological connectedness we have with our cerebrums is not
sufficient for our persistence over time. If it were, then there would be two of us if each of our cerebral
hemispheres were transplanted into different heads, which is absurd: one thing cannot be identical with two
different things. To his credit McMahan bites this bullet, and follows Parfit in the claim that the survival of
our qualitative psychological properties is what matters, not our identity (McMahan 2002, 43; Parfit 1984,
chap. 12). I leave it to the reader to decide whether this increases the plausibility of his proposal under the
assumption that commonsense is to guide our evaluation of these views.
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from our ontology, because it is very hard to believe that corpses are genuine wholes that
amount to something more than just the sum of their (decomposing) parts. Nor should
those who want to retain corpses on the list of real things in the world be bothered by the
idea of a corpse coming into existence after the death of an organism, because the
persistence conditions of corpses and organisms are incompatible. No organism can
survive decomposition, alright, but if organisms can survive death, why should they not
be able to survive decomposition? There seems to be no fundamental difference between
decomposition and death, insofar as death is the onset of decomposition marked by a loss
of entropy-resistant metabolism (Schrödinger 1992, chap. 6). Hence, the plausible view
that an organism survives only if its metabolic processes continue without interruption
such that new particles are configured and assimilated into its complex organic structure,
and old ones no longer useful to the structure are jettisoned as waste (Blatti 2014; Olson
1997, 16; 2007, 28).39 As Eric Olson explains:
A corpse, like a marble statue, maintains its form merely by virtue of the
intrinsic stability of its materials. The stability of a living thing, by contrast, is
dynamic. Matter constantly flows through it, in much the same way as it flows
through a fountain. A living thing maintains its form — in particular the fine
biochemical structure that makes it alive — only by engaging in constant activity:
repairing damage, removing waste, fighting infection, acquiring and digesting
food, and so on. All of this comes to an end when the organism dies. Matter
ceases to flow. The repairs stop. Decay sets in. It is this irreversible process that
we call death. If ending an organism’s life appears less dramatic than shutting off
a fountain, that is because some of an organism’s materials — its solid parts —
are more stable than those of a fountain. But even its solid parts ‘flow’(2004,
269).
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This is also thought to be a sufficient condition for organisms to exist, but I deny this for reasons

below.
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Since this dynamic activity is characteristic of organisms, there is no reason why the
career of an organism cannot incorporate some relevant set of particles into itself as being
caught up in the life of the organism, nor is there any reason to think it odd if members of
that set continue to persist when that life is finished.40 Once this entropy-resisting process
ceases there is no more organism. Hence, a dead organism is just an organism “in name
only” as Aristotle would say.
The second objection is against the idea that we can be classified as organisms by
an appeal to the phenomenon of dicephalic twinning (Campbell and McMahan 2010;
McMahan 2002, 35–39). Consider Brittany and Abigail Hensel, two women whose heads
extend from a single, four-limbed body that houses two hearts, two stomachs, two
gallbladders, four lungs, three kidneys, a single diaphragm, a liver, a large intestine, and a
set of reproductive organs. They share a common blood stream and immune system; yet
each twin has their own nervous system which senses and controls her own side of the
body. As such, they appear to be two human persons caught up in the life of a single
human organism; therefore, Brittany and Abigail (whom I once saw playing Frisbee41)
cannot be classified as organisms, and since they are not fundamentally different from us,
neither can we.
The argument from dicephalic twinning is usually marshalled against the view
that we are identical with organisms, which entails that we are essentially organisms.
That is not something I assume here, but never mind. The relevant question the argument
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Owen Flanagan estimates that a person who lives seventy years could have up to ten different
completely replaced sets of cells that compose one’s body, or in his words “ten different bodies in a
lifetime” (1991, 17). Whether these bodies spatially coincide with the organism will depend on our
metaphysics of composition or substance.
41
At Bethel University circa 2008-2009. It’s hard to describe how awe-inspiring this was.
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raises for me is how organisms are individuated, an ongoing issue in the philosophy of
biology (e.g. Bouchard and Huneman 2013). As I see it, there is no decisive reason to
believe there is exactly one organism where Brittany and Abigail are, and some good
reasons to believe there are two which share some of the same space with one another.
First, if there is exactly one human organism where the Hensel twins are, then it is not
clear how the organs within the twins are biologically related to them. Lee and George
state the problem nicely:
Each set of eyes, each set of ears, and so on would not belong biologically more
to one girl than the other. Each of these organs would have to be a part of a single
larger organism, subservient to the survival and function of this one organism. But
this plainly is not the case. It is indisputable that each one biologically has not
only her own brain, but also her own skull, eyes, ears, and many organs, while
sharing many other organs (2008, 47 emphasis original).
Campbell and McMahan are eager to agree that some of the organs, to use their words,
“serve only one of the two persons” (2010, 291). But in virtue of what, if not a
numerically distinct organism, do they do this? They claim that, “one sibling’s eyes
‘belong’ to her because they are the ones that she sees with. That is exactly what one
would expect when two persons are sustained by a single organism” (Ibid, 291 emphasis
original). The point appears to be that an organ belongs to a person by virtue of the fact
that the person uses and benefits from the function of the organ in question. But this
cannot be right. If it were, then the kidneys of the person kidnapped by the Society of
Music Lovers in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous thought experiment would ‘belong’ to
the sickly violinist, because, after all, they are the ones with which he filters toxins from
his blood (Thomson 1971, 48–49). This functional activity is shared between the violinist
and the kidnapped person no less than it is for the Hensel twins. But clearly the kidneys
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belong to the kidnapped person rather than the violinist. This is because the kidneys,
along with every other organ in the kidnapped person’s body are integrated into the life
of the organism by virtue of the organism’s coordinating activity for the sake of the
organism’s survival. In the case of the Hensel twins, there is overlapping integration
when it comes to their kidneys, but there is no overlap when it comes to their sense
organs. Hence, Brittany’s eyes do not belong to Abigail (and vice versa), because they
are not integrated into the coordinating activity of her organism.
Second, the fact that each twin develops not only her own head complete with a
full set of sensory organs, but also her own spine and nervous system that senses and
controls one side of the body — as well as her own heart, stomach, esophagus, and pair
of lungs — indicates the presence of two distinct, though not completely independent
entities. What else could those entities be besides numerically distinct human organisms?
This hypothesis fits well with the facts of human embryology since dicephalic twinning
occurs when the fission-process of monozygotic twinning fails to completely separate
two embryos from one another (Kaufman 2004). It is not some genetic or epigenetic
condition of a single embryonic organism. Why should we, then, count only one human
organism in this case and not two? Perhaps the reason is that we assume that two human
organisms cannot share some of the same physical space. We should not assume that,
however, unless we are willing to suppose that, for any case of conjoined twinning, two
brand new organisms would suddenly pop into existence if the twins were surgically
separated. Thus, it is more plausible to believe that two teleological centers of life conjoin
and develop together within a shared space wherein two distinct capacities for directing
and regulating life-processes can be identified — and that is all that is needed to say there
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are two organisms there (Liao 2006, 340–41).
Before making a more positive case for thinking of ourselves as organisms, let me
pause for a moment to say that I will not be surprised if advocates of the “higher” brain
view remain skeptical of these arguments. The ontology of human persons is notoriously
difficult and is of limited use in guiding our policies in the hospital room. But even if our
metaphysical disputes are judged to be indeterminate, then, on the basis of the
precautionary principle, the best epistemic position that we can be in when determining
the irreversible loss of whatever psychological property is thought to be essential to us is
one that satisfies the accepted neurological criteria. Given that the whole-brain criterion
is our most demanding neurological criterion, we can have a high degree of certainty that
no one would be “dissected alive” after it is satisfied. The same principle also applies to
our “donation after cardiac death” protocols; they should be scrutinized for the same
reason: no one should be declared dead by circulatory criteria if we do not know for sure
that someone has irreversibly lost their capacity for consciousness (Napier 2011). Thus,
even if the organism view turns out to be false, nothing significant should change insofar
as our death-declaring policies go.
2.2.2 In favor the organism view
What positive arguments are there for thinking of ourselves as organisms? Part of
the problem with answering this question concerns what we take organisms to be. As a
philosophic category, organisms should not be construed as being in the domain of one
side in the divide between materialists and non-materialists, though it can certainly seem
that way. Those who defend a biological approach to personal identity (a topic which
should not be confused with human ontology) often use the term “organism”

55

interchangeably with the word “animal” within a materialistic framework (e.g. Olson
1997; 2015). By contrast immaterialists like Descartes take an impersonal, and
implausible, “machine” view of organisms (which is aptly criticized by Nicholson 2013;
2014). A better understanding of organisms is one that places them in the category of
substance, which materialists like Peter van Inwagen (1990; 2007, 200), hylomorphists
like Patrick Toner (2011), and even dualists like Richard Swinburne (1997, 153) try to
account for in terms of their vastly different ontologies. As substances, organisms are
concrete particulars that endure through time, survive change, derive their unity from
their internal structure or essence, possess causal powers not reducible to their parts, and
are wholes that are ontologically prior to their parts such that the parts receive their
identity by virtue of their place in whole.42 Is there any argument for believing we are this
sort of thing?
Here is a question worth asking: do we bear the capacity for biological human
life? More specifically, is there a substance with which we can be identified that (1) bears
the capacity for developing and functioning in the form of a human organism from the
moment of conception or twining (or implantation?43) onward, and that (2) subsequently
loses this capacity in death? If there is, then we can live the lives of human organisms and
survive the loss of consciousness. Whether this substance can survive death in the form
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My view is at home in the Aristotelian tradition and is ably defended in contemporary form by
David Braine (Braine 1992, 256–67) and J.P. Moreland (Moreland and Rae 2000, chap. 2), both of whom
have had a deep influence on my thinking.
43
See Smith and Brogaard (2003) for a defense of the implantation view; see George and Tollefsen
(2008, chap. 2) for a defense of a conception/twinning view.
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of something else is a question I shall leave aside.44 A sound answer to that question will
depend on whether we have the capacity to survive death, which is independent of the
question I ask here: do we have the capacity to live a biological human life? If not, then
either our biological human life derives from something that does, or we are not the sort
of the thing to which biological life applies.
Suppose we are not the sort of thing to which biological life applies. Then our
fundamental nature is entirely outside the purview of biology. We share nothing in
common with the natural history of living things on our planet and we quite literally do
not need food, water, or air to survive. That we depend on organisms to get around and
do the stuff we do is just a funny contingent fact about our universe. But we really do not
need these mangy creatures to get by any more than we need a car to get from Mobile to
Milwaukee. Medical tests for death, then, relate to organisms insofar as we depend on
them for our functioning. These tests will likely zero in on our organism’s higher-brain
functions, the functions upon which we happen to depend for being recognizable in this
world. Despite the strangeness of this view and the fact that it inherits the epistemic
problems of the higher-brain standard for death, it is very hard to understand what we
could be on this view. All we know is that we can do stuff, though we are not strictly
speaking biologically alive. Are we a kind of computer program that can be “uploaded”
and “downloaded” if need be (e.g. Dennett 1978)? Then we are just bits of information, a
kind of universal that is timelessly eternal and bereft of causal powers, which is contrary
to our assumption that we can act and do things. If we are some sort of immaterial soul,
44

I assume that being able to classify ourselves as organisms does not depend on our being identical
with them. For a view that classifies us as organisms, but identifies us with “embodied souls” see Gilbert
Meilaender (1993).
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then we need some reason to believe that, in spite of having the relevant capacities to
interact with the material world so as to act and do things, we do not have the relevant
capacities to interact with the material world so as to live a biological human life. There
is simply no principled reason why, on any plausible view of substance dualism, this
should be the case.
What about the idea that our biological human life derives from something else
that bears the capacity for it? This is a more interesting suggestion, because it makes use
of the category of derivative properties. 45 For instance, a race horse crosses the finish line
in a secondary, derivative sense because its nose crossed the line in a primary, nonderivative sense. In this case, the parthood relation allows us to make an appropriate
derivation of the relevant property (Swinburne 1997, 145). Likewise, if we are part of a
brain, we are biologically alive in a derivative sense, because the organism of which we
are a part is alive in the non-derivative sense (McMahan 2002, 88–94). The same goes for
“persons” who are materially constituted by an organism (Baker 2000, 99). In each case,
there is an appropriate relation between us and our organism, which allows us to attribute
the properties of the organism to ourselves by way of some rule of derivation.46 We get
infected if our organism gets infected, we get punched if our organism gets punched, and
so on. Derivative properties abound, and sometimes they go the other way: that a human
organism thinks is derived from the fact that we think. In this way, I can consistently
think of myself as bearing the capacity for biological human life in the derivative sense.
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Here I am influenced by Andrew M. Bailey (2016). What follows is indebted to him.
These are rarely, if ever, formally articulated. Speaking in defense of her “constitution view” Baker
gives a nice example: “Roughly, (omitting reference to times), x has F nonderivatively iff x’s having F does
not depend on x’s constitution relations, and x has F derivatively iff x’s having F depends on x’s having
constitution relations with something that has F nonderivatively” (Baker 2008, 43).
46
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If this is the case, then I am a human organism in the derivative sense. But consider this
argument (adapted from Bailey 2016, 207–8):
1.   I am a human organism in either the derivative sense, or the non-derivative sense.
2.   If I am a human organism in the derivative sense, then there are two human
organisms in my immediate vicinity.
3.   But there is only one human organism in my immediate vicinity.
4.   Therefore, I am not a human organism in the derivative sense (2, 3)
5.   Therefore, I am a human organism in the non-derivative sense (1, 4).
To deny premise [1] is to opt for the claim we are not the sort of thing to which biological
life applies, which is a claim we have already examined and found wanting. Premise [2]
rests on the plausible assumption that something exists if something has a property; since
two things end up having the property of being a human organism — me and the
organism — there are two human organisms in the neighborhood. Premise [3] is hard to
deny; all we have to do is inspect the immediate vicinity where I am and start counting:
“one” is as far as we are going to get.47
A final objection to this argument would be to deny the initial claim that bearing
the capacity for living a biological human life is sufficient for being a human organism.
One could argue that a pair of human gametes or any of our somatic cells have this
capacity, but neither of these is a human organism like us (see Singer and Dawson 1988;
Charo 2001). Yet it is hard to understand how a pair of gametes, which only composes a
mereological sum and not a genuinely unified whole, bears such a capacity. Since neither
of them individually bears the capacity for living a biological human life, no new human
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It is worth mentioning that if we count two, we end up violating McMahan’s plausible assumption
that “there can be no more than one of a particular kind at a given place at a given time” (2002, 90).
Perhaps this not a problem for everyone, but it is for McMahan, a point I owe to David Hershenov (2005,
33).
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organism will ever come to be if they never meet. Same goes for our somatic cells: leave
them to do what they normally do, and no human organism will result. The fact that these
things can stand in a causal relationship to a new human organism is not sufficient for
them to bear the capacity for living a biological human life. To think otherwise is to
stumble over an ambiguity that fails to capture the sort of capacity I have in mind: a
capacity that is exercisable by the entity that has it. This sort of capacity is a power
within the entity to produce change within itself, and since this change presupposes the
sameness of the entity that produces it, this capacity is “identity-preserving.” Neither the
pair of gametes, nor any of our somatic cells have this sort of capacity. Rather, they only
have a “compositional capacity” which requires that they be acted upon by an external
agent to effect the desired change — a change they do not survive — so that something
new can come to be (See DiSilvestro 2010, 108:18–19 for a nice overview of these
distinctions.). Since this new entity, which comes to be in the form of a human embryo,
bears an active, identity-preserving capacity to live a biological human life, it is as good a
candidate as any to be a human organism.
Therefore, a human organism dies when the DDR is violated, because when that
occurs, someone loses their capacity to live a biological human life.
2.3 On determining death in human organisms
Unfortunately, determining the death of a human organism faces its own set of
deep and hard metaphysical and epistemological questions. Specifically, what is needed
is some mark by which we can empirically determine that the life of a human organism is
finished. Given that an organism survives only if an organism’s entropy-resisting
metabolic processes continue without interruption, the mark should be related to when
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these cease. Thus, we should agree with Miller and Truog when they assert that “death
occurs at the moment when the entropy-increasing forces have irreversibly exceeded
those that are resisting this process” (2012, 70). Normally, what follows this event is the
beginning of the process of decay. Death, then, is thought to be marked by the
“disintegration” of the organism as a whole, and, conversely, life is thought to be marked
by the “integration” of the organism as a whole (President’s Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1981, 33, 77).
Hence, the intuitive plausibility of the “integrative unity” model of life and death. Organ
transplantation well illustrates this enduring idea that goes back to Aristotle: just as a
severed hand is a hand in name only, so too is a severed heart, lung, liver, or kidney
unless it is promptly reattached. If it is reattached to someone genetically distinct from
the donor, immunosuppression treatment is usually needed so that the host will not reject
the foreign organ and fail to integrate it into its life-sustaining work.
2.3.1 Shewmon’s challenge to the “integrative unity” model
Just what the source of this “integrative unity” is, however, is a contentious
question. As far as I can tell, the debate has been framed by the assumption that only
organisms are able to exemplify integrative unity. For better or worse, then, the dispute
over whether whole-brain death is equivalent with death has traditionally been a dispute
over whether the brain is necessary for the integration of the organism as a whole. An
influential interpretation of death canonized in a paper by Bernat, Culver, and Gert
(1981) is that the brain is the principal source of integration — the “integrator” of the
human organism, so to speak. Thus, in their description of various deaths, whether by
hanging, chronic disease, or massive head injury, death always coincides with a total loss
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of brain function, which brings about disintegration (Ibid., 392–93). This idea was
challenged in a deep and compelling way in a series of papers by D. Alan Shewmon
(1997; 1998; 2001), who persuasively argued that the source of this integration is not
localizable in any one organ. While he agrees that the brain substantially contributes to
the integration of the organism as a whole, it does not confer such integration on the
organism as a whole. If this is right, then it seems that the brain-dead body can survive as
an organism so long as its integrative unity remains intact.
It is worth examining the operational definition Shewmon gives of “integrative
unity” and his criteria for determining whether it is present. Within the orthodox
biological paradigm, he thinks integrative unity should be:
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  

Applicable to all living organisms.
Reflective of the thermodynamic characteristic of life being anti-entropic.
Absent in corpses.
Internally holistic, which distinguishes organisms as wholes, rather than a mere
collection of organs, tissues, and cells which require some external force to
artificially unify them.
5.   An all-or-nothing, non-degreed property that is either present or absent.
6.   Compatible with profound disability or moribund status.
7.   Compatible with being irreversibly unconscious.
Hence, Shewmon says a putative organism possesses “integrative unity” when it
“possesses at least one emergent, holistic-level property” (2001, 461 emphasis orginal).
A paradigm example is consciousness. In Shewmon’s view, an isolated, yet conscious
brain is an organism as a whole, though, of course not a whole organism (Ibid., 461).48
Other examples of emergent holistic-level properties include homeostasis, elimination of
waste, energy balance, regulation of temperature, wound healing, infection fighting, fetal
48

This position was subsequently denied by Shewmon eight years later (2009a), but then reaffirmed
three years after this denial (2012). I believe his uncertainty is explained by the permissiveness of his
criteria, something I contend for below.
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gestation, sexual maturation through puberty, proportional growth, and electrolyte
balance — all things he has found in subjects diagnosed with whole-brain death (Ibid.,
467–68). He even asserts that respiration and nutrition are characteristic of an integrative
unity that does not depend upon the brain. By “respiration” he means the biochemical
process by which oxygen and carbon dioxide transfer “across the alveolar lining of the
lungs” or “the electron transport chain in the mitochondria of every cell in the body”
(Ibid., 464). By “nutrition” he means “the breakdown of food into elemental forms that
are either biochemically burned for energy or assimilated into the body's structure” (Ibid.,
465). Since the brain has nothing do with these integrative functions, the absence of
brain-function cannot signify an absence of integrative functioning in a human organism.
2.3.2 Two living things, not one: A response to Shewmon
What should we make of Shewmon’s penetrating and searching criticisms of
whole-brain death? I suggest that the presence of integrative unity, as Shewmon defines
it, is not sufficient for determining whether the entity that exemplifies it after brain death
is identical with the entity before brain death. Indeed, I argue that something other than
an organism can exemplify Shewmon’s idea of integrative unity. At first glance, this is a
counter-intuitive claim. Nonetheless, I think it is plausible to construe whole-brain-death
as a sign of discontinuity between an organism as a whole, and a living part of an
organism, albeit one that is rather large. To maintain continuity, Shewmon’s operational
criterion for integrative unity needs to be permissive enough to ensure that the brain-dead
body remains a human organism as whole. Unfortunately, this permissiveness yields
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individuals that violate the transitivity of identity.49 We have already seen that he allows
for an isolated, yet conscious brain to be an organism as a whole; but what about the body
from which it is removed? Suppose, we maintain the brainless body and it exhibits all the
life-signs that Shewmon lists as being present in brain-dead bodies. By Shewmon’s
criterion, then, the brainless body is a human organism (a position he has defended in D.
A. Shewmon 2007, 302–16). But they both cannot be the same organism simply because
one thing cannot be numerically identical with two things, since they differ in their
properties (one is in a vat, the other is not).50 Either we go with the brain, the brainless
body, or neither and that is end of us.51 To his credit, Shewmon is aware of this
implication, but he rejects the validity of fission-style thought experiments, because in the
context of clinical diagnosis he says, “there is only one piece of living matter and only
one person at issue” (2010, 263). This response is simply question-begging. Whether one
and the same entity survives brain-death is precisely under dispute, so Shewmon cannot
use this claim as a premise in an argument for the conclusion that the brain-dead body in
the hospital bed is numerically identical with the organism before brain-death.52
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The following is influenced by Olson (2016) who responds to Shewmon’s findings.
I assume there is no trans-spatial relation between the isolated brain and the brainless body, because
such an occult relation is not only unacceptably ad hoc, it is also outside the purview of biology in general.
As Khushf says, “If an account of death implies that the previous organism is sustained in both parts, so I
could ‘turn off’ either part without causing the death of the original organism, then this only shows that
Shewmon did not get the correct biological concept” (2010, 353). Thus, I assume that spatial contiguity is
required by a sound theory of integrative unity.
51
Failure to understand this point besets Miller and Truog’s discussion of what they call “the
decapitation gambit” and the status of a decapitated chicken that runs around aimlessly for a few moments
(2012, 82; 2009b, 398). Supposing that it is alive, it does not follow that the headless chicken is identical
with the chicken before decapitation. Thus, they miss the point of the division scenarios put forward by
Lizza (2009a, 394) and Khushf (Khushf 2010, 352–53): the issue is not whether the brainless body is alive
or an organism of some sort, but whether the brainless entity is numerically the same as the one with the
brain.
52
Indeed, this premise belies his argument as he acknowledges that “there is only one ‘part’ (i.e., the
entire body)…”present before and after brain death (Shewmon 2007, 322 emphasis added). Proper parts
are numerically distinct from their wholes, of course.
50
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The permissiveness of Shewmon’s criterion also transforms individual organs
removed from the body and sustained by artificial means into individual organisms
(Khushf 2010, 353). Suppose we remove a kidney, yet keep it “alive” in some sterile
environment by perfusing it with oxygenated blood from someone with renal failure.
Then, by virtue of the fact that it respires oxygen and carbon dioxide, exchanges
nutrients, and creates urine, it displays “integrative functioning” and is therefore an
organism. But it isn’t — it’s just a detached organ that is neither continuous with the
organism it came from, nor the one it is hooked up to.53 Why should we think that a
brainless or headless body is any different?
Shewmon recognizes this sort of objection and responds with a what I take to be
his best argument against it:
1.   A functionally brain-disconnected patient on a ventilator (e.g. one suffering from
a high spinal cord transection) is a severely disabled organism as a whole, not just
a conscious head connected to an unintegrated collection of organs and tissues
enclosed in a bag of skin.
2.   The somatic effects of brain nonfunction are necessarily identical to those of brain
disconnection.
3.   Therefore, a patient without brain function is also a severely disabled organism as
a whole (merely an unconscious one) (2010, 259).
As stated, the argument is formally invalid (Moschella 2016b, 281). Clearing away the
otiose language it just says [1] The brain-disconnected patient is an organism; [2] the
somatic effects below the point of disconnection are exactly similar with those found in a
brain-dead patient; [3] therefore, the brain-dead patient is an organism. The premises can
be true, and the conclusion false. My preferred way to make it valid goes like so:
1.   The brain-disconnected patient is an organism.
53

In a later article, Shewmon came to agree with this, because the kidney only has the “structural” and
“vital-operational” wholeness of an organ, not an organism (2012, 433). We should ask however, why this
same analysis cannot be applied to the brain-dead body?
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2.   There is no fundamental difference between the brain-disconnected patient and
the brain-dead patient, because both are exactly similar in terms of their somatic
functioning.
3.   Therefore, the brain-dead patient is an organism.
The problem with this argument is that the “somatic effects” mentioned in premise [2] are
assumed to be sufficient for wholeness, and we have just seen that they are not. Nor are
they even exactly similar with one another. As Melissa Moschella explains, there is in the
brain-disconnected body a “continued functioning of the ninth and tenth cranial nerves as
well as continued brain-mediated hormone regulation through the blood stream” that is
not found in the in the brain-dead body (2016a, n. 35).54 Moreover, there is something
deeper assumed in the first premise that makes it the case that the individual with the
spinal cord transection is a unified whole. What could that be? It seems to me that what
remains is a capacity for self-directedness or self-movement towards the distinctively
human end of rational thought and action. It is this capacity that makes us “rational
animals” — to use Aristotle’s words again — and which makes us a member of the
species homo sapiens. Evidence for the presence of this capacity in transected individuals
is found in the fact that they are conscious, complete with a drive to breath as signaled by
the work of the brain stem, and the fact that their circulatory system pumps one quarter of
its blood every minute to the brain: “Thought,” as Henry Marsh remarks, “is an energyintensive process” (2014, 41). This is not the case with headless bodies or the infamous
“TK” — a subject examined by Shewmon whose body persisted for twenty years after
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To be fair, Shewmon had not overlooked these functions, but he did not consider them important for
his purposes, because he thinks they make no difference to the question as to whether the body below the
brain is a living entity marked by somatic integration (2012, 451). This, I think, is the wrong question. We
should want to know if it is the remaining part of a whole that no longer exist, or numerically identical with
a whole that survives brain-death.
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being diagnosed with whole-brain death at age four (Shewmon 1998). At age eighteen, an
MRI revealed no intracranial blood flow (something common in brain-dead bodies), and
the subsequent autopsy revealed a shrunken spherical structure in place of the brain that
had calcified over time (Repertinger et al. 2006).
Still TK’s body was living in some sense. This is hard to deny given the level of
integrative functioning present in his body; indeed, it just sounds wrong to speak of TK
as a “living cadaver,” or a “warm-bodied corpse,” or worst of all “a heart-lung
preparation.” That sort of language is inappropriate, if not absurd, and medical
professionals would do well to discard it. The assumption that there could not be a
category of biological life that makes sense of “living remains” or “humanoids” or
“biological remnants” is unwarranted.55 Gary Rosenkrantz is surely right to recognize this
third intermediate category when he says:
[M]ulti-cellular living organisms have other living things as proper parts, for
instance, lung cells, sperm cells, nerve cells, and the like. However, living things
of the latter sorts are insufficiently autonomous to qualify as full-fledged living
organisms. That is, they are generally unable to survive for long apart from multicellular organisms under naturally obtaining conditions. On the other hand, some
living entities of this sort can survive and reproduce apart from an organism
under artificial conditions, for instance, in a tissue culture. The distinction
between a living organism and such a living possible part (LPP) appears to be
real, unconventional, and based upon the natural evolutionary causal priority of a
living organism to a LPP (Rosenkrantz 2015, 307 emphasis orginal).
Thus, it is coherent to believe that there could be two “deaths” that occur in the hospital
bed: the death of an organism as a whole (the human being), and the death of the living
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Such an assumption is made by McMahan when he says, “Those who hold that brain death is death
are obliged to describe the examples cited above as cases in which corpses support fetal gestation, maintain
immune functions and adjust them to the presence of a fetus, metabolize nutrients, excrete wastes, retain
reproductive potential, and so on” (2009, 289 emphasis original).
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remains.56 This would just be the logical consequence of an argument showing that the
entity before brain death is not identical with the one that exists after brain death by
virtue of a loss of wholeness. The relevant question, then, is whether there is such an
argument.
2.3.3 The relevance of an organism’s “fundamental work”
With all the evidence to the contrary, I think there are some good reasons to think
of a brain-dead body, as being a human organism “in name only” but not a real human
organism. Thus, we need to think harder about what it means for a human organism to be
an organism as a whole. Shewmon and other critics are right to highlight the ambiguity
of this idea. What exactly does this mean? The standard view is that the “organism as a
whole” refers to something more than the sum of its parts by virtue of instantiating
certain “emergent” properties that are not reducible to any of its parts (Bernat 2014, 5).
This, I think, is too thin of an analysis. It is precisely this appeal to “emergence” that
generates the ontological permissiveness in Shewmon’s work and compels him to see the
brain-dead body as being an organism as a whole. The problem is this: being an
“emergent” property is one that is compatible with being supervenient on, or “over and
above,” some combination of subvenient parts that are metaphysically prior to the whole.
Yet we need not think of organisms this way. Assuming organisms are substances, the
whole is metaphysically prior to the parts, and the parts receive their “parthood” by virtue
of being unified in the appropriate way by the activity of the whole. What we have said
about the capacities of the individual with a transected spinal cord offers a clue as to what
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This effectively neutralizes the inconsistency Shewmon alleges against those who speak of braindead bodies as “dying” (D. A. Shewmon 2007, 297–98).
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I am on about. An organism as a whole is an enduring, self-directed and self-moving
entity in which its parts derive their identity and function from its internal structure, and it
develops by virtue of its own capacities and powers latent in itself according to an
information-rich design plan intrinsic to its kind towards a distinctive end or goal.
Death, then, is the end of the organism as a self-moving whole, meaning there is
no more entity that has this active internal structure by which its parts receive their
identity and function, no more development or activity toward a kind-distinctive end by
virtue of its own capacities and powers. Just as this sort of entity does not persist after
decapitation, neither does it persist after brain death. A mad neurosurgeon would not do
anything fundamentally different to you than a medieval executioner if he were to empty
the contents of your skull — it is not as if he is merely disabling you, albeit in a severe
way. Rather, he is like the utilitarian transplant surgeon who cuts you up and removes
your heart and lungs without replacing them or supplementing their function. We need
not presume any dubious brain-body dualism to know that this immanent, holistic, and
teleological power is lost in brain death, and that any residual somatic integrative unity
that this power once produced has to be artificially maintained by virtue of the transient
causation supplied by a ventilator, artificial nutrition and hydration, and a lot of intensive
care. By contrast, this immanent power is not lost in the ventilator-dependent patient with
a spinal cord transection, the PVS patient, or the anencephalic baby. Everything in their
bodies is continuously formed out of what Aristotle would call, “the source of its own
production” (Phys. II 1.25-30, 192b), and while they may be disabled in severe ways,
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they continue to be ordered towards their fundamental work as organisms: animal life
with a conscious experience characterized by rational action.57
This talk of an organism’s “fundamental work” comes from the President’s
Council on Bioethics lucidly written “White Paper,” which functions partly as a response
to Shewmon’s discontent with “the integrative unity” rationale for whole-brain death
(President’s Council on Bioethics 2008). As they surveyed the issues of the brain-death
debate, the members of the President’s Council found it prudent to substitute the
language of “whole-brain death” with the language of “total brain failure” so as to better
reference the clinical condition that underlies the neurological test for the death. In the
position the members outline for the sake of justifying the neurological criterion, they
reject the integrative unity rationale as being sufficient for the human organism’s
wholeness, and replaced it with a “fundamental work” rationale. The Council explains:
All organisms have a needy mode of being. Unlike inanimate objects which
continue to exist through inertia and without effort, every organism persists only
thanks to its own exertions. To preserve themselves, organisms must — and can
and do — engage in commerce with the surrounding world. Their constant need
for oxygenated air and nutrients is matched by their ability to satisfy that need, by
engaging in certain activities, reaching out into the surrounding environment to
secure the required sustenance. This is the definitive work of the organism as an
organism. It is what an organism “does” and what distinguishes every organism
from non-living. And it is what distinguishes a living organism from the dead
body that it becomes when it dies (Ibid., 60–61emphasis original).
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In a recent article, Miller and Nair-Collins object to idea that brain-dead bodies only “appear to be
alive” because the cause of their vital activity comes from a ventilator (Nair-Collins and Miller 2017).
What they fail to consider, however, is what exactly it is that is being kept alive by the medical technology,
an organism as a whole, or a very large part of an organism, something aptly noted by Moschella (2017) in
her reply to their argument. The absence of a robust philosophy of an organism besets their entire analysis,
which makes it unsurprising that they think that the “fundamental work” criterion invoked by the
President’s Council is “ad hoc” lacking an independent justification (Nair-Collins and Miller 2017, 751).
On the contrary, such a criterion can be independently justified on Aristotelian grounds.
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The President’s Council goes on to argue that the capacities for breathing and
consciousness signify the presence of three more basic capacities that are fundamental to
an organism’s vital work:
1.   The capacity to be open to the world and receptive to stimuli and signals from the
surrounding environment.
2.   The capacity to act upon the world so as to obtain selectively what it needs.
3.   The capacity to sense the neediness that compels the organism to act so as to
obtain what it needs (Ibid., 61).
All three of these capacities are present in a human organism if either a spontaneous,
appetitive-drive to breath is present or signs of consciousness are present. So, the PVS
patient is in the class of human organisms; the President’s Council explains:
When a PVS patient tracks light with his or her eyes, recoils in response to pain,
swallows liquid placed in the mouth, or goes to sleep and wakes up, such
behaviors — although they may not indicate self-consciousness — testify to the
organism’s essential, vital openness to its surrounding world. An organism that
behaves in such a way cannot be dead (Ibid., 61).
Likewise, anencephalic babies exhibit a drive to breath as they struggle against their fate;
the fact that they have a very bleak prognosis is no reason to diagnose them as dead
(Capron 1987, 6). We should also be mindful of the fact that anencephaly is often
confused with hydranencephaly, another condition in which both cerebral hemispheres
are absent, but the subject of which can survive for years. One clinician has observed that
such individuals are “not only awake and often alert, but show responsiveness to their
surroundings in the form of emotional or orienting reactions to environmental events”
(Merker 2007, 79).58 Thus, a human organism dies if both the capacity for consciousness
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Shewmon and colleagues rightly point out the difficulty of clearly diagnosing a true case of
anencephaly from one of hydranencephaly (Shewmon et al. 1989, 1776). Getting it wrong and commencing
with transplant surgery would be to ignorantly kill such children, and to do so for their organs.
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and the capacity for breathing are irreversibly lost (President’s Council 2008, 64–65).59
Since the condition of total brain failure is adequate for establishing the irreversible loss
of both of these capacities, it is adequate to indicate the death of a human organism.
Two objections to the Council’s position are worth considering. The first comes
from Miller and Nair-Collins, who believe that “The strategy of identifying some
privileged functions that ‘count’ (ie [sic], perform ‘vital work’) as distinct from those that
do not ‘count’ is arbitrary and ad hoc” (Nair-Collins and Miller 2017, 751). To be sure,
airflow through the bronchial tree is necessary for mature human life (not so in embryos),
but so is the maintenance of the blood-air barrier that allows for gas exchange.
“Necessary conditions are necessary conditions,” they write, “none are either privileged
or discountable” (Ibid.). But surely, this is false. Just because a cause is as necessary as
another does not mean that they cannot be distinguished in terms of their source and
priority, that is, in terms of whether one is external and transient or internal and
imminent. David Oderberg helps elucidate the concept of immanent causation:
This is a causation that originates with an agent and terminates in that agent for
the sake of its self-perfection. It is a kind of teleology, but metaphysically
distinctive in what it involves. Immanent causation is not just action for a
purpose, but for the agent’s own purpose, where “own purpose” means not merely
that the agent acts for a purpose it possesses, but that it acts for a purpose it
possesses such that the fulfillment of the purpose contributes to the agent’s selfperfection. Hence, in immanent causation, the agent is both the cause and the
effect of the action, and the cause itself is directed at the effect as a perfective of
the agent (2013, 213 emphasis original).
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Shewmon errs, therefore, when he claims the Council’s position is one that asserts that the lack of
breathing and consciousness is necessary and sufficient for death (Shewmon 2009b, 10); they are not
necessary, because a brainless and breathless embryo can die by virtue of losing its capacity for cell
division, which signifies the fundamental work of the embryo (Landry and Zucker 2004). What cannot be
missed is that there are operations of human organisms relative to their state of development that signify the
basic capacities that are fundamental to the organism’s vital work.
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If we could not privilege imminent causes within a thing above transient ones external to
it, then we could not even say that a car battery, which cannot hold a charge and is in
need of a jump, is “dead” in contrast to one that can turn the starter when prompted by
the ignition key.60 While the faulty battery might be able to circulate current so the driver
can make a pit stop at the auto parts store, he dare not turn the engine off before he gets
there, unless he wants to jump the battery again.61 I do not mean to draw an analogy
between human death and the death of car batteries, but to highlight an important feature
of the causal story about a thing, which can in turn provide us with knowledge about the
condition of a thing. That is to say, the absence of the immanent causal powers of a thing
signifies a problem with the thing, and replacing the immanent powers with transient
causes does not reverse the problem, but bypasses and perhaps conceals it. Moreover,
spontaneous breathing signifies immanent causal activity unified by the ends of the three
basic capacities fundamental to an organism’s vital work mentioned above. It is not
merely a series of events that involves the billowing of the chest with air, as it is with
mechanical ventilation. Furthermore, the maintenance of the blood-air barrier is not
necessarily a sign of an organism’s capacity to sense the neediness that compels it to act
in order to obtain what it needs, since such an activity can be maintained in headless
bodies, which are not organisms at all.
The second objection comes from Shewmon who notes that the President’s
Council’s position depends on the claim that breathing and consciousness are the only
two functions that are individually sufficient for human life; if there were another one,
60

Oderberg defines transient causation as follows: “If A does F to B, and A is not the same [kind] K as
B (for some K), and B is not part of A, A does F to B transiently” (Ibid.).
61
Sadly, I know this all too well from experience.
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their joint absence would not be sufficient for death (2009b, 10). True enough, but what
other function does he have in mind? The fact that he names none only serves to bolster
the Council’s position. If anyone could furnish one, it would be Shewmon, who is by far
and away the most informed and respected critic of brain death there is. Perhaps, though,
he figured the informed reader would just supply one from the list he has already given.
Miller and Truog do just that when they assert that “fighting infections and wound
healing” are indicative of the human organism’s fundamental work as an organism
(2009a, 189). The gestation of a fetus certainly seems to be another good candidate. Yet
all these functions depend on a capacity that is more fundamental: the capacity to breathe,
which is the capacity to ‘reach out’ into the environment and attain what it needs
(oxygen) and to ‘push out’ into the environment and expel waste. Even if the capacity is
blocked by an injury, the drive remains. As the President’s Council says, “This drive is
the organism’s own impulse, exercised on its own behalf, and indispensable to its
continued existence” (President’s Council on Bioethics 2008, 62).62 This capacity is
entirely lost in total brain failure. Thus, the functions critics appeal to are definitely
functions of a living thing, alright (certainly not that of a rotting corpse), but they need
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In their effort to debunk the President’s Council’s position, Shah and Miller assert that fetuses “do
not have a drive to breathe” apparently because they “take in amniotic fluid in order to obtain oxygen”
(2010, 550). But they fail to recognize that there is a second-order capacity the fetus has that is developing
the capacity or drive to breath that is relevant. And surely the drive to breath is present at some point in
womb, otherwise we would fail to breath when we are born. Perhaps they think this drive to breath appears
only when one is outside the womb. That too is false, because a mature (8 month) fetus can breathe inside
the womb as the following report indicates:
Dr. Liley relates the experience of a doctor who injected an air bubble into an unborn baby’s (eight
months) amniotic sac in an attempt to locate the placenta on x-ray. It so happened that the air
bubble cover the unborn baby’s face. The moment the unborn child had air to inhale, his vocal
cords became operative and his crying became audible to all present, including the physician and
technical help. The mother telephoned the doctor later to report that whenever she lay down to
sleep, the air bubble got over the unborn baby’s face and he was crying so loudly he was keeping
both her and her husband awake (Horan 1971 quoted in Schwarz 1990, 6).
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not only be functions of an organism as a whole. Rather, they can just as well be the
coordinated activity of a living part of an organism (Condic 2016), a part that could just
as easily be identified with an artificially sustained headless human body.63 This should
not be altogether surprising (though it is fascinating), since it is just this sort of entity that
can supply healthy vital organs for transplant.
2.4 Conclusion
Therefore, we should conclude that what dies if the DDR is violated is a human
organism, something with which we can be identified, and that total brain failure is
equivalent with death despite Shewmon’s criticisms. As it stands, our current public
policy correctly aligns our moral and biological concepts of death, and the biophilosophic
justification for it is stronger than critics realize. This is not to say that our current tests or
diagnosing practices are perfect. At the very least, the tragic case of Jahi McMath gives
us a reason to scrutinize and refine our tests for brain death (Magnus, Wilfond, and
Caplan 2014).64 Lastly, if it turns out that I am wrong about brain death, this will do
nothing to change the validity of the DDR. The fact that it would be harder to accept does
not undermine the case that it should be accepted as a matter of public policy. The reason
why we should forbid killing people for their organs stands independently of the brain
death debate: it is a matter of respect. Or so I shall argue in the coming chapters.
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Some empirical evidence to suggest that this is the case is found in an experiment where researchers
decapitated a pregnant sheep, sustained the headless body by artificial means, and subsequently delivered a
healthy lamb (Steinberg and Hersch 1995).
64
Shewmon has testified under oath that McMath satisfied the tests in December, 2013, but no longer
does as of October, 2014.
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Chapter 3: What Mortal Harvesting Is and Isn't
Abstract: Chapter 3 begins my defense of the first premise of my
master argument: transplant protocols that would have us secure
the donor’s death would have us kill someone for their organs.
There are two aims of this chapter. The first is to clarify what is
meant by “transplant protocol.” The second is to clarify and
elaborate what I mean by “kills” and what it is to kill someone “for
their organs.” This will involve contending for a theory of
intention that seeks to balance out our first- and third-personal
perspectives with respect to determining what counts as an
intentional action.
Unfortunately, the extant defences of DDR… typically do not address killing by organ procurement, but
instead focus on preventing killing patients for organs.
—Christian Coons and Noah Levin
The moral character of actions depends upon two orders: what an action is directed to and what an action
should be directed to.
—Steven Jensen

3.0 Introduction
It would seem obvious that someone is killed for their organs if a donor’s death is
secured by a transplant team. Why, then, is a detailed treatment of this claim needed? The
short answer is that it can be interpreted in ways that spell trouble for the rationale behind
the DDR, if not the transplant enterprise altogether. As we shall see, there are some who
believe that the rationale behind the DDR only forbids being killed by the removal of
vital organs, and that it does not forbid being killed for them. The burden to be
shouldered, then, is to explain why this is false, and why a sound ethical justification for
the DDR is concerned with killing for organs. Shouldering this burden gets us into the
thicket of action theory and all the problems one might find in this difficult area of
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philosophy. It should come as no surprise hat some of these problems rear their ugly
heads in the DDR-related literature, yet they are often ignored, glossed over, or
superficially dismissed.
Whenever we morally evaluate an action or a proposal for action, the first
questions we must answer are “What is being done?” or “What is being proposed?” No
sound moral evaluation can occur without an adequate understanding of the action or the
proposal for action in question. Beyond this general reason, getting clear on what it
means to kill someone for their organs will be helpful for two particular reasons. The first
provides a principled way to rule out arguments that would have us broaden the concept
of intentional killing to such an extent that we could not withdraw life-support upon a
valid request in a normal end-of-life setting without intending the death of the patient.
Likewise, the second provides a principled way to rule out arguments that would have us
narrow the concept of intentional killing to such an extent that we could thereby
surgically remove all of a patient’s vital organs, not replace them, and then distribute
them to others without intending the death of the patient (that is, the patient’s death is just
a foreseen “side-effect” of our life-saving actions). Ruling these arguments out is
important, because, on the one hand, if our concept of intentional killing is too broad, one
would engage in mortal harvesting if vital organs were retrieved from a dead donor
whose death subsequently followed a valid request for stopping treatment. This would
make the rule absurdly burdensome. On the other hand, if our concept of intentional
killing is too narrow, then one could engage in mortal harvesting and claim compliance
with the DDR, which would render the rule vacuous. If either case is correct, then we
would have good reason to reject the rule. Yet, as I shall argue, both of these cases
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depend on a faulty theory of intention that does not unify the first- and third-person
perspectives with respect to what it is being intended. That is to say, the too-broad
concept of intentional action grossly privileges the third-person perspective over the first,
meaning that our intentions include every physical effect we know our actions can cause.
By contrast, the too-narrow concept grossly privileges the first-person perspective —
which is to say that our intentions are just a matter of what we choose to do, and are
(predictably) chosen under an indemnifying description.
Hence, the major focus of this chapter is to get clear on what we mean by
intentional killing by balancing out these competing perspectives. I shall begin by
explaining what mortal harvesting is not so as to show that the DDR, contrary to what
critics allege, is not excessively burdensome to the transplant enterprise. This discussion
will include, among other things, criticism of the assumption that killing and causing
death are equivalent as well as a principled way to distinguish killing from allowing
death. Next, I shall explain what mortal harvesting is so as to show that someone is killed
for their organs if the DDR is violated. The point of this discussion will be to further
clarify the point of the rule and show that Double Effect cannot be used to justify mortal
harvesting. I then end with some thoughts on what kind of activity transplant surgery is,
and what sort of theory of intentional action we should embrace for making sense of our
practices.
3.1 What mortal harvesting isn’t
If it could be shown that compliance with the DDR rules out practices we have
good reason to permit, then it should be rejected. This is a commonly deployed strategy
for undermining the rationale for the DDR, and it comes in its strongest form from the
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likes of Franklin Miller, Robert Truog, and Daniel Brock (2009; 2010). According to this
strategy, merely withdrawing life-support from a deathly-ill patient constitutes intentional
killing. This sort of killing should only be thought of in terms of causing the patient’s
death, and not necessarily in terms of taking the patient’s life, which would be to cause
death without the patient’s consent. Hence, the strategy assumes a morally neutral
account of killing so as to avoid begging normative questions against end-of-life practices
in which physicians are thought to “cause death.”65 On this view, if life-support is
withdrawn from donors upon their request, and they consent to donate their organs, they
are licitly killed for their organs. Since these antecedent practices are thought to be
rendered permissible by virtue of informed consent, there is nothing wrong in principle
with killing people for their organs. Thus, the DDR should be abandoned. Or so the
argument goes.
3.1.1 What does it mean to kill someone?
At this point, it will be helpful to answer the following question: what exactly
does it mean to kill someone? The answer is not obvious, because it is not clear whether
“killing” should be analyzed in terms that are normatively neutral or not. It is hard to
escape normative judgments about whether or not an action is an act of killing, because
there is such a strong presumption against it. Indeed, we might be tempted to prejudge a
death-related act as an act of killing when in fact it is no such thing. The advantage of a
normatively neutral account is that it allows us to impartially move from the identity
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As Miller and Truog say, “Although it is certainly possible to distinguish between authorized and
unauthorized killings, the usual connotations of ‘killing’ suggest taking life without authorization. ‘Causing
death’ is more naturally used in a normatively neutral sense, with no implications relating to justification or
authorization” (2012, 3).
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conditions of an instance of killing to a judgment about whether it is wrong or not. This
appears to be the sort of project Jeff McMahan undertakes in his magisterial tome The
Ethics of Killing (2002). Although he offers no formal definition of “kills,” he does say
that killing is an instance of doing rather than allowing, which involves the creation of a
lethal threat, or at least, the redirection of, or a removal of a barrier to, a preexisting threat
(Ibid., 236). On this interpretation, there is an act of killing, not merely an act of allowing
death, if a greedy son-in-law withdraws life-support from a ventilator-dependent patient
for the sake of collecting inheritance money. Why, then, would there not be an instance
of killing when physicians withdraw-life support at the patient’s request? According to
McMahan, the answer has to do with whether the source of aid originates from those who
withdraw it. To be sure, both the physicians and the son-in-law act so as to remove the
aid upon which the patient’s life depends, but since the physicians also acted so as to
provide aid in an effort to save the patient’s life and treat the underlying pathology, we
have defeasible evidence to believe their act is of a different kind. In McMahan’s terms,
the physicians operate in the role of “Providers” while the son-in-law merely operates as
a “Remover.” Roughly put, anyone who acts in the capacity of a Provider allows death
when they withdraw a continuous source of life-sustaining treatment which the Provider
supplies; by contrast, Removers kill when they withdraw a source of aid and they do not
act in the capacity of a Provider (Ibid., 380-83). While McMahan does not claim that this
distinction guarantees a correct description of every action causally related to death, he
does put his finger on an intuitive way to marshal defeasible evidence for distinguishing
between the class of acts we normally identify as “killing” and the class of acts we
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normally identify as “letting die” without making any normative assumptions about the
parties involved.
Another helpful account of killing found in the medical ethics literature, comes
from Daniel Sulmasy (1998). Again, the overall concern is to distinguish killing from
allowing death, but instead of working out a general theory that could impartially
adjudicate particular cases, Sulmasy gives a normative account of killing that is meant to
account for the distinction between killing and allowing death in traditional medical
ethics. In his view, killing is “an act in which an agent creates a new, lethal
pathophysiological state with the specific intention in action of thereby causing a
person’s death” (Ibid., 57). By contrast, allowing to die is “an act in which an agent either
performs an action to remove an intervention that forestalls or ameliorates a preexisting
fatal condition or refrains from action that would forestall or ameliorate a preexisting
fatal condition, either with the specific intention of acting that this person should die by
way of that act or not so intending” (Ibid., 57-58). We should note that Sulmasy’s
definition of killing excludes accidental killings, because it is already presumed in
medical practice that those are to be avoided. His definition of “allowing to die” is
disjunctive because the traditional medico-ethical norm is one that forbids all proposals
for killing, and permits some, but not all proposals for allowing death. For Sulmasy,
being causally related to death whether by killing or withdrawing aid does not matter
much; what does matter is the manner in which the cause of death is brought about, and
how the agent’s intentions relate to it. With respect to how death is brought about, the
doctor must act so as to create a new lethal threat when killing, but when allowing death,
the doctor may or may not make use of a preexisting threat as a means to the patient’s
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death. With respect to intention, the doctor must aim at death when killing, but when
allowing death, the doctor may or may not aim at death. If killing is to be authorized, it
must come by way of a request for intervention; if allowing death is to be authorized, it
only needs to come by way of a refusal of treatment, and the right to refuse treatment is
taken to be stronger than the right to request treatment. With these differences noted,
traditional medical ethics presumes instances of killing to be wrong; insofar as allowing
to die is concerned, there should not be a presumption for or against it since the subtleties
of intention involved are harder to discern than in acts of killing — more stringent
standards involving the patient’s consent and the legal authority to carry out the act of
withdrawing life-support must be satisfied. What the tradition leaves open, however, is
what might explain the wrongness of killing or certain instances of allowing death.
We now have two relatively clear accounts of killing before us, one that is meant
to be normative and one that is not, which can help us get a handle on what the DDR
forbids: surgery protocols that would lead us to secure the donor’s death. To secure
someone’s death is to aim at someone’s death by initiating, aiding, or exercising control
over a fatal sequence that leads to death.66 Such securing could come about by creating a
lethal threat independent of the donor’s underlying pathology, or it could make use of the
underlying pathology so as to execute an intention to bring about the donor’s death. Thus,
I follow Sulmasy insofar as I define killing in terms of an action that is irreducibly
intentional, because that is the sort of killing that is at issue in the debate over the DDR.
With that said, I depart from Sulmasy and follow McMahan in the judgment that one can

66
I am indebted to Philip A. Reed for this formulation. The “fatal sequence” language comes from
Philippa Foot (1984).
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intentionally kill by intentionally redirecting or removing a barrier to a preexisting lethal
threat. That there could be vagueness in our act-descriptions or borderline cases that are
hard to adjudicate is something I will accept, as I think this problem generally applies to
any action-theoretical account of killing. What is important, however, is that we have a
reasonably clear idea about what it means to kill someone in a medical context.
3.1.2 Distinguishing killing from causing death
We are now in a position to evaluate the various arguments made by Miller,
Truog, and Brock. Specifically, there is what might be called the No Difference
argument, which we saw in Chapter 1:
1.   If it is true that doctors should not cause the death of their patients for any reason,
then withdrawing life-sustaining treatment upon patient request is
impermissible.67
2.   But it’s not.
3.   Therefore, it is false that doctors should not cause the death of their patients for
any reason.
There are two ways to read this argument, one that is controversial and one that is not. If
we concede along with Sulmasy that physicians contribute causally to the death of their
patients when they withdraw life-support, then the argument is sound.68 But nothing
interesting follows from this unless we substitute “causes death” with “kills” as if they
were equivalent act-descriptions. Clearly, this is the more controversial reading of the
argument.
67
I formulate premise [1] this way because Miller and Truog think that the norm against causing the
patient’s death applies to a doctor who does not intend the patient’s death, but rather intends to honor the
patient’s request to stop treatment. “In these cases,” they write, “the clinicians would not be intending to
cause death, though the LST [life-sustaining treatment] would be stopped intentionally in response to a
patient's refusal” (2012, 18). In their view, this is enough to bring physicians into conflict with the
traditional norm against killing.
68
It should be noted that thinkers like Sulmasy deny that Double Effect is necessary to justify
terminating life-support; in his view, life-support only needs to be correctly judged futile or
disproportionately burdensome to justify its termination (D. Sulmasy and Pellegrino 1999, 547–48).
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In a notable iteration of this argument, Miller, Truog and Brock (whom I will call
‘the authors’) stipulate that “killing and causing death are equivalent,” and go on to
contend that the “routine practice of stopping life-sustaining treatment is an act of
medical killing” (Miller, Truog, and Brock 2010, 303; 2009, 456). Evidence for this
judgment is adduced from comparing two cases, one of which I will call Injured Man and
the other, Murder Victim:
Injured Man: A middle-aged man suffers an injury that leaves him in a
quadriplegic state and dependent on a ventilator. After living in this condition for
a few years, he judges life to be not worth living, and requests that life-support be
withdrawn. After his request is deemed valid and his physicians comply, he dies
twenty-minutes after life-support is withdrawn.
Murder Victim: A middle-aged man suffers an injury that leaves him in a
quadriplegic state and dependent on a ventilator. Unlike the Injured Man, he
wants to go on living. But a greedy son-in-law wants his estate and when the
opportunity presents itself, he withdraws life-support. The man dies 20 minutes
later.
The authors think that we cannot sensibly claim that the Murder Victim was killed, while
the Injured man was not killed, but merely allowed to die. Nor do they say that both were
allowed to die, because in both cases, “What explains his death following withdrawal of
mechanical ventilation is not his spinal cord injury but the act of turning off the
ventilator” (2010, 304). The only morally relevant difference between the two cases is
consent; “but,” they assert, “this ethical and legal difference has nothing to do with the
cause of the patient’s death, which is the same in both cases” (Ibid.). Elsewhere, Miller
and Truog (sans Brock) say they do not presuppose any theory of causation in general,
but only a commonsense notion that is able to pick out interventions that a “make the
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difference” in an otherwise normal sequence of events.69 They write,
Causes are events or circumstances that make the difference in explaining a
particular occurrence. Assuming that when a patient is on life support, the patient
normally will continue to live for some period of time (though may be vulnerable
to dying despite LST [life-sustaining treatment]), then withdrawing life support is
an intervention that brings about death, when death, in fact, ensues after the
withdrawal occurs. The withdrawal makes the difference between continued
living and death occurring at a given time subsequent to the withdrawal (Miller
and Truog 2012a, 6 emphasis orginal).
All three authors are agreed: “Withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, when followed
shortly by the patient’s death, is a life-terminating intervention,” and the “proximate
cause” of death (Miller, Truog, and Brock 2009, 456).
Before I list four problems with this argument, let me register a complaint with
this “makes the difference” account of causation. As we know from tort law and
negligence cases, what “makes the difference” in an actionable event involves an agent
operating in as a sphere of responsibility with specific duties and goals, not just mere
causal activity. Indeed, it is difficult if not impossible to give a non-normative account of
human action, because human agents operate within a sphere of responsibility constituted
by duties and goals. This sphere of responsibility gives us reason to reject the equivalence
between “causes death” and “kills” straightaway. “Causing death” — whatever that might
mean — is only necessary and not sufficient for killing, because “difference-making”
causes can be direct or indirect, and one does not necessarily kill if one indirectly causes
death. Think of a sheriff who is the fastest draw in the West and will win his duel with a
cocky outlaw at high noon, provided that his gun functions properly. In preparation for
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Though to be sure, all three authors agree that they are assuming the “commonsense” notion as
articulated by Hart and Honoré (Hart and Honoré 1985).
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the duel, the sheriff has his gun serviced by the local gunsmith (so that it will function
properly), who, through some tragic mishap, renders faulty service. At high noon, the
sheriff’s gun jams and the outlaw shoots him dead. Since in the ‘normal course of events’
this would not have happened, we can say that the gunsmith caused the sheriff’s death,
because his faulty repair made the difference to the outcome.70 Nevertheless, he did not
kill him — the outlaw did that (this example belongs to Katz 1970, 253 n31; cited in
Wierzbicka 1975, 491).
Second, the authors beg the question against McMahan’s supposedly nonnormative account of the distinction between killing and letting die. On his account, it
can be coherently maintained that the Injured Man was allowed to die, and that the
Murder Victim was killed. This is because the physicians removed a continuous source of
aid they had initially supplied in the Injured Man case, whereas the son-in-law removes a
source of aid he had never supplied in the Murder Victim case. This does not mean that
what the doctors did was okay, or that it is false that they ‘caused death’ in some sense.
As we saw from Sulmasy’s account, it is hard to believe that A is not causally responsible
for B’s death if A allows B to die by virtue of removing life-support. Yet by failing to
recognize the Remover/Provider distinction and by equating causing death with killing
the authors are left with the problem McMahan is trying to solve. That is, it leaves them
with little ground to affirm the intuitive judgment that the famed violinist of Judith Jarvis
Thomson’s “Defense of Abortion” (1971) need not be killed, but merely allowed to die if
the one who is kidnapped and hooked up to the violinist (so as to provide the means of
70

The “difference-from-normal-course-of-events” view of causation is precisely taken to be the
commonsense of causation as rigorously outlined by Hart and Honoré, which they apply to omissions,
particularly the case of the gardener who fails to water the flowers (Hart and Honoré 1985, 38).
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life-support) unhooks herself from him. The position of the authors implies that the
kidnapped person kills if she unhooks. To be sure, it is possible for the kidnapped person
to intend the violinist’s death by unhooking herself from him. Yet, the point of
Thomson’s argument is to show that it is also possible for the kidnapped person to refrain
from providing treatment for a good reason and thereby allow the violinist’s death as a
side-effect of her action.71 This much is not even possible on the authors’ argument. Their
fundamental mistake lies in analyzing the killing/letting die distinction in terms of the
causing/not causing distinction (Jensen 2011, 176).
Third, by virtue of invoking talk of causation the authors inherit an ambiguity that
once clarified, either renders their account trivial or irreducibly normative, both of which
are contrary to their intentions. Specifically, they fail to adequately distinguish between
the causes of history and causes of explanation. The causes of history are the individual
elements in a set of elements which are jointly sufficient for the effect. Deciphering the
scope of the causal history can be tricky, but we can reasonably do so through a
normatively neutral scientific method. By contrast, the causes of explanation are those
elements we pick out from a causal history that “make the difference” according to some
explanation that is relative to our interest in understanding why some event occurs (see
Lewis 1986 for a nice overview of this distinction). Determining the causes of
explanation is generally a pragmatic exercise in which we make assumptions about what
is ‘normally’ the case and what is at stake for us in the explanation. When we say “Y
occurs by virtue of X” in the causal sense, we highlight X as a salient part of the causal
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Whether this is analogous with abortion is another a matter.
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history behind Y’s occurrence. What determines salience? John Greco identifies two
factors: (1) the elements that are abnormal in the causal history, and (2) our interests and
purposes in formulating an explanation (Greco 2002, 310). A useful shorthand for
distinguishing the causes of history from the causes of explanation can be put like this: an
element in the causal history of an effect is a cause of the effect, whereas an element
named as the cause of explanation for an effect is the cause of the effect.72
Once this distinction is made, we can see that the authors’ argument is not wellserved by either of them. As we have seen, defenders of the traditional distinction of
killing and letting die (like Sulmasy) readily agree that physicians are a cause of the
patient’s death when they withdraw life-support. This renders the No Difference
argument trivial, which is contrary to the authors’ assumptions. In order to make it nontrivial, they have to single out the physician’s causal contribution as the cause of death.
But to do this, they have to make judgments about what is salient, which pushes them
beyond the neutrality their project. To see why, let us suppose Ann is chopping firewood
and the axe-head works loose and flies off the handle, hitting Brody in the head. Brody
crumples to the ground unconscious, but does not immediately die; the resulting head
injury causes him to breath irregularly, though he will continue to live if he receives
assistance. Carly springs into action and performs mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on
Brody for a full hour while Ann calls for help. Sadly, there is no help to be found because
they are far out in the country. Exhausted and frustrated, Carly gives up hope for Brody,
and ceases breathing air into his lungs. Brody’s breathing becomes irregular and it finally
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stops, which leads to cardiac arrest shortly thereafter. What caused Brody’s death? We
might suggest a number of things, like brain damage, or the loss of circulation, or to be
more commonsensical, the fatal injury from the axe head. All of these factor into a causal
story about Brody’s death. Of course, Brody’s death would have occurred at an earlier
time than it did had not Carly intervened. Thus, Carly’s ceasing to resuscitate Brody can
be factored into the account as a cause too. But it makes no sense to say that Carly is the
cause of Brody’s death, because her actions do not best explain why he dies. This is
because she neither initiated, nor aided unto completion the sequence of events that led to
his death — rather, she merely delayed them. To be sure, if all we are interested in is
explaining the timing of Brody’s death, then our focus shifts immediately to Carly as to
what might explain the cause of death at that particular time.
The authors seem to sense this problem, which is why it is no accident that they
frame their causal explanations in terms of the timing of death. They write,
To be sure, [the] patient’s inability to breathe on his own is part of the causal
explanation for why he dies after his ventilator is stopped. But withdrawing the
ventilator causes his death precisely because had it not been withdrawn he would
continue living, likely for a substantial period of time. The withdrawal of the
ventilator accounts for the patient dying at the time and in the manner that he
does. It is difficult to see how it can reasonably be denied that stopping the
ventilator causes this patient’s death (Miller, Truog, and Brock 2010, 304
emphasis added).
Difficult, indeed. Nonetheless, this is not a decisive argument. We might also think that
the patient’s request “makes a difference” too, because if he had not made it, the doctors
would not have terminated life-support and he would have continued living. If the authors
are right, then it should be just as difficult to deny that requesting the withdrawal of life-
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support “causes” the patient’s death.73 This, however, would not serve their purposes in
showing that withdrawing life-support is the cause of the death, which is essential to their
broader claim: that withdrawing life-support is a form of medical killing. Widening the
scope of concern to include things like the patient’s request or the underlying pathology
— which is the reason why the patient is on life-support in the first place and why he
wants to die — only complicates the picture.
To their credit, Miller and Truog (sans Brock) acknowledge this complexity in
their helpful book Death, Dying, and Organ Transplantation (2012). They even sense the
ambiguity between the causes of history and the causes of explanation in this particularly
interesting paragraph:
Consider the following example. A sailboat springs a leak and begins to take on
water. The sailor turns on a battery-operated pump that keeps the boat from filling
up with water. The battery, however, becomes drained and the pump stops
working. The boat begins to fill up with water. What caused this outcome?
Obviously, it wouldn't have happened if the boat hadn't sprung a leak. But it also
wouldn't have happened if the pump had continued to operate. Thus, it is natural
to say that the stopping of the pump (along with the leak) caused the boat to fill
up with water. At the least, we would note the battery failure as contributing
causally to, or being a partial cause of, the outcome. If the stopping of the pump
by battery failure causes the boat to fill up with water, then certainly the same
outcome would be caused if the sailor, for some reason, turned off the pump.
Once a mechanical device intervenes to arrest a natural process, the stopping of
the device causally explains, at least in part, the outcome. If not the cause, it is a
cause. It is difficult to see why the same account should not apply to stopping
LST [life-sustaining treatment], such as mechanical ventilation (2012, 6 emphasis
original).
Here they are aware of the difficulty in saying the pump’s stopping was the cause of the
boat’s sinking. To be sure, it would be much easier to single out the faulty pump if we
were only interested in explaining why the boat sunk at the time it did, but that is not all
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Note the unhappy proliferation of causal over-determination in their “common sense” account.

90

we are interested in. Once we start explaining the occurrence of the event per se, the
scope of causal history necessarily broadens to include things like the condition of the
hull or whatever it was that brought about the leak in the first place. So too with
explaining why a patient dies when life-support is withdrawn. And as we have seen, the
recognition that stopping life-support is a cause is no problem for traditional medical
ethics.
In fact, Miller and Truog’s rejection of any appeal to the underlying condition as
the cause of death betrays their commitment to a non-normative account of “causing
death” that is free of moral bias (something they hold against the traditional view). This is
evident in the thought experiment they marshal in defense of attributing of causal
responsibility to physicians. They write,
Consider the following case. A careless hiker throws a lit cigarette into the woods,
causing a forest fire. The act wouldn't have caused the fire if the woods were wet,
rather than extremely dry; nor would the fire have spread widely if the wind
wasn't blowing. But neither of these underlying conditions negates the commonsense judgment that throwing the lit cigarette into the woods caused the forest
fire. We don't say that the dry conditions or the wind caused the forest fire. The
patient's underlying medical condition is (to some extent) analogous to these
underlying conditions necessary for the fire to start and spread (Ibid., 10).
While this analogy might befit a scenario in which the doctor is indifferent to harming the
patient, it does not befit the normal circumstances under which a caring doctor withdraws
life-support. Here’s one that does: a raging forest fire is encroaching on a house, but it is
being held back by firefighters. After fighting it off as best they can for a while, they
realize their efforts are futile even if they could continue delaying the fire’s encroachment
for some time. They decide to turn off their hoses and vacate the premises, which allows
the fire to overtake and consume the house. While it may be true that the retreat of the
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fire fighters contributes causally to the destruction of the house, it makes no sense to say
that their retreat is the cause of the house’s destruction.
The fourth problem with their argument is that withdrawing-life support is not
necessarily even a cause of death. There are notable cases in which life-support is
withdrawn and the patient goes on living, the most famous being that of Karen Ann
Quinlan (Kass 2002, 36). Other cases are less well-known, but no less dramatic. Consider
a ventilator-dependent patient who indicates no sign of an effort to breathe for a week;
when the ventilator is finally withdrawn, the patient subsequently gasps for air,
compelling the physicians into life-preserving action.74 In this case, a deep drive to breath
emerges when the body is being deprived of oxygen. Since withdrawing the ventilator
“makes the difference” in bringing about the effort to breath, it would clearly be wrong to
say that withdrawing life-support “causes death” — indeed, we might even think it brings
about a greater degree of well-working within the organism as a whole. Obviously, this
undermines the authors’ argument, which is why they routinely build the occurrence of
the patient’s death into all the cases they examine. But it is one thing to shoulder the
burden of explaining why death comes about, if it comes about, when life-support is
withdrawn; it is quite another to assert that death will inevitably come about when lifesupport is withdrawn, which is what we might reasonably interpret “causes death” to
mean. If the authors are to successfully defend the claim that physicians kill their patients
by means of withdrawing life-support from them, they would be better served by utilizing
language that gets past the difficulties that beset talk of causation.
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This experience was relayed to me personally by a physician.
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For these reasons, we should reject the claim that transplant protocols that involve
withdrawing life-support from donors must involve killing someone for their organs. This
is not to say that donors could never be killed in this way, or that moral qualms of over
certain protocols that involve the transplant team in withdrawing life-support are
unjustified. Perhaps those teams are not acting in the capacity of Providers or they are
intending the donor’s death as means to their ends. However we adjudicate these
protocols, the manner in which death is caused will be at issue, not that death is caused.
3.2 Mortal harvesting is killing for organs
So much for the strategy that purports to show that killing must be involved in
ordinary procurement procedures by virtue of broadening our concept of intentional
killing. But what about a strategy that narrows it? This is a less prominent strategy, but it
is sometimes disputed that mortal harvesting involves killing for organs. Christian Coons
and Noah Levin remind us that someone is not necessarily killed for their organs if
surgeons simply remove (and do not replace) vital organs from a living person, a trivial
truth if that is all that is being done (Coons and Levin 2011, 241–42). More controversial
is their claim that the DDR, which they formulate solely in terms of the Death
Requirement, only forbids killing by having one’s organs removed, not killing for one’s
organs (Ibid., 242). They consider a case where: (1) the time of a person’s termination is
fixed; (2) the person autonomously requests to be killed by the surgical removal of vital
organs, but does not choose this method of killing for the sake of organ removal; and (3)
the act of surgical organ removal is no more harmful to the person than alternative forms
of termination (Ibid., 237). To illustrate, they imagine a killer who gains access to a
magical killing machine that will terminate its victim fifteen minutes from the time it is
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turned on. Since it can kill by any method, it would not be wrong to honor the request of
the victim to tell the machine to kill by surgical organ removal as opposed to other forms
of killing — being crushed by a giant iron ball, for example. As they see it, the killer
would be permitted, if not obligated, to program the machine to kill by surgical organ
removal, and that this would constitute a justified violation of the DDR, which, in their
view says “multiple vital organs should only be taken from dead patients” (Ibid., 236).75
Despite their acknowledgement that the “killing machine” thought experiment is fanciful,
they argue that the relevant conditions can be satisfied in contexts where voluntary active
euthanasia and capital punishment are permitted. In these contexts, choosing to be killed
by surgical organ removal has at least a neutral or even beneficial effect, because a
measure of the victim’s autonomy is respected and the lives of those who might receive
one of the leftover organs are preserved. Thus, they conclude that the DDR does not
strictly prohibit killing people for their organs, but only killing by organ removal. This,
they think, renders the DDR arbitrary and unmotivated.
Their argument fails for two reasons. First, they offer no reason why the DDR
should be formulated exclusively in terms of the Death Requirement. As we saw in
Chapter One, there are good reasons to interpret and formulate the rule in terms of the
Don’t Kill rule, which can be stated conditionally: if killing the donor is involved to get
vital organs, then we ought not do it. Why they insist on such a narrow interpretation of
the rule goes unexplained. Second, the fact that one could consent to be killed by the
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Note the oddness of thinking that the killer would be obligated to do this for the victim while
ignoring the question as to whether the killer is obligated not to kill the victim. The authors never stipulate
or assume that the killer is free from this obligation. The most charitable reading of their argument, which
will henceforth be assumed, is one that makes this assumption.
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surgical removal of organs, but not for the sake of their removal is simply irrelevant in
the context of organ donation, the context to which the DDR applies. In that context, no
donor is indifferent to the good of having one’s organs harvested for the sake of helping
others, and no transplant team is indifferent to the good of harvesting healthy organs for
transplant. Nor is it clear how someone who is subjected to the whims of a maniac that
controls a magical killing machine could be considered a “donor” in any relevant sense.
In any event, for those who intend to donate, the choice-worthiness of death by surgical
organ removal depends on being able to choose it for the sake of supplying healthy
organs. Apart from the context of organ donation, the only plausible reason for choosing
death by surgical organ removal would be for the sake of avoiding a more painful death
(assuming the procedure is painless). But this completely evaporates in a context where
voluntary active euthanasia is allowed (assuming the practice is painless), a context
which is supposed to simulate the conditions of the “killing machine” thought
experiment. The same can be said of killing in capital punishment, which, at least in
modern societies, aims at applying the most humane form of killing possible.
Undoubtedly, it is possible for one to choose death by surgical organ removal, but not
intend, though perhaps foresee that one’s organs would be used for transplant. We can
always tell some macabre story about how dying by surgical organ removal would be a
better way to go than suffering some other grisly fate. Nevertheless, it does not follow
from the fact that the DDR fails to sensibly forbid killing people for purposes unrelated to
attaining healthy organs that it fails to sensibly forbid killing people for their organs in
the context of organ donation.
Nor is the rule redundant, as Coons and Levin allege (Ibid., 243), as if it were like
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a rule that prohibited killing without anesthesia; indeed, being killed without anesthesia is
not choiceworthy. This is not the case with “organ donation euthanasia” because it is
thought that the benefits of donation, to the donor and the recipients, provide the
strongest case for the practice of euthanasia in general (Wilkinson and Savulescu 2012,
41). This explains why exceptions to the ban on killing patients for any reason are
sometimes entertained and advanced by those who otherwise reject euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide. For example, James Bernat, who is a defender of the DDR
(2013) and an opponent of physician-assisted suicide (1996), thinks that if it could be
shown that a currently accepted donation-after-circulatory-death (DCD) protocol violates
the DDR, it would be a “justified exception” to it (2006, 128). Yet this is a mistake on
Bernat’s part, because it is simply inconsistent with the norm against intentionally killing
patients for any reason in general, and for their organs in particular, which, as Bernat
correctly notes, is “the raison d'etre” behind the DDR (2006, 129).
3.2.1 Could Double Effect justify mortal harvesting?
One way to deny that intentional killing is involved in mortal harvesting is to
narrow the concept of intentional killing. We might exploit the aforementioned
distinction between what is intended and what is foreseen, but not intended, which is
essential to Double Effect, a procedural rule of practical reasoning that permits the bad
effects of an action only if they are side-effects of the action, that is, effects which are
foreseen, but not intended. Roughly, Double Effect permits actions that cause at least two
effects, a good one and a bad one, if the following criteria are satisfied: (1) the act is
aimed only at the good effect; (2) the bad effect is unavoidable if the good effect is to be
achieved; (3) the bad effect is not a means to the good effect; and (4) the good effect is
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proportionate to the bad effect (Harris 2012, 85). While there are different ways of
formulating the rule of Double Effect (e.g. Marquis 1991), the common purpose of each
is to provide justification for causing a bad effect that is consistent with morality.
Traditionally, Double Effect is utilized in normative systems of ethics that are committed
to moral absolutes (Shafer-Landau 2015, 223–27); thus, it is relevant to my argument as I
am defending an absolute prohibition on killing people for their organs.
Surprisingly, there are some who think Double Effect is able to justify mortal
harvesting. Noah Levin suggests just such a strategy when he writes:
Such a defense could work as follows: DCD donors are patients that are
candidates for organ procurement. Whether they are dead is irrelevant to the
procedure. Doctors are permitted to procure vital organs from such patients. This
might have the consequence of terminating the patient, but this is an unnecessary
concern. The goal of the procedure was to procure organs and doing so in this
situation is morally permissible. If they are killed, this is merely just an
unintended consequence, and if it is bad, then it is acceptable. This defense is an
example of the “doctrine of double effect.” Although it might be impermissible to
kill a patient under normal circumstances, this harm is acceptable because it is a
consequence of the decidedly good action of procuring organs (2013, 93).
This makes little sense. If doctors are already permitted to engage in DCD-style mortal
harvesting on independent grounds, then invoking Double Effect is redundant. Nor is the
death of the donor an “unnecessary concern” for those who deploy Double Effect,
because it must be proportional to the good effect. In any event, Levin is only floating
this as a possible justification for mortal harvesting, though he does not seem to take it
too seriously.76
Still there are better appeals to Double Effect that are worth examining. The act-
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David DeGrazia also suggests that Double Effect could be used to justify taking organs from braindead patients (he contends that such patients are alive), though it too seems doubtful that he takes this
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Bioethics (2005, 154 n85).
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utilitarian philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö thinks that those who are not committed to
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, yet are committed to the sanctity of human life (i.e.
innocent human life must not be taken) and the rule of Double Effect, “must concur” with
the judgment that it would not be wrong to cut up and distribute the organs of an
unsuspecting patient provided that no one finds out about it (Tännsjö 2015, 205).77 How
is the bad effect of the patient’s death not a means to the good effect of organ
procurement? “When the doctor cuts up the patient,” Tännsjö writes, “the intention need
not be to kill him. The idea is just to use his organs to save lives. If the doctor could take
the organs without killing the patient, then he would do so” (Ibid., 205). To justify her
intention, the surgeon can deploy a counterfactual test to show that the death of the
patient need not be part of her goals. Roughly, the counterfactual test goes like this: if one
were able to choose a course of action that would achieve one’s goals without the bad
effect, and if one would thereby so choose, then one does not intend the bad effect; but if
one knowingly refrains from choosing that course of action, then one intends the bad
effect. Therefore, if this theory of intention is correct, it need not be the case that a
transplant team intentionally kills someone for their organs while following a protocol
that will lead them to secure the donor’s death.
3.2.2 Double Effect cannot justify mortal harvesting
The problem with this argument is that the counterfactual test is insufficient to
distinguish between what we intend as a means to an end, and what we foresee, but do
not intend as a side-effect. While it may reveal something interesting about our attitudes
77

Tännsjö assumes without argument that Kant’s principle that we must always treat someone as an
end, and never as a mere means is not contained in the sanctity of human life doctrine or Double Effect
reasoning. This is unwarranted assumption, but I will grant it for the sake of argument.
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towards the bad effect if we would not will it as an end in some possible world, it does
not follow that we do not will it as a means to an end in the actual world. The problem is
that the test confuses what we value with what we intend, which in turn, produces the
fallacious consequence that our intentions are only concerned with our ends. Since what
we ultimately value is determined by our end, and since the means to the end only have
instrumental value and therefore can be dispensed with if they fail to achieve the end, it is
mistakenly thought that we do not intend the means if we would be willing to do
something else to achieve our end (Di Nucci 2014, 34). There is, however, no reason to
believe that what we intend is exclusively defined by the ends to which we aim. The fact
is the means are intended, since they are chosen for the sake of bringing about the end.
What one could choose in another possible world does not determine what is intended in
the actual world.
Despite the failure of the counterfactual test of intention, Tännsjö could insist that
the surgeon need not intend the death of the unsuspecting patient if determining one’s
intention is only a matter of identifying the descriptions under which a proposal for action
is chosen. Interestingly enough, this view of intention is defended by some very reputable
sanctity-of-life advocates. In particular, John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle
(2001) defend an account of intention that is purely “first-personal,” meaning that an
agent’s intentions are only constituted by the agent’s reasons for choosing what to do (or,
more technically, by the agent’s reasons for choosing a nested sequence of things to do).
On this view, what one intends is just a function of what one chooses to do, and what one
chooses to do is identified by the description under which one’s proposal for action is
selected. As Christopher Tollefsen helpfully explains, “What the agent intends is thus a
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matter of this proposal, and nothing else: facts about the world, of causality, or of the
proximity of one effect to another do not determine agent’s intention…” (2008, 9). Thus,
to morally evaluate an agent’s action one must identify the act-description in question
from the agent’s perspective and not from the perspective of an observer (Finnis, Grisez,
and Boyle 2001, 12).78 For example, under the circumstances in which the death of a
mother and her unborn child is unavoidable due to complications in delivery, Finnis,
Grisez, and Boyle believe it is possible for a doctor to perform a craniotomy without
intending the child’s death — “even one involving emptying the baby’s skull,” as they
daringly put it (2001, 28).79 How is this possible? By truthfully articulating what is
included and not included in one’s proposal for action. If one’s reason for acting is “to
save the life of the mother,” and to do that, one chooses “to remove the child from the
womb,” and to do that, one chooses “to change the dimensions of the child’s skull,” and
to do that, one chooses “to empty the contents of the skull and collapse it,” then it does
not follow that one chooses to kill the child, because the child’s death appears nowhere in
the means chosen in the agent’s deliberation. Indeed, this course of action could be
adopted for the same reasons if the child died before the operation, so it need not be the
case that the doctor intends the child’s death. We can construct a parallel case for
Tännsjö’s purposes: if the surgeon’s reason for acting is “to save the lives of the five,”
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We might favor this view of intention, because it avoids (1) the problems posed by Chisholm’s
(1970) “diffusiveness” and “division” principles in our theory of action, (2) the dubiousness of the “actomission” distinction, and (3) the problematic presence of “moral luck” in our practices of attributing moral
responsibility to people (Tollefsen 2006, 454–58). We might object to this view, however, because it makes
morality only a matter of the heart, and never a matter of events or processes that occur in the physical
world (see Jennifer A. Frey forthcoming).
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A craniotomy in this context is the operation of cutting or crushing the child’s head to effect
delivery.
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and to do that, she chooses “to change the location of these organs to those locations,”
and to do that, she chooses “to cut up the patient and distribute the relevant organs
accordingly,” then it does not follow that she chooses to kill the patient, because the
patient’s death appears nowhere as a chosen means in the agent’s deliberation. Indeed,
this course of action could be adopted for the same reasons even if the patient suddenly
died before the operation, so it need not be the case that the doctor intends the patient’s
death. That this would be wrong because the patient does not consent to the operation is a
Kantian concern, which is something we are setting aside for the moment. Thus, Tännsjö
can preserve Double Effect’s intend-foresee distinction in a way that shows how one
could engage in mortal harvesting without intending anyone’s death.
Or can he? It is not clear to me whether those who hold to a purely first-person
account of intention would agree that the surgeon need not intend the death of the
unsuspecting patient. After all, defenders of this account do expect agents to be rational,
and that they “must believe there to be some relationship between what is chosen as the
means and what is desired as the end state of affairs” (Tollefsen 2006, 453). It would be
odd if the surgeon genuinely believed that the death of the unsuspecting patient did not
contribute to saving the five, because it would seem, from the surgeon’s point of view,
that the removal every vital organ from the patient would entail the patient’s death. Yet
defenders of this view of intention, like Lawrence Masek, contend that “an effect is
intended (or part of the agent’s plan) if and only if the agent A has the effect as an end or
believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A’s end”
(2010, 569). In his view, the surgeon can remove all of the patient’s vital organs without
intending his death if she retrieves the organs from his body without believing that his
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death contributes to saving the five (Ibid., 570). How could this work? Consider how
Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle justify the performance of a craniotomy:
…a surgeon who performed a craniotomy and could soundly analyze the action,
resisting the undue influence of physical and causal factors that would dominate
the perception of observers, could rightly say ‘No way do I intend to kill the baby’
and ‘It is no part of my purpose to kill the baby (2001, 24).
If this works for the craniotomy case, then it should work for the transplant case too (‘No
way do I intend to kill the patient. It is no part of my purpose to kill him’). But if this is
correct, then this shows that Tännsjö’s argument depends on the purely first-person
account of intention being true, which means one has to be committed to more than just
Double Effect and the sanctity of life — one also has to take up this controversial account
of intention to make his argument succeed. But this not a view assumed here, and despite
the respect I have for its proponents, I think we have good reason to reject it and prefer an
account that accommodates some constraints from a third-person perspective on an
agent’s intentions.80
Let us ask this question: can we soundly analyze an action while resisting the
influence of causal factors concerning death? Obviously, Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle
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In fairness to Finnis and friends it does not follow that Tännsjö has a way of preserving Double
Effect’s proportionality criterion, because one can reject his consequentialist interpretation of it (Tännsjö
2015, 29). This is precisely what Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle do. In an earlier work, they reject the
assumption that determining proportionality depends on being able to objectively commensurate the
relevant goods at stake; they contend that a condition of fairness has to be met, and that no natural number
of individual lives at stake overrides this condition (Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez 1987, 263–68). Because
Double Effect is ambiguous with respect to what its proportionality criterion requires, Tännsjö cannot
assume that it involves a utilitarian calculus by which the goods at stake are measurable by some objective
non-moral standard. To do so is to beg the question. Still, he might complain that the standards of fairness
invoked are Kantian in their character (e.g. the Golden Rule or the principle of universalizability) and that
we cannot appeal to these by his hypothesis, so let us set this concern aside for the sake of a deeper analysis
of where Tännsjö’s argument goes wrong.
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believe we can, yet their belief depends on the relevant causal factors being “undue” as
they say (Ibid.). What makes them “undue” and what exactly does this mean? It is not
exactly clear, but a plausible interpretation is that undue causes are rationally
unwarranted insofar as they are irrelevant for bringing about the end of one’s action
despite their immediate effects and “impressive physical directness” (Ibid.). It is just not
the case that the death of the patient causes the five to survive — it is the transplant of the
organs removed from the patient into the five, not the death of the patient, that produces
this outcome (pace Sartorio 2009, 585). But all that follows from this is that death is not
intended as the effective means to the end; it does not follow that death is not intended
insofar as it is constitutive of the means chosen to bring about the end. To remove the
patient’s vital organs and not replace them or supplement their function is to fatally injure
to the patient, and the life-saving transplant cannot go forward without choosing to inflict
this fatal injury. The same is true in the craniotomy case: to empty the contents of
someone’s head and crush their skull is to fatally injure them (Jensen 2014, 279–80).
Physical descriptions like this matter. If they do not, then practical reason is entirely
mental, inwardly available only to the agent, something that is completely at odds with
commonsense medical practice.81 In fact, medical textbooks from the nineteenth century
represent a conceptual connection between the size-reshaping of the fetus and the
destruction of its life. Speaking of the craniotomy procedure, Richard Cooper Norris
states that “These terms are applied to all destructive operations by which the volume of
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Philosophically speaking, the problem is that practical reasoning becomes subject to a ‘private
language’ in which the meaning of its referring terms can only be known to the speaker, something that is
impossible as Wittgenstein famously argued. I owe this point to John O'Callaghan who relayed it to me in a
personal conversation.
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the fetus is reduced in order to permit delivery per vias naturales” (Norris 1895, 926
emphasis added on “destructive”). Though the injury may not be choiceworthy for the
doctor in itself, it nonetheless remains an injury that must be inflicted, and a fatal one at
that. Fatality is built into what is done in these cases, because the nature of human beings
is such that they cannot suffer a major change in the shape of their skulls or the loss of
the functioning of all their vital organs and survive. Since these forms of surgery are
ordered unto death, they cannot be knowingly chosen without intending death even if
death is not what precisely brings about the realization of one’s goals. Such acts are
aimed at death by their nature, and if they are performed on an innocent person, they
cannot be aimed only at the good effect (S. L. Brock 1998, 204-05 n17). Thus, Double
Effect’s requirement that the act be aimed only at the good effect is unsatisfied.
Defenders of the first-person view might reply that there is no good reason why
the surgeon must believe that death is included or entailed by the intended state of affairs
or the morally relevant description of the action: “cranium-narrowing for the purposes of
removal from the birth-canal” (Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle 2001, 26 n38) or “removing the
vital organs from the patient’s body and transplanting them into the bodies of the
recipients.” These states of affairs are merely causally related, not conceptually related, to
states of affairs involving death. This they maintain in the face of the influential criticism
of Philippa Foot, who compared the craniotomy case to a group of cave explorers who
use dynamite to blast a fat man stuck in the cave’s only exit out of the way so as to avoid
the threat of rising flood waters (Foot 1967). As Joseph Boyle says, “In both cases there
are two states of affairs — the skull’s being collapsed and the fetus’s dying, the fat man’s
being blown up and his dying — which are causally and not intrinsically related.” (Boyle

104

1977, 308). The mere logically possibility that the child or the fat man could survive
these ordeals (assume a miracle occurs) creates the logical space for thinking that the bad
effect can remain outside the surgeon’s intention.
My response to this is to say that the conceptual relation between the relevant
procedures and death need not be so strong as to require that it be logically impossible to
perform these procedures without death occurring. We should press Boyle to accept a
conceptual relation between death and the relevant procedures and, as he acknowledges,
“the relevant physical laws and the present state of medical technology” (Ibid., emphasis
original). One cannot deliberate between proposals for actions without taking these things
into account, since our deliberation is shaped by the causal structures of the world, which
are perceived by the one deliberating (Jensen 2010, 463). What we perceive in these
surgical procedures is that death is practically inseparable from their operation (we
cannot plan on miracles happening). Just as crushing one’s skull is a form of killing
someone, so too is removing all of their vital organs for transplant. The destruction of
human life is not accidently related to these procedures, which gives us a reason for
thinking there is a conceptual relation between the two.
A recent analysis of the intend-foresee distinction and the so-called problem of
“closeness” by William FitzPatrick helps articulate what I take this conceptual relation to
be in terms of constitution. He writes,
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[I]f the relation between two states of affairs is known to the agent, natural, and
constitutive rather than merely causal, then we cannot properly speak of an
agent’s intending the one while merely foreseeing but not intending the other
(2006, 603).
Some caveats:82 (1) the relation between two states of affairs need not be known, but only
believed insofar as one’s intention is concerned, and (2) the relation between states of
affairs need not be “natural” because some social practices are sufficient for one state of
affairs (e.g. I ordered a pizza and you delivered it) to constitute another (e.g. I owe you
for the pizza) (Anscombe 195883). Nevertheless, it follows, as FitzPatrick says with
reference to the craniotomy case, that “the fetus’s skull’s being crushed constitutes its
being seriously injured or killed, rather than just being a cause of it, so that it is
impossible to aim at the first without thereby aiming at the second (except in the unlikely
case of ignorance of the relation between skull crushing and injury or death, which we
may set aside)” (Ibid., 595). This explains why the surgeon cannot avoid illicit activity by
describing the proposal for action as “cranium-narrowing for the purposes of removal
from the birth-canal” or “removing the vital organs from the donor’s body for the
purposes of transplanting them into the five” without including in the meaning of the
description that one is “performing lethal surgery on an innocent person.” The mind of a
competent surgeon cannot soundly exclude death from these sort of proposals for action
any more than the mind of a shrewd older brother cannot soundly exclude the destruction
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(so as to avoid the criticisms of Nelkin and Rickless 2015, 389–93).
I take Anscombe’s discussion of “brute facts” to be facts to representative of material causation
while O’Brien and Koons take it to be “something analogous to the relation of matter to form” (O’Brien
and Koons 2012, 670). How to precisely characterize this relation is not important for my main purpose,
which is to claim that “a context of normal procedure” (Anscombe 1958, 71) or a social convention can
determine the constitution relations between one state of affairs and another.
83
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of his kid sister’s balloon from a proposal to prick it with a pin (Austriaco 2005, 86).84
This is not to say that the surgeon’s perspective counts for nothing in our moral
assessment. If he is mentally unstable, we would judge him differently than we would if
he were a Nietzschean sociopath who wants to demonstrate his surgical prowess to
himself. Nonetheless, while we may choose an action under a description that best
promotes our goals, we should not believe that other descriptions of the very same action
are excluded from our intention just because we did not choose them under those
particular descriptions. It is one thing to say we do not intend to kill the patient for his
organs if we genuinely do not know that surgically removing them for transplant would
secure the patient’s death (an unlikely possibility). It is quite another to say we do not
intend the patient’s death if we know better, but choose to act on the basis of a
description that fails to represent our knowledge of other un-choiceworthy descriptions
that identify the same act.
In our analysis of intention, we should not become beholden to the definite article
(the intention), as if there could only be one unique intensional description of the action
in question (Chappell 2013, 99–101). We should heed the advice of Elizabeth Anscombe
who cautions us against “choosing a description under which the action is intentional, and
giving the action under that description the intentional act” (2005, 223 emphasis orginal).
Her words are worth quoting at length:
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To be sure, sorting out constitution cases will be tricky. But we should not be too critical of this
conceptual relation, otherwise we are burdened with explaining the relationship between crushing the skull
and resizing the skull. Surely, the former constitutes the latter!
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The suggestion is that that is all I am doing as a means to my end. This is as if one
could say: ‘I am merely moving a knife through such-and-such a region of space’,
regardless of the fact that that space is manifestly occupied by a human neck, or
by a rope supporting a climber. ‘Nonsense,’ we want to say, ‘doing that is doing
this, and so closely that you can’t pretend only the first gives you a description
under which the act is intentional’. For an act does not merely have many
descriptions, under some of which it is indeed not intentional: it has several under
which it is intentional. So you cannot choose just one of these, and claim to have
excluded others by that. Nor can you simply bring it about that you intend this and
not that by an inner act of ‘directing your intention’. Circumstances, and the
immediate facts about the means you are choosing to your ends, dictate what
descriptions of your intention you must admit (Ibid., emphasis original).
To make his argument go through, then, Tännsjö would have to give some argument for
why we should ignore this advice.
Thus, there is no good reason to believe that a surgeon who cuts up a living
patient for his organs does not intend to kill the patient for his organs. Anyone who does
this causes the patient’s death in a non-accidental way since the operation is inherently
lethal. For these reasons, then, no one should appeal to Double Effect so as to deny that
one kills the patient for his organs by engaging in an act of mortal harvesting.
3.3 Transplant surgery is an activity of shared cooperation
So far, we have been engaging in the familiar thought-experiment of a lone
surgeon taking organs from an unsuspecting patient to analyze more abstract principles.
Yet such a scenario is not all that feasible. To further defend the claim that someone is
killed for their organs if one undergoes mortal harvesting, it is worth reflecting more
generally on the sort of activity transplant surgery actually is. This sort of surgery
typically does not involve a single agent. While it definitely involves a lead surgeon who
shoulders the responsibility for the outcome, it is a shared activity that coordinates the
actions of a number of individuals, each of whom follows a specific role for the sake of
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retrieving at least one organ for transplant, or transplanting at least one organ into a
recipient (or both).
Transplant surgery is philosophically interesting because it is an example of a
shared cooperative activity. As such, the participants exemplify the three characteristics
Michael Bratman names in his influential paper on the topic (1992): (1) mutual
responsiveness to one another, (2) a commitment to a joint activity, and (3) a
commitment to mutually supporting each other in the ways appropriate for carrying out
the end of that activity (see also his 2014). Thus, at the very least, a planning theory of
intention is involved in their activity, which serves to unify the intentional actions of the
individual agents.85 As Bratman explains:
According to the planning theory of our individual agency, our practical thought
and action is structured by plans, plans that are normally partial and need to be
filled in as time goes by. We characterize these plan structures by joint appeal to
their characteristic roles in our temporally extended agency and to underlying
rationality norms of consistency, agglomerativity, means-end coherence, and
stability. Intentions are plan states (Bratman 2015, 1–2).
The element of planning is found in the protocols, which are designed with the intention
to facilitate cooperation among the members so as to achieve the best outcomes. In
current practice, the management of deceased donors requires serious attention to
utilizing and directing the body’s remaining functions toward maintaining organ health so
that the target organs will remain viable for transplant.86 One study found a 10% increase
in lungs recovered when standard donor management practices involving aggressive
therapies were carefully followed (Levine et al. 2003). Refinement of surgical techniques
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While I am in agreement with Anscombe concerning the nature of intention in general, it should be
noted that Bratman is not, which I nevertheless take to be salutary for my case: one need not be committed
to Anscombe’s theory to properly understand what sort of activity transplant surgery is.
86
For a nice overview of this process see McCartney and Wood (2011).
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have also yielded net increases of organs available for transplant (Gridelli and Remuzzi
2000). One particularly efficient example is the procedure of splitting a liver from an
adult donor into two and transplanting the grafts into an adult and a child (Malatack et al.
1987). Thus, the better the plans and the cooperation there is among the members of the
transplant team, the better the chance there is at procuring healthy organs. In a wellworking transplant team, all the members of the team act with the intention to achieve the
goal of organ recovery when a specific protocol is followed — a protocol being a
procedural set of instructions that is able to guide members of the team in their effort to
retrieve healthy organs for transplant.
Therefore, if a protocol calls for actions that would have a team secure the
donor’s death, then any team who successfully follows it intentionally kills the donor.
More specifically, to successfully carry out a procedure that secures the donor’s death for
the sake of retrieving healthy organs is to kill someone for their organs. By way of
shorthand, this is what I mean when I say transplant protocols that would have us secure
the death of the donor would have us kill someone for their organs which is identical with
the first premise of my master argument. Insofar as the Don’t Kill rule is concerned, these
sorts of protocols ought not be followed. To do so would be to engage in mortal
harvesting.
3.4 Conclusion
My general strategy in this chapter has been to show how different theories of
intention, which emphasize or exclude either the first- or third-person perspectives of the
agents involved, lead to counterintuitive claims or faulty conclusions concerning what
constitutes medical killing. We saw how defenders of the first-person view could
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advocate some counter-intuitive act-descriptions by virtue of their mistaken insistence
that only the inward mental content of the description of the proposal for action specifies
the action. On the other hand, we saw how Miller, Truog, and Brock disregard the
relevance of the first-person perspective as it relates to withdrawing life-support by
reducing intentional action to causal relations between different events of physical
activity or inactivity. A bare third-personal focus on efficient causation while ignoring
the older and more subtle ideas of formal and final causation inherent in intentional
action makes it impossible to understand the traditional distinction between killing and
letting die, if not human action altogether (Bishop 2006). We should remember that
human action in a medical context is voluntarily directed by reason to some end or goal,
and whether it is in the form of the end or the means to the end, it can have its own enddirected nature evident to observers situated in a context of established social practices.
This fits well with the planning theory of intention we find inherent in transplant
protocols, and it helps us avoid the mistake Coons and Levin make when they separate
the act of killing by surgical organ removal from the act of killing for organs, as if the
former has no end-directed relation to the latter, particularly in the context of organ
donation. What we should learn from all of this is that an adequate view of intention is
indispensable for making sense of the subjects of ethical analysis, that is, human actions;
having an impoverished view or no view at all leads us astray.
Therefore, as far as intentional actions are concerned, transplant protocols that
would have is secure the donor’s death would have us kill someone for their organs.
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Chapter 4: What Makes Killing for Organs Wrong?
Abstract: Chapter 4 defends the second premise of my master
argument, that killing someone for their organs is disrespectful to
the worth of the one killed. The fundamental problem with such a
practice, to which I assume the donor consents, is that it bestows
more worth on the organs than the donor who has them. What is at
stake is the very basis of human equality, which is an ineliminable
dignity that each of us has in virtue of having a rational nature. To
allow mortal harvesting would be to make our worth contingent
upon variable quality of life of judgments that can only be based
on properties that come in degrees. Thus, rejecting the ban on
killing donors comes at the expense of our egalitarian principles.
“True guilt arises only from an offense against a person, and a Down’s is not a person. There is no cause
for remorse, even though, certainly, there is for regret. Guilt over a decision to end an idiocy would be a
false guilt, and probably unconsciously a form of psychic masochism. There is far more reason for real
guilt in keeping alive a Down’s or other kind of idiot, out of a false idea of obligation or duty, while at the
same time feeling no obligation at all to save that money and emotion for a living, learning child.”
— Joseph Fletcher
“As far as the right to life is concerned, every innocent human being is absolutely equal to all others. This
equality is the basis of all authentic social relationships which, to be truly such, can only be founded on
truth and justice, recognizing and protecting every man and woman as a person and not as an object to be
used.”
— John Paul II

4.0 Introduction
In this chapter, I defend the second premise of my master argument, that killing
someone for their organs is disrespectful to the worth of the one killed. As will be made
clear, the fundamental problem with such a practice, to which I assume the donor
consents, is that it bestows more worth on the organs than the one who has them. What is
at stake is the very basis of human equality, which is an ineliminable dignity that each of
us has in virtue of having a rational nature. To allow mortal harvesting would be to make
our worth contingent
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upon variable quality of life of judgments that can only be based on properties that come
in degrees. Or so I shall argue in the coming pages.
In the first section I defend the notion that the wrongness of killing involves an
act of disrespect, though I deny that it is our autonomous choice that is the primary object
of respect; rather, I contend that it is the human person as an individual substance with a
rational nature. As I’ve already mentioned, such beings possess an ineliminable dignity
that implies that there is no threshold one can cross in the diminishment of one’s wellbeing that would make us worthy of destruction. Some preliminary words about this are
in order as “dignity” is sometimes thought to be a “useless” concept (Macklin 2003). I do
not mean to dispute that there is some sense in which we lose our “dignity” in suffering,
insofar as “dignity” is understood as a subjective sense of self-worth or self-respect. But
the kind of dignity I am talking about is more fundamental, an objective kind that makes
us matter, and therefore, makes our suffering matter. Why should we believe in this?
Here is my quick and dirty argument. If this dignity could be stripped from us through
suffering or other deprivations (suppose we are forever deprived of the ability to feel
pain), then our suffering would matter less and less, the more and more our dignity
diminishes through suffering or deprivation. But this is not the case. Therefore, we have a
dignity that cannot be stripped from us.87 This is the most I will say about this, so
whatever disagreement one might have at this point will either have to grant me my
assumptions for the sake of argument or dismiss the argument entirely.
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The astute reader will note that this argument constitutes my reasons for rejecting sentience as the
criterion for moral status, though I affirm that it does make one morally considerable. As I understand the
terms, moral status does not come in degrees whereas moral considerability does.
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In the second section I argue that the basis for our dignity is our rational nature,
which is marked by the possession of a basic, natural capacity for rational action. This
account is grounded in a capabilities-style approach that conceives of human beings as
members of a natural kind that has at its root the capacities for rational action, the kind of
action that is constitutive of human flourishing, something that everyone agrees ought to
be safeguarded if not promoted. Kind membership is what matters for having these
capacities, not a certain degree of their performance. Essentially, the argument I defend is
that if anything has the set of basic capacities for rational action, it has dignity (or “moral
status”); all human beings have that set no matter their level of maturity or disability;
therefore, all human beings have dignity, which makes them objects of respect (following
DiSilvestro 2010). I then address objections to this argument, specifically from the appeal
to “marginal cases” (anencephalic infants, PVS patients, etc.) which is supposed to show
that killing such individuals is of no more concern than killing a non-human animal.
In the third section I address the objection that the true nature of respect involves
honoring the wishes of the donor, and not the donor’s life. In the final two sections I
show how our political equality is threatened by a policy that would permit mortal
harvesting. Traditionally, an unacceptable reason for killing is to kill an innocent human
being in order to benefit another, which is an application of the longstanding Talmudic
principle ain dochin nefesh mipnei nefesh — one life may not be set aside to ensure
another life (Choong 2014; Jotkowitz 2008). This principle is precisely what is at issue in
the debate over the rule against killing donors for their organs, whether it be authorized
by the donor or not. Those who reject the dead-donor rule must reject this principle. But
doing so comes at a cost: either our egalitarian principles ought to be revised or none of
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us are protected from being exploited for whatever purpose is deemed expedient. What
follows, then, is my account of this position.
4.1 The wrongness of killing: A matter of respect
Respect-based theories feature prominently in the ethics of killing. They are
typically contrasted with harm- or deprivation-accounts, which make the badness of the
victim’s death central to the wrongness of killing, something respect-based theories deny.
The classic representation of the deprivation account is articulated well by Don Marquis;
he says “for any killing where the victim did have a valuable future like ours, having that
future by itself is sufficient to create the strong presumption that the killing is seriously
wrong (1989, 195 emphasis original). More succinctly, Ellen Kappy Suckiel says, “if
dying is not always bad, then killing may not always be wrong (1978, 47 emphasis
original). This claim seems intuitive to many, and a vivid illustration of the power of this
“intuition” comes from the honest words of Jonathan Glover:
It does not seem plausible to say that there is no conceivable amount of future
misery that would justify killing someone against his will. If I had been a Jew in
Nazi Germany, I would have considered very seriously killing myself and my
family, if there was no other escape from the death camps. And, if someone in
that position felt that his family did not understand what the future would feel like
and so killed them against their wishes, I at least am not sure this decision would
be wrong (1977, 82 emphasis original).
Anyone familiar with the Holocaust literature will understand, however dimly, the
bleakness of such a future. It is not hard to see the reason behind the malediction of an
inmate who ‘greeted’ Elie Weisel and his father with these words, “You should have
hanged yourselves rather than come here. Didn’t you know what was in store for you
here in Auschwitz?” (Wiesel 1958, 30). Sadly, examples like these could be multiplied,
so let us suppose for the sake of argument that the deprivation account is correct. Then

115

how do we explain the wrongness of a Nazi SS officer’s action when he shoots a
hysterical mother dead on her way to the gas chamber? After all, he eliminates the cause
of her hysteria: the thought of watching her two small children die from poison gas
twenty minutes later. We might think his action is wrong insofar as it causes bad effects
on her kids and those around her, or insofar as it comes from a vicious character (or
both). Be that as it may, neither of these explanations address what he does to her, and
since the deprivation account is only concerned with what he takes away from her, which
certainly is not a “future of value,” he does nothing bad to her and perhaps something
nice. This is hard to believe. What remains unexplained is the fact that he wrongs her,
and that he does not merely act wrongly with respect to some principle of utility or theory
of human flourishing. Furthermore, there is a sense in which the Nazis wronged their
victims equally. Suppose the woman’s children die in the gas chamber with their elderly
grandfather; it seems that the killing of the grandfather is just as objectionable as the
killing of the grandchildren even though a greater deprivation of life-goods is suffered by
the children. While our sense of tragedy may vary with the amount of life-goods lost, our
sense of injustice does not. Why is this? An intuitive, though I think not fully satisfying,
answer is that the Nazis took their victim’s lives without their consent. As Warren Quinn
explains,
Among the several moral reasons you may have not to kill me, take me captive, or
subject me to your idea of the good life, perhaps the most important lies in the
simple fact that I choose, or would choose were I to consider the matter, that you
do not. Viewed in this way these rights are nothing other than equally distributed
moral powers to forbid and require behavior of others, and violations of them are
nothing other than refusals to respect the exercise of these powers (1984, 49
emphasis original on 'choose'; emphasis added on 'nothing other').
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Since the choice to go on living is all-or-nothing, the violation of that choice is all-ornothing. Hence, a principle of respect for autonomy remains unsatisfied, and this seems
sufficient to explain how it is that the Nazi’s not only wronged their victims, but wronged
them equally.
4.1.1 Against the disjunctive theory
Respect for autonomy, however, is not absolute; nearly everyone is agreed that it
would be impermissible to kill healthy people upon their request.88 Fortunately, respecttheorists need not and should not deny that part of what explains the wrongness of killing
is that it harms the victim in terms of a deprivation of life-goods lost in death. Nor are
those who contend for deprivation-accounts required to deny the moral significance of
respect. Hence, the prominence of what I shall call disjunctive theories, which
incorporate the moral significance of respect, and identify autonomous choice as the
relevant object of respect. Though they vary in their details, what unifies them is the
general claim that the wrongness of killing can be explained either in terms of the harm
done to the victim, or the disrespect to the victim’s autonomy, or both (e.g. Quinn 1984;
McMahan 2002, chap. 3; Luper 2009, chap. 7). On this view, it is permissible to kill an
innocent person, S, if and only if (1) S is not (or is only minimally) harmed by death, and
(2) S gives valid consent to be killed by some humane means; it is wrong to kill S just if
one of these conditions is unsatisfied. That killing someone who meets these conditions
might benefit others, as it would in organ donation, only bolsters the reason for killing by
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A notable exception is John Harris who writes, “'Should I be permitted voluntarily to donate a vital
organ like the heart? Again, if I know what I am doing then I do not see why I should not give my life to
save that of another if that is what I want to do” (Harris 1992, 113). Yet his respect for autonomy is merely
pragmatic, since as he (in)famously argued that it would permissible to institute a “survival lottery” in
which some people were killed at random for their organs regardless of their consent (Harris 1975).
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transplant surgery; hence, the disjunctive theory is attractive to those who would sanction
such actions and something like it is asserted by everyone in favor of mortal harvesting.89
Plausible as it may be, the disjunctive theory is unsatisfying. What exactly counts
as a “harm” and who decides whether or not it is “negligible?” If harms are just setbacks
to one’s interests (Miller and Truog 2012a, 115; Feinberg 1984), and one has an interest
in sacrificing one’s life for others above all else, why must the donor even be sick? A
healthy person, perhaps like the main character in the film Seven Pounds (Columbia
Pictures, 2008), could claim to be harmed if this preference goes unsatisfied, which just
collapses harm into the logic of preference satisfaction making the disjunctive theory
redundant.90 To be sure, the relevant sense of harm is often construed as something lost in
terms of a “worthwhile life” (Glover, 1977), or “biographical life” (Rachels, 1986), or “a
future of value” (Marquis, 1989) or an exercisable ability “to act or do things” (SinnottArmstrong and Miller, 2013). It seems that there is little if not nothing left to lose near
the end of life if these things constitute what is lost in an act of harmful killing. But who

89
There is a discussion worth commenting on about the so-called “Nothing is Lost” principle (NIL),
which purportedly permits the killing of the innocent when (1) the innocent will die regardless of what is
done, and (2) other innocent life will be saved. Somewhat recently, it was put forward by Gene Outka to
justify lethal experimentation on spare embryos left-over from in vitro fertilization practices. Interestingly,
Outka realizes that NIL justifies mortal harvesting and even medical experimentation on those “who are
slated for death anyway” (2002, 205). To avoid these results, Outka appeals to one’s “agential history” to
make it “impermissible to destroy any entity for body parts even if “he or she does not now have any
considerable future” (Ibid. emphasis original). Miller and Truog are eager to endorse NIL, but reject
Outka’s “agential history” criterion as irrelevant (2012, 136–40; more on the irrelevance of an "agential
history" below). Yet their endorsement of NIL is qualified in terms of two additional conditions: (1) the
donor must not be harmed, and (2) the donor must provide valid consent. Given these conditions, the NIL
principle does little to justify mortal harvesting, and only names conditions that motivate it; avoiding harm
and respecting autonomy do all the work. This is why we should focus on disjunctive theories of the
wrongness of killing, and leave this principle aside.
90
That healthy people are willing to give up their lives for the sake of organ donation is not a fanciful
one. It was reported that Stanford’s heart transplant team was contacted by healthy individuals who wanted
to sacrifice their lives for the sake of saving others and advancing medical knowledge (Elliott 1995, 95). On
the idea that one can be harmed if one is disrespected, see Koppelman (2003).
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decides whether there is little if not nothing left to lose? If it is the patient, then we are
back to the logic of preference satisfaction again, which makes the disjunctive theory
redundant. If it is the doctor or some legal authority, then this assumes that people other
than the patient are in a position to determine whether the harm of death would be
acceptable or not if the patient’s death wish were honored. We would privilege the
patient’s wishes only when others (with some authorized standing) have judged her life
not to be worth living. Consequently, the patient’s self-determination ends up being quite
limited because she is only empowered to give up her life when she is in a diminished
state (Menikoff 2003); an autonomous choice for death deserves no respect if she is
healthy. Moreover, if the patient is terminally ill but chooses to go on living, her choice
will require some sort of justification if she is to be judged rational. Since we expect
human beings to provide reasons for their choices, the patient is required to justify her
continued existence under the pain of irrationality in a way that healthy people are not
(Velleman, 1992). This inequality is entirely contingent upon one’s health status, and
therefore places an unfair burden on the vulnerable so that they might enjoy one of the
most basic rights that should be guaranteed by any just society: the right not be killed.
The sort of “autonomy” given to the dying in the disjunctive theory masks a form of
paternalism more insidious than the kind the bioethics movement rejected in the 1970s,
and therefore the disjunctive theory should be rejected if autonomy is to have the sort of
worthiness of respect it is assumed to have.
On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to think that autonomy is being respected
too much. It may be against your will for me to poke you in the belly, but violating your
autonomy in this respect is not nearly as serious as me killing you against your will. What
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your will is concerned with matters quite a lot more than just the mere fact that you have
a will concerned with something, which indicates that the respect-worthiness of your
autonomy is determined by goods that are more fundamental than the good of autonomy
itself (Oderberg 2000, 58–59; pace Quinn’s “nothing other” clause above). Another way
autonomy may be respected too much is found in arguments that conclude that
incompetent individuals are just as entitled to the so-called “benefits of death” as
competent individuals from considerations of suffering (Doyal 2006). Since the suffering
of the incompetent matters no less than that of the competent, it is unfair for the
competent to be entitled to the so-called “good of death” and not the incompetent
(Rachels 1986, 179–80). It has long been observed that the disjunctive theory is simply
an ad hoc proposal that compromises between autonomy-based and harm-based
justifications for killing for the sake of garnering legal support for euthanasia.91 With
respect to euthanasia and the twin requirements of the disjunctive theory, Daniel Callahan
explains that:
Each [of the requirements] has its own logic, and each could be used to justify
euthanasia. But, in the nature of the case, that logic, it seems evident, offers little
resistance to denying any competent person the right to be killed, sick or not; and
little resistance to killing the incompetent, as long as there is good reason to
believe they are suffering. There is no principled reason to reject such logic, and
no reason to think it could long remain suppressed by the expedient of an arbitrary
legal stipulation that both features, suffering and competence, be present
(Callahan 1993, 108–9).92
Even if the legal stipulations were to remain intact with respect to mortal harvesting
practices, there would be no reason why the disjunctive theory should not be deployed to
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Rachels thinks that legislation limiting euthanasia to the voluntary variety is “devious” (Ibid.).
While competence may be “present” through an advanced directive, it still begs the question as to
why they would be needed at all if the good of death can bring about an end to suffering and a set of
healthy organs to others who need them.
92
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justify killing for the sake of medical experimentation, something few are willing to
entertain (a case of under-respect for autonomy?). As long as its conditions are satisfied,
it really does not matter how we use the living body before us. None of this counts as
decisive refutation of the disjunctive theory, but it does motivate a search for better one
and at least raises a more fundamental question: what is it that ought to be respected in a
respect-based view of killing?
4.1.2 The human person as the primary object of respect
I submit that the individual human person ought to be primary object of respect.
By “human person” I mean a flesh and blood Aristotelian substance that is a rational
animal, not something that just so happens to fall under an abstract description of being
an “autonomous agent” whatever that might be. Classically understood, the human
person is an individual substance with a rational nature (as Boethius would put it), a
definition that is hard to improve upon (Simpson 1988). This enduring idea includes both
autonomous and non-autonomous individuals, something that is recognizable in the
Belmont Report’s statements on “Respect for Persons.” As it says, “persons with
diminished autonomy are entitled to protection” and may be so severely compromised
that they should be excluded from activities that may harm them (National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979, 4).
One must distinguish this view from the contemporary one that reduces respect
for personhood to respect for autonomous agency, and consequently leaves those with
diminished autonomy at risk of not being protected (e.g. newborn infants in Tooley 2009;
Giubilini and Minerva 2013). As M. Therese Lysaught (2004) has shown, one can find
this subtle, but substantive shift from the particular human being to the property of
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autonomy in the early editions of the Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical
Ethics as well government reports on research involving human embryos (e.g. Advisory
Committee 1994).93 In the first edition of their famous book, Beauchamp and Childress
interpret Immanuel Kant as saying “a moral relation between persons is always one
where there is mutual respect for autonomy” and then infer that, “The principle of
autonomy thus applies to persons with autonomous choice” (Beauchamp and Childress
1979, 59–60 emphasis added).94 What might protect those with diminished autonomy is
what they call “the principle of human worth” according to which “human life has an
intrinsic value irrecoverably destroyed” in an act of killing (Ibid, 87, 88). While this
resembles what I am defending it is much too abstract and impersonal, which perhaps
explains why they thought the most reasonable interpretation of it is that “killing is prima
facie wrong and so permissible only if it is necessary to save the life of at least one
innocent person…” (Ibid., 88) — something that is quite compatible with mortal
harvesting!95 Contrast this watered down “principle” with the statements from Paul
Ramsey’s influential work (which appeared before the baleful era of “principlism”) that
banned mortal harvesting “out of respect” for the human being that is “presented to us
with its moral claims solely within the ambience of a bodily existence” (Ramsey 1970,
190–91). Further contrast Ramsey’s notion of respect as “holy awe” (Ramsey 1968, 76)
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In the latest edition of their book, Beauchamp and Childress reply that Lysaught has misunderstood
them to be implying that they deny that non-autonomous human beings are not worthy of respect
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 108, 142n12). Perhaps that is the case, but the question remains as to
what exactly it is that makes diminished human persons worthy of respect in the first place.
94
In the second edition they remark that the principle of autonomy “does not apply to persons who are
not in a position to act in a sufficiently autonomous manner” (Beauchamp and Childress 1983, 64).
95
The remaining part of the sentence concealed by the ellipses is “…or if it is necessary to preserve a
morally worthy society.”
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with the contemporary rhetoric of “respect” that has become so separated from the norms
of protection and so abstracted from the bodily subject before us, that we are now called
to give “profound respect” to human embryos while at the same time being told it is quite
permissible to destroy them for research purposes (Ethics Advisory Board 1979, 101; e.g.
Fitzpatrick 2003, 31). Such “respect” is not the kind anyone should want.
A recovery of a respect for persons in their bodily life, where they are prioritized
above whatever contingent properties they might have, is not only necessary for
safeguarding the individual from abuse and honoring the dignity inherent in each of us
(the dignity that makes our suffering matter), but it is also sufficient to explain what is
fundamentally wrong with killing: it simply destroys someone.96 Theories of the
wrongness killing that focus exclusively on the loss of the properties of the person,
whether it be a future of value or an autonomous will, are pathologically forgetful of the
particular being killed and leave aside this obvious factor in what makes killing wrong
when it is wrong. As Timothy Chappell97 remarks, “deprivation is not the main thing
wrong in killing, even when it is part of what is wrong. In killing, the main point is not
that something is taken away from someone, but that the someone is taken away”
(Chappell 2004, 111). The issue, then, is what grounds our dignity, that is, our worthiness
of respect such that we should always be protected from being destroyed for utilitarian
benefit.
4.2 The ultimate capacity for rational action as the basis of human dignity
I submit that the ultimate capacity for rational action is the basis of human

96
97

Or for those pesky substance dualists, it simply destroys someone on this earth.
Who now goes by the name Sophie Grace.
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dignity. What I mean by these terms will become clearer in the argument that follows.
We can begin by assuming that anyone who can read this text has human dignity, which I
will identify with “moral status” going forward. That is to say, they should be respected
as individuals who bear certain fundamental rights guaranteeing them the opportunity to
pursue human flourishing. Since they are able to be self-aware, make their own choices,
use language, engage in humor, be creative, form friendships, and pursue knowledge,
economic efficiency, political organization, and perhaps God or a sense of the ultimate,
we accord them a special status. And since human flourishing involves all of these
activities in one form or another, it is not uncommon to find lists of this sort in the
literature that relate these distinctively human capacities to our ethics of killing (even
unto radically different conclusions; e.g. Nussbaum 2008; Finnis 2011). I shall follow in
this line of thought, because the virtues of doing so is that we (1) generate criteria for
moral status that are not arbitrarily speciesist, which (2) can help explain why killing a
human being is a more serious matter than killing a non-human animal; these I take to be
desiderata for a good theory of the wrongness of killing.98 I use “rational action” as a
kind of general term for all of these activities. To be sure, there is a sense in which some
non-human animals engage in “rational action” insofar as they engage in means-to-ends
reasoning and pre-linguistic communication (MacIntyre 1999). Yet what remains
distinctive of human animals is that they are able to give and evaluate reasons for their
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A further comment on sentience: sentience is unable to help us explain why it is a more serious
matter to kill a human being than a non-human animal. Since both can experience pain, there is no reason
to suppose that our capacity to suffer pain matters more. That human beings may have a greater capacity
for suffering than non-human animals is due to our capacities for rational action: we are able to understand
what it is happening to us and others in ways animals do not, and part of what we understand is the loss of
life-goods towards which we are directed.
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actions, something I take to be distinctive of “rational action” as I deploy the term. That
is, if one is able to perform a rational action, then one is able to give and evaluate a
reason for doing so. We might want to amend our lists of actions in various ways, but the
general idea is that each of the forms of activity mentioned signifies rational action —
that is what matters in each of them. Hence, the wide and enduring agreement that the
sort of activity relevant for moral status or our “dignity” is related to rational action (from
the Stoics to moderns, especially Kant).
4.2.1 Why ultimate capacities must matter morally
Of course, it isn’t just rational action simpliciter that matters, it is also our
capacity to perform it. Indeed, capacities for rational action must matter morally.99 If only
actual exercises of rational action mattered, then we would lose our moral status every
time we fall into a deep, unconscious sleep, which is absurd. Nor does the likelihood that
I will perform some rational action in the future matter. If I am now under anesthesia
which would keep me out for a few hours, and it is true that I will die from a falling
meteor ten minutes from now, it does not follow that I lose my moral status ten minutes
before impact. Nor does the fact that I have a history of rational action matter.100 If
Parfit’s replication booth exists (Parfit 1984, 199–200), and it is true that Jones will
require a heart transplant at age 50, and he scans himself “in” at age 20, and Jones-clone
is scanned “out” when the time comes for the transplant, it does not follow that Jonesclone would have no more moral status than a brain-dead body just so long as he is kept
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The following is largely a summary of the argument developed by Russell DiSilvestro (2010, vol.
108, chap. 3)
100
Recall that Gene Outka is someone who appeals to a person’s past accomplishments of rational
action to make it “impermissible to destroy any entity for body parts even if “he or she does not now have
any considerable future” (2002, 205 emphasis original).
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from waking up. The unavoidable implication is that potentiality for rational action, in
some relevant sense, is both necessary and sufficient for moral status.
Although it is not easy to specify the relevant sense of this potentiality (see Lizza
2014), we all recognize the moral status of those who have an immediately exercisable
capacity for rational action. To have an immediately exercisable capacity for rational
action just is to have a first-order capacity to perform some rational action that is not
impeded by some circumstance or condition (DiSilvestro 2010, 108:26). Yet while the
presence of this capacity is sufficient for us to recognize that one has moral status, it is
not necessary to ground it. The dramatic story of Douglas Copland’s Girlfriend in a
Coma (1998) illustrates well how a temporary change in one’s possession of a first-order
capacity for rational action does not affect one’s moral status. As the story goes, Karen
McNeil wakes up from a coma she is in for seventeen years. But if only first ordercapacities matter, then Karen had no more moral status than a brain-dead body in the time
between her conscious states, and she could have been volunteered for transplant surgery
at any time in between. The same would be true of Terry Wallis, a man who awoke from
a nineteen-year-long coma and recovered fluent speech (Schiff and Fins 2007). Although
Wallis was misdiagnosed as being in a vegetative state when he actually was in a
minimally conscious state (Giacino et al. 2014), he nonetheless lacked a first-order
capacity for rational action while he was in it. Are we to believe that his moral status
came and went with his first-order capacities for rational action? We might think so
because of the length of time involved, but then how much time? There is no determinate
answer. If Wallis had only lost his first-order capacities for nineteen days, we could not
plausibly believe his moral status disappeared for nineteen days too.
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What if we move up in the order of capacities so that our capacity to have a firstorder capacity for rational action is what grounds our dignity (call this a second-order
capacity)? Answer: we can run what Russell DiSilvestro calls a “temporary change”
argument to show that what is true of the first-order capacity is also true of the secondorder capacity (DiSilvestro 2010, 108:37–42). Suppose Wallis loses his second-order
capacity for rational action, but retains a third-order capacity for the second-order
capacity (i.e., he has the capacity to develop the capacity for having a first-order capacity
for rational action). As time progresses, say for nineteen days, he regains his secondorder capacity. Again, we cannot plausibly believe his moral status disappeared for
nineteen days too. Once we get on the wheel of arranging capacities in a hierarchal
fashion, we are off to the races until we terminate in what might be called an “ultimate”
or “root” or “radical” or “basic” or “natural” capacity (Moreland and Rae 2000, 200–
202), which, I submit is the ground of our moral status. The upshot is that, for any nonultimate order of capacity for rational action that we stipulate, we can always conceive of
a temporary scenario where that order of capacity is lost (e.g. the second) and a higherorder capacity remains (the third), and therefore your moral status remains. Therefore, as
long as you have the capacity, at some level or other, to perform a rational action at any
given time, you have moral status at that time (DiSilvestro 2010, 108:75).101
4.2.2 What about “defective” humans or permanent changes?
Let us suppose the foregoing is correct. Still, it may be the case that we can
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We should be careful to note that basic capacities are not numerically distinct from first-order
capacities; rather, they are the “root” of a single capacity that “flowers” into an immediately exercisable
one given enough time and nurture. Conceptually parsing them in terms of first-order, second-order, and
basic capacities is just a convenient heuristic for explaining their properties and their significance for moral
status (see Lee's interesting reply [2011] to Marquis [2011] on this point).
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survive the loss of our ultimate capacities for rational action, and that we persist on as a
“human vegetable.” Therefore, if our moral status goes with our ultimate capacities for
rational action, and if we survive the loss of those capacities, then we will no longer have
moral status. There seems to be no reason to believe that the length of our lives and the
time we have our moral status are co-extensive. We all know some changes are
permanent; some injuries are so devastating that there is no coming back from them. Isn’t
the forgoing argument limited to temporary changes, in which there is a realistic
possibility of recovery? The fact that recovery is logically possible (via miracle) is simply
not strong enough for us to judge that someone who is permanently changed possesses
the relevant capacities for rational action — they seem to be lost forever. Thus, as
interesting as the argument may be for establishing the moral status of the very young or
temporally unresponsive, it does nothing for those who are typically thought to be
eligible for mortal harvesting: anencephalic children and PVS patients (Marquis 2011,
15).
What to make of these objections? Certainly, it does not follow from my
argument’s premises that that we cannot survive the loss of our ultimate capacities for
rational action. But neither does it follow that we can. That is an issue that stands
independent from the argument. The question to be settled, then, is whether our ultimate
capacities for rational action are essential to us. This brings us back, once again, to the
nature of human beings; what reason is there to believe that the basic capacity for rational
action is constitutive of human life? Why should we think that anyone who has the
capacity to live a biologically human life automatically has a capacity for rational action?
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The answer I shall defend is this: we cannot make sense of the human life form
without conceiving it as having a rational nature. While this claim is initially startling,
there is some evidence for it that can be found even in the writings of those who are
skeptical that all human beings have a basic capacity for rational action. Consider the
words of Jeff McMahan when he speaks of “a defective human embryo that lacks the
potential to develop into anything other than an anencephalic infant” (2002, 210
emphasis added). Or the case of Peter Singer who takes the following to be an “obvious”
truth:
If we compare a defective infant with a nonhuman animal, a dog or a pig, for
example, we will often find the nonhuman to have superior capacities, both actual
and potential, for rationality, self-consciousness, communication, and anything
else that can plausibly be considered morally significant (1994, 201 emphasis
added).
McMahan concurs when he says that those who are “severely retarded” are not only
cognitively comparable to certain non-human animals, “they also have no more potential
than those animals” (2002, 205 emphasis added). Now, there is a sense in which these
claims are true if they are only talking about some level of potential, but it seems that
they are making a stronger claim about some level of potential or other.102 What is
puzzling about these claims is that if such individuals lack potential for rational action at
every level, then they are not “defective” or “retarded” in any way. They simply develop
as they are supposed to develop and actualize exactly what they are in potency; yet
McMahan and Singer are eager to classify them in the set of things which have gone
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This also appears to be the case with Miller and Truog who, when writing of those just fall short of
whole-brain death, say, “these patients lack any capacity for experience, owing to profound brain damage
and the absence of any responsiveness to stimuli indicative of sensory awareness…” (2012, 121 emphasis
added).
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awry.103 What makes their claims so puzzling is that they assume that these so-called
“defective” humans are not supposed to be the way they are; rather, they are supposed to
develop into, and function as, a mature member of the human species. The old-timey
ideas of a human nature perfected by its complete development and the species-grounded
norms associated with concepts like health and proper function haunt these claims,
despite the fact that both of these thinkers work within a broadly neo-Humean tradition
that purports to be skeptical of such things.104
The point I want to make is this: basic or ultimate capacities for rational action are
present even in cases of severe disability or injury, because we would not be able to make
sense of ‘disability’ or ‘injury’ if these capacities were not essential to human beings in
their nascent or waning forms. A germ of this idea is found in Aristotle when he says:
If, though either the thing itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, it
has it not; e.g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses ‘deprived’ of sight;
the latter in contrast with its genus, the former in contrast with his own normal
nature (Metaph. V.22).
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This tension is especially evident in McMahan’s writings where he seems to assume a ‘genocentric’
view of organisms, which views organisms and their features as being determined by their genetic code.
This explains his difficulty in making sense of a human being without a genetic basis for the development
of a rational nature that is still “internally directed toward the full realization of its inherent nature as a
rational being” (2008, 90). Indeed, he ought to be puzzled if one’s genetic constitution exhausts one’s
internally directed capacities. But why assume that? An ‘organacentric’ view of organisms takes more into
account, specifically its dynamic epigenetic systems, to explain how it is that an organism’s development is
internally directed (The genocentric/organacentric distinction belongs to Goodwin 1994, 3). On this view, a
condition like anencephaly would arise not from some genetic mutation, but from disruptions in the
interaction of epigenetic factors. This controversy over the nature of the organism is not obscure either as it
turns up in cancer research (Baker 2014; Prehn 1994): is cancer caused by genetic mutations or
developmental problems? My point, however, is not to say what happens in anencephaly; rather, it is to say
that if it is a result of some genetic mutation, then we should not, as McMahan does, speak of human
organisms with anencephaly as undergoing some developmental failure.
104
Note McMahan’s candid admission to Tim Mulgan (2004), when he says Mulgan is “obviously
right” when Mulgan says "McMahan wants to combine a naturalistic, broadly Humean, picture of a world
where continuous properties come in degrees, with a set of Kantian intuitions that clearly require sharp
boundaries between persons and non-persons. This is an essentially unstable combination” (McMahan
2008, 94).
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Human injuries and disabilities, then, are understood in light of the “normal nature” of
human beings. While “normalizing” the body is anathema to certain social
constructivists, especially in the disability rights movement, the idea of a healthy, wellworking human life form is hard to escape. Insofar as the disability literature is
concerned, this helps explain why it is common among some social constructivists to
distinguish between “impairment” and “disability” where the former refers to physical
defects of the body, and the latter to a stigma or prejudice imposed on those defects by
society (e.g. Oliver and Barnes 2012, 22).105 The general idea is that there is a picture of
health relative to the human form that is defined, not by some statistical model of
averages (which, e.g., regarding eyesight measures below 20/20), but by capacities
intrinsic to the human form itself (20/20 is the standard for human vision regardless of
the average), and thereby constitutes our idea of a well-working member of the species
(contra Boorse 1977).106 As Michael Thompson writes, “every thought of an individual
organism as alive is mediated by thought of the life-form it bears. A true judgment of

105

Elizabeth Barnes has perhaps the best and most consistent approach to the social model of disability
I’ve seen that avoids “normalizing” the body. In her view, someone, S, is physically disabled in a context,
C, if and only if:
1.   S is in some bodily state x.
2.   The rules for making judgements about solidarity employed by the disability rights movement
classify x in context C as among the physical conditions that they are seeking to promote justice
for. (Barnes 2016, 46).
Yet dropping the idea of a healthy, well-working human life form from her analysis produces curious
results. On her model, pregnant women in the work place are physically disabled. Now there is a sense in
which this is true, but another in which it is not. Other complications notwithstanding, pregnancy is a sign
of health. Pregnant woman are “disabled” only if disability makes no reference to health, and only to
contingent social factors that make discrimination against pregnant women possible. Obviously, we have
prudential reasons to classify pregnant women in the workplace as “disabled” since it so happens that there
are legal protections for them at stake if they are so classified. But this is just a contingent social fact that is
a result of our imperfect attempt to safeguard the welfare of pregnant women in the workplace, something
that any just society could protect without appealing to the concept of disability.
106
Michael Thompson draws attention to how the truth conditions of what he calls “natural historical
judgments” do not depend on statistical inference. As he says, “although ‘the mayfly’ breeds shortly before
dying, most mayflies die long before breeding” (2008, 68 emphasis added).
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natural defect thus supplies an ‘immanent critique’ of its subject” (2008, 81).107 No
doubt, all things considered, a blind person can be healthier than a sighted person, but if
all other things are equal, a sighted person is healthier than the blind. Yet this ceteris
paribus comparison does not hold between humans and moles; nor does it hold, for the
same reasons, between non-disabled individuals and the sort of individuals Singer and
McMahan call “defective” provided that they are correct in their claim that such
individuals have no potential for rational action at some level or other. The consistent
thing to say is that such individuals are not even human at all.
One thinker who is refreshingly consistent on this point is Martha Nussbaum. She
writes,
Some types of mental deprivation are so acute that it seems sensible to say that
the life there is simply not a human life at all, but a different form of life. Only
sentiment leads us to call the person in a persistent vegetative condition, or an
anencephalic child, human (2006, 187 emphasis added).
She accepts this counter-intuitive claim, because she thinks it is more acceptable than the
alternative: that such an individual is human, but will “never be able to have a flourishing
life despite our best efforts” (Ibid.). While I will leave it to the reader to decide if she is
ultimately correct, I think there is more than just “sentiment” involved in our judgments
that such individuals are human.108 It is one thing for a PVS patient’s friends and relatives
to think that their loved one now lives a life not worth living or even no longer exists as a
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More clearly, he says “Your observations, which are at bottom always observations of individual
organisms, will thus lead in the end to a possible critique or evaluation of individual organisms and their
parts and operations. And they will lead to the articulation of general standards of critique applying to
organisms of the kind in question. This sort of critique of the individual is everywhere mediated by the
attribution to it of a specific form; to bring an individual under a life form is, we might say, at the same
time to bring it under a certain sort of standard” (Thompson 2004, 55 emphasis original).
108
The problem with sentiment is that it cuts both ways: it may very well be that what motivates some
to literally dehumanize the PVS patient and the anencephalic baby is sentiment, the kind that underlies
contempt rather than care for the body before us.
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person in some qualified sense; it quite another to think that there loved one is not there
at all (Olson 2009, 95). No doubt, one could embrace a tough-minded body-self dualism,
which identifies us with something that can only be accidently related to the human
organism lying there in the hospital bed, but body-self dualism is both contrary to
Nussbaum’s assumptions and metaphysically dubious. Nor does it follow from her
assumption that being capable of a flourishing life is essential to “human life” that the
anencephalic child or the PVS patient lack this capacity at every level. It is perfectly
reasonable to suppose that someone in a PVS who is protected and cared for has a more
flourishing life than one who is starved, mocked, or sexually abused. The same can be
said of the anencephalic child; better to be held and made comfortable in the little time
that remains than to be thrown in the medical waste bin as if the anencephalic baby were
on the same metaphysical plane as its placenta (of human origin, but not a human being).
It is simply not the case that nothing good or bad can happen to a person if that person
has no way of experiencing what is happening.109 The capacity to experience one’s state
of flourishing may be absent, but that capacity is not required to enjoy the opportunity to
flourish as such.110 No doubt such opportunities are limited and will look quite different
from those of a healthy adult, but they are nevertheless real opportunities with real human
goods at stake.111
Aside from these complaints, however, is the more important question Nussbaum
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Pace Kurt Baier who says a comatose “human individual may have no qualitative life and so
nothing may be a good (or evil) to him” (1979, 167 ), quoted in Rolston (1982, 341). What we do and what
is done to us matters in ways that go beyond that which we experience or not, as Nozick’s “experience
machine” thought experiment illustratively teaches us (Nozick 1974, 42–45).
110
The same is true of being harmed; one need not be aware of the harm in question to be harmed.
111
I owe these points to Tollefsen (Tollefsen 2010, 217–18).
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raises: do the anencephalic child and the PVS patient fall into a different species category
or none at all? If so, then they still cannot be called “defective” or “injured” humans for
they are not human at all. If they are members of a different species, then what we have is
absence of mental capacity, not a deprivation, because the subject of deprivation — the
human being — no longer exists. But then what else could these “lacking” individuals be
but organisms of some sort? Note the oddness of there being a human organism as a
whole lying there in the hospital bed the moment before it loses the relevant capacities,
and then suddenly goes out of existence and is instantly replaced by a similar looking
organism as a whole. To be sure, an argument from oddness is not sufficient to
undermine this as a consistent metaphysical thesis and no amount of empirical evidence
is going to determine whether or not this is the case. Yet Ockham’s Razor should lead us
to adopt a simpler explanation: there is a human being there that is profoundly disabled,
because it lacks the ability to activate its ultimate capacities for rational action (Eberl
2011, 15).
Nor are we in a good enough epistemic position to place the PVS patient and the
anencephalic child in the same category as the brain-dead body. The fact is our diagnostic
tests for anencephaly and PVS are not reliable enough to confirm these conditions (see
Shewmon, Holmes, and Byrne 1999; Merker 2007 for details). Since the (drastic)
outcome for such individuals is essentially binary — life or death — we need a reliable
method for sorting out the humans from the non-humans by criteria that clearly and fairly
discriminate among them. Yet it is difficult to establish this solely on the degree of
incapacity one might display; some would be in and others out on the basis of negligible
differences, which is unjust. We should not presume such individuals are guilty of failing
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the test of species membership on such flimsy grounds. In short, we have reason to
believe that such individuals remain “rational animals” until they die.
In any event, the answer to McMahan’s question (2008, 88), “What reason is
there to suppose that all human beings are in fact internally directed or programmed
toward the development of a rational nature?” is this: they would not be human beings if
they were not so directed. One may consistently “dehumanize” them, alright, but not with
sufficient evidence nor without dubious metaphysics.
4.2.3 On species membership and other objections
Obviously, the criterion for species membership I am working with is essentially
metaphysical, and not merely biological. If we have an affirmative answer to the
question, “Is this a rational animal,” then we can say “This is human” — even if the
subject before us is a Martian. No doubt, this is a counter-intuitive claim but the reason it
is counter-intuitive is benign. It is simply a matter of convention, albeit one informed by
some long-standing biological observations, that “human” refers to all and only homo
sapiens from planet Earth; but it does not have to only refer to them. As David Oderberg
explains:
If we remove the fixation on biology (supplemented by chemistry and other
natural sciences) as the source of all knowledge of what it is to be human, we
remove the supposed self-evidence of the idea that rational animals without what
we think of as the specifically human body plan or genotype would not be human.
Further, if we place the appropriate emphasis on rationality we will have more
reason to see ranimals [his word for Martians, etc.] as human (2007, 105).
Given this sort of view, the problem of “speciesism” can be avoided since what is
problematic about it is the assumption that only biological concepts of species are
relevant for determining moral status and they are not; what matters is the metaphysical
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concept. If we are still hesitant to classify Martians as “human,” then so be it: all that
matters is that we classify them as rational animals, for that is sufficient to determine
their moral status.
An objection to this line of reasoning is what might be called the “Anything you
can do, an animal can do also” objection. According to this objection, once we start
moving upward in a hierarchy of capacities, we will have trouble drawing sharp
boundaries between human beings and non-human and animals and perhaps even insects.
Who is to say that a dog or a cat or even a spider lacks ultimate capacities for rational
action, and that all that is needed to actualize them is some not-yet-discovered
procedure?112 McMahan’s articulation of this objection is representative:
[I]f it is physically possible, through some as-yet-undiscovered form
of genetic therapy, to augment a defective fetus’s brain in a way that will enhance
its future cognitive capacities, it is surely physically possible to achieve the same
result in an animal-for example, a dog. If, therefore, we claim that a fetus with
cerebral deficits is a potential person on the ground that it is physically possible
for its brain to develop in ways that would be identity-preserving and would
overcome or repair the deficits, we must concede that a dog is a potential person
for the same reason (2002, 312).
While it may be far-fetched to think that there really could be talking beasts like we find
C.S. Lewis’ Narnia, the point is that McMahan and Singer need not be committed to the
claim that anencephalic babies and PVS patients lack the potential for rational action at
every level; rather, they need only affirm that these individuals lack some relevant level
of potential, which functions as a threshold for determining moral status. A dilemma,
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McMahan advocates for dogs (McMahan 2002, 302–29), Tooley for cats (1983, 191), and Boonin
for spiders (Boonin 2002, 23–24). For an extended criticism of this objection, see DiSilvestro (DiSilvestro
2010, 108:146–64).
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then, appears to remain for my position: either embrace the moral status of the whole
animal kingdom or accept the charge of speciesism.
In response, the first thing to say is that this objection succeeds only if it really is
physically possible to alter the constitution of a non-human animal in an identitypreserving way so that it will be able to engage in rational action. Why should we believe
that? Nor should the extent of metaphysical generosity given to non-human animals for
possibly bearing basic capacities for rational action end with capacities for rational
action. Why not also suppose that it is physically possible to alter the constitution of, say,
a cow in an identity-preserving way so that it will be able to jump over the moon? If we
are inclined against such ontological promiscuousness, it is because we think there is
something deeper and more stable within the bovine nature that does not permit such
identity-preserving changes. If this were not the case, then there would be no reason why
we should not think that inanimate objects could be changed in an identity-preserving
way into rational animals. No doubt, critics would be skeptical of this for the same
reasons they are skeptical of the claim that PVS patients and anencephalic children are
rational animals. There are what DiSilvestro calls “modal boundaries” that cannot be
crossed. As he explains:
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There are innumerable ways that an entity can be modified, but an entity's
modal boundary is the metaphysical line beyond which that entity cannot go. For
example, the caterpillars we are aware of would cross their modal boundary if
they changed into puppies. But the caterpillars we are aware of do not cross their
modal boundary merely by changing into butterflies. On the other hand, if we
discovered a group of organisms that looked like caterpillars, but that changed
into puppies, we would not say that these organisms were caterpillars that had
crossed their modal boundaries. We would say that they were not caterpillars at
all: perhaps we would call them "scatterpillars". Even the character from Greek
mythology named Proteus had his modal boundaries: even though he could take
on the typical capacities of a donkey, and then take on the typical capacities of a
human, and so on, still, he could not become omnipresent, omniscient, and
omnipotent (DiSilvestro 2010, 108:159).
In any case, why should we think that the modal boundaries of cats and dogs are on par
with the modal boundaries PVS patients and anencephalic children? Suppose that it is in
the nature of cats and dogs to have a capacity for rational action; why do we not, then,
characterize them with a pathological label (defective, injured, disabled, ill, etc.) when
these capacities fail to develop? It cannot be because of the statistically regular fact that
they never happen to develop these capacities. If it suddenly became statistically certain
that everyone from now on would be born infertile like in the dystopian novel The
Children of Men (James 1992), it would not change the fact that human beings are
supposed to reproduce. Nor would it change the fact, assuming that cats and dogs have a
rational nature, that they are supposed to think, even if it is statistically certain that none
ever will. Aristotle’s insight about the different senses of “deprivation” should motivate
us to classify such animals as unhealthy; the fact they are not counts against the belief
that they fundamentally lack the basic capacities for rational action.
Another problem with this objection is that it assumes an ambiguous concept of
potentiality. While it may be the case that it is physically possible for a to F provided that
a has the potential for F, it is not necessarily the case that a has the potential for F if it is
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physically possible for a to F.113 Consider again Aristotle’s mole; let us suppose that it is
“physically possible” for the mole to see by way of some yet-to-be discovered
technology. It does not follow that the mole has the kind of potential to see that I am
talking about, an active potential intrinsic to its kind that is internally directed by its own
nature to see. In the imagined case the mole is made to see, in spite of its nature, which is
not internally directed towards the development of sight. My argument requires that only
active capacities for rational action are sufficient for moral status. That there may be a
passive capacity in place to receive active capacities for rational action is not — it is a
misrepresentation of my view to suppose that it does.
What to make of the objection that “permanent” changes make all the difference,
and that the temporary change argument fails to address them? The key to answering this
question begins with another question: what exactly changes in the “permanent”
scenarios? It is not the nature of the human being before us, as I have argued. The
distinctive feature of “permanent” cases is that we do not have the medical know-how to
reverse the conditions of anencephaly or those that cause a PVS. Indeed, “permanence”
turns out to be a tricky concept, which is nicely illustrated in the writings of the 1983
report of the President’s Commission. In their guidelines for deciding when to forego
life-sustaining treatment, the Commission wrestled with how to interpret ‘permanence’
deciding, on the one hand, that it is better to say that one is ‘permanently unconscious’
than ‘irreversibly unconscious’ so as to avoid conflating a state like a PVS with
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I am uncertain as to whether physical possibility is a necessary condition of potentiality. In one
sense, it is “physically impossible” for a pigeon forced to live in a cage all its life to fly, and yet, by virtue
of being what it is, the pigeon has the basic, though undeveloped, capacity to fly (President’s Council 2002,
178). But I will assume it is for the sake of argument.
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“irreversible coma” which was identified with whole-brain death by the 1968 Harvard Ad
Hoc Committee (President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1983, 179 n13). On the other hand, their
rationale for rejecting the phrase ‘judged to be permanent,’ is that the element of
“probabilistic judgment” is essential to “every scientific prognostication” and “redundant
and unnecessarily awkward” (Ibid.). So, it seems “permanence” implies an “irreversible”
state that has a small probability of reversing. Awkward as that may be, what the
Commission was getting at is that it may be metaphysically possible to reverse
someone’s unconscious condition, but it will not happen for contingent reasons. That is to
say, a permanent condition of unconsciousness is one that can, but will not be reversed,
because we lack the technical resources for how to reverse it and will continue to do so
for the foreseeable future. Clearly, then, none of this implies that the permanently
unconscious patient lacks the ultimate capacity for rational action any more than someone
under anesthesia that will die in the next minute from a falling meteor. The temporary
change argument is concerned with the metaphysically possible conditions that assume
(for conditional proof) enough time and technical know-how are operative to make the
desired changes, not the actual conditions.
Nevertheless, some think that the possession of basic active capacities for rational
action is not ethically significant in itself, and that the degree of the remoteness or
nearness of their actualization is. John Lizza offers the following thought experiment to
illustrate why:
For example, suppose that we have the knowledge and technology to clone the
skin cell but lack the knowledge and technology to correct the genetic defect in
the anencephalic embryo. Suppose further that we had some dire need to increase
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the human population and that the cloning technology was in very limited supply.
Even though the anencephalic embryo might be said in Shewmon’s view to have
the active potential for intellect and will with assistance, we would not value it as
much as the skin cell and cloning technology that could “produce” a human being.
If one had to perform triage and devote resources to either the anencephalic
embryo or the skin cell, it would be ethically justified to devote those resources to
the skin cell rather than to the embryo (Lizza 2011, 26).114
While I am not sure there are such things as “anencephalic embryos,” Lizza’s implication
is clear: the value of one’s potentiality for rational action, whether it be active or passive,
depends on the likelihood of its being realized.115 To be sure, the time it might take for
someone to recover is going to factor into what sort of treatment options, if any, we might
choose. Yet we should not assume that potentiality only has instrumental worth and
should not be taken as evidence of intrinsic worth, for reasons already stated: if I am now
under anesthesia and will not wake up for another hour, and it is true that I will be killed
by a falling meteor five minutes from now, I still retain my non-instrumental worth. The
contingent certainty of me not “coming back” is simply irrelevant as to whether I have
moral status or not. Another way of stating the problem is that Lizza assumes that the
ethical significance of human potentiality is exhausted by what its actualization becomes,
i.e. a person, and therefore its importance depends on when and if, its actualization will
occur. But active capacities for rational action that are intrinsic to a thing are constitutive
of a thing’s being. That is to say, they indicate what the thing is, and help explain why it
might have non-instrumental worth regardless of its circumstances — even circumstances
114

One of the odd things about Lizza’s paper is that he charges theories of potentiality like mine with
the problem that it cannot adjudicate borderline cases in a non-arbitrary way. This is puzzling, because if it
could adjudicate “borderline” cases in a non-arbitrary way, then they would not be borderline cases at all.
Borderline cases are essentially indeterminate. I would think it is worse if a theory gets the wrong results,
which Lizza’s theory certainly does (as aptly demonstrated by Eberl [2011, 16]).
115
Nicholas Wolterstorff is another thinker who thinks the appeal to higher-level capacities is
“unimpressive” though he does not say why (2008, 333). If this were the case, there would be no concern
whatsoever over medical experiments that destroy human embryos. But there is, so it’s not.
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where it might be better to invest limited resources in cloning a skin cell over preserving
an “anencephalic embryo”.
Lizza is surely right when he observes that disagreement over the nature of
potentiality and its moral significance depends, in part, on the view of human persons we
assume (see his 2010). Of course, he believes that anencephalic children and PVS
patients are not persons at all, and that no human organism is identical with a person. A
human organism’s potential to become a person, then, is only valuable only insofar as it
is likely that the organism will constitute a person. Thus, human organisms that fail to
constitute persons are “potential persons” at best. 116 Yet on my view, human beings are
“persons with potential” at least. The reason why, as I have argued, is that we not only
have the basic capacity for rational action, but that we also have the basic capacity to live
a biological human life. Our life began at fertilization (or twinning), we grew inside our
mothers, we were fed and had our diapers changed when we were newborns, and we
grew up to be smart enough to read this text. Lizza denies this conjunctive claim, but he
and I agree that the ethical significance of potentiality depends on the nature of human
persons; and I have already criticized his view and defended mine at length in Chapter 2.
4.3 Is a “respect for donor” rule different from a “dead donor” rule?
A final objection worth considering to my thesis (that killing someone for their
organs disrespects the worth of someone) is that I misunderstand the true nature of
respect. As Elysa Koppelman claims,
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The same is true of the views espoused by Singer, McMahan, Tooley, and Boonin.
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By applying the [DDR], we are failing to help patients achieve the fate that best
fulfills their personhood. And this failure, especially given the implications of
medical progress, reflects a moral cowardice and an abdication of our common
humanity. By changing our focus we will realize that life and death distinctions
are not always compatible with respect for persons (2003, 7).
She reaches this conclusion through an argument, which can be formalized like so:
1.   If a person has indicated that she wants to be an organ donor, and forgo lifesustaining treatment when brain-dead or in a PVS, then denying her the
opportunity to donate in these circumstances harms her.
2.   This harm is a form of disrespect.
3.   Therefore, any person who is denied the opportunity to donate in these
circumstances is disrespected.
Because the DDR is the source of disrespect, she calls for its replacement with the
“respect for donor rule,” which takes into account a patient’s life history, decisions, and
values, not whether they are dead or alive. This, in her view, is a more holistic view of
human personhood. Instead of focusing on the characteristics one might have at a given
moment, like one’s potential capacities for rational action, one’s ends as set by the person
and one’s life history as shaped by the person, including the directives for what others are
to do after death or incapacitation, is more important. These things, she thinks, are the
substance of our shared humanity, and not the mere possession of a rational nature. So, if
one’s life history includes directives to be volunteered for transplant surgery while alive,
but whose unconsciousness is medically irreversible, then the ethics of respect generate a
duty in others to honor them. Failing to honor them, results in the “moral cowardice” and
“the abdication of our common humanity” that she speaks of.
A close inspection of her argument, however, reveals a dilemma: either all parties
to this debate can agree with its premises rendering it trivial, or it trades on a
controversial reading of “opportunity to donate” rendering it ambiguous. Even one who
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denies that brain death is death can agree with her conclusion if the “opportunity to
donate” merely refers to working with a transplant team to deploy standard procedures
that remove vital organs after a determination of death by circulatory criteria. This, of
course, is compatible with the DDR, which is contrary to Koppelman’s assumptions. To
make her conclusion incompatible with the DDR, we must take “opportunity to donate”
to refer to the opportunity to be killed on the operating table by one’s transplant surgeons.
But is it really the case that one is disrespected if one is denied this opportunity?
Supposing for a moment that her conclusion is true in this controversial sense, it
follows that the transplant community is obligated to kill the donor, which is simply
false. This is because norms of respect generate rights-claims on behalf of the one who is
owed respect, and rights entail obligations. Yet no one is obligated to kill her. The
problem for Koppelman’s “respect for donor rule” is that it ends up demanding overrespect; it effectively nullifies the autonomy of transplant surgeons not to engage in
mortal harvesting. What Koppelman needs is an argument that reaches a weaker
conclusion: that transplant surgeons are merely permitted to kill donors under such
circumstances, not that they are obligated to do so.
This is no problem for her if she assumes (and she does) that the life of a PVS
patient is of such a low worth that it no longer deserves protection from being killed
through the framework of informed consent. If she wants to exclude healthy people from
the donor pool (and she does), then she must answer the question as to what gives life its
worth, such that it should not be killed even upon request. Koppelman’s answer is the
well-worn psychological property of being capable of forming desires and interests (Ibid.,
8; cf. Zohar 2003, 12). Contrasting the PVS patient, (whom she permits to be killed) with
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the severe Alzheimer’s patient (whom she does not), she writes, “There isn’t really
anything that being in such a state [the vegetative state] is like, for being in such a state is
like being in no state at all” (Ibid.). Of course, the same is true of being under anesthesia
or in a deep sleep: there is no felt experience of those states either. Clearly, what matters
is some level of capacity to get out of these states, but then we are back on the wheel:
what level of capacity for these things is morally relevant? I argue that, for any nonultimate level of capacity we choose, we can envision a temporary change scenario where
one redevelops the capacities relevant for moral status, and therefore had moral status all
along. Without giving an argument for why we should believe PVS patients have no
ultimate active capacity for rational action, we cannot safely claim that they lack moral
status, which, again, is contrary to her assumptions.
Koppelman’s preferred way to limit the autonomy of healthy people in order to
avoid respecting their death wishes only serves to bolster my point about the moral
relevance of basic, natural capacities. As one who is sympathetic with Kant’s moral
framework, Koppelman believes “it can be argued that the end of giving vital organs
when not in a suspended state [i.e. being brain-dead or in a PVS] is almost always
irrational or immoral, while the end of giving vital organs when in such a state is not”
(Ibid., 8). Although she gives no argument, I suspect that she finds something compelling
in Kant’s argument that we should not respect a suicidal will since it seeks to annihilate
the very thing that merits respect: a will that is capable of setting ends for oneself.117
Kant’s point is that an autonomy-based right to withdraw oneself from all the duties of
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See Cholbi (2000) for an excellent overview of this argument.
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respect one is owed involves a contradiction (Kant 1964, 84). The reason is that we
cannot divest ourselves of our worth by virtue of exercising the capacities that give us our
worth. So, if PVS patients no longer have this capacity, then their wishes to die by
transplant surgery as indicated beforehand generates no paradox of autonomy in which
one wills both to be respected and annihilated. Yet even if we grant that the thrust of
Kant’s argument is largely correct (and I think it is), Koppelman begs the question with
respect to whether PVS patient’s actually have the capacity for rational action at some
level or other. I say they do, for if they did not, they we could not intelligibly understand
them to be injured. Therefore, we should not assume that donors can consent — even in
advanced directives (pace Cochrane and Bianchi 2011) — to be treated in a way that
makes their lives comparably less valuable than their organs, and as a mere receptacle of
coveted pieces of tissues that can be mined for beneficial purposes. This is what is
fundamentally wrong with mortal harvesting.
4.4 The basis of human equality
Let us take stock. Essentially, my argument is that if anything has the set of basic
capacities for rational action, it has moral status; all human beings have this set no matter
their maturity level or disability status; therefore, all human beings have moral status —
what I call ‘dignity’ — which makes them objects of respect. This argument was made
with a view towards providing a basis for human equality. Any basis that depends on
properties that come in degrees is flimsy at best. The chief virtue of Jeff McMahan’s
work is that he has shown that our liberal egalitarian principles must be revised if we are
to make one’s moral status depend on the exemplification of certain psychological
properties. To his very great credit, this is something he recognizes (e.g. 2008, 104), and
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with great intellectual integrity, he is willing to follow his principles where they lead. In
particular, he is willing to claim that killing a healthy orphaned newborn infant for its
organs is permissible, since he thinks a newborn’s “psychological connectedness” is not
strong enough to generate a time-relative interest in continuing to live.118 He is worth
quoting at length:
Suppose that a woman who wants to be a single parent becomes impregnated via
artificial insemination, but dies during childbirth. She has no close friends and no
family — no one to claim the child. The newborn infant is healthy and so is an
ideal candidate for adoption. But suppose that, in the same hospital in which the
infant is born, there are three other children, all five years old, who will soon die
if they do not receive organ transplants. The newly orphaned infant turns out to
have exactly the right tissue type: if it were killed, its organs could be used to save
the three ailing children. According to the view I have developed, it ought to be
permissible, if other things are equal, to sacrifice the newborn orphaned infant in
order to save the other three children (2002, 359; cf. 2007, 152).
This frank acknowledgment appears in a discussion of troubling implications that
function as reasons to reject his view altogether. Nonetheless, he is willing to bite the
bullet, because he thinks not biting it leads to morally inconsistent positions, specifically
with respect to how we treat certain animals (McMahan 2013). Since I refuse to accept
this, I have labored to develop an alternative account of the nature of human beings and a
morally consistent view of the wrongness of killing to support my judgment.119 Those
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McMahan distinguishes between interests and time-relative interests, because he does not think
identity is the basis of rational egoistic concern. He says,
One's time-relative interests are always, as the label is intended to suggest, relativized to one's state at a
time. They are different from one's interests (as traditionally understood) in that they are affected by
the strength of the prospective prudential unity relations whereas one's interests are not. One’s interests
are concerned with what would be better or worse for oneself as a temporally extended being; they
reflect what would be better or worse for one's life as a whole. If identity were the basis of rational
egoistic concern, there could be no divergence between one's interests and one's time-relative interests
(2002, 80).
119
A clear way of expressing the disagreement between McMahan and I goes like this: he thinks it is
more counter-intuitive to believe that a day-old embryo is entitled to the same protections from being killed
as those of us who can read this text than it is to believe that killing an orphaned healthy newborn infant for
its organs is permissible — I do not.
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who attach moral status to psychological properties that come in degrees should take
heed, because more is at stake than we realize. The egalitarian principles, so cherished in
Western societies, that have been foundational to democracy and an impetus for much
progress are at risk of being undermined.
By contrast, my view implies that the moral status we have in virtue of being
rational animals is one that does not come in degrees. This is precisely what our
egalitarian principles require, and they are elegantly satisfied by an all-or-nothing
property: the possession of a rational nature. Those that have a rational nature have a noninstrumental worth I call “human dignity” Human dignity is inherent and ineliminable,
and there is a duty to respect it at every stage of development or at any degree of (nonultimate) incapacity throughout human life. While some may be discomforted by the
“conservative” implications this view may have for the practices of abortion, embryonic
stem cell research, euthanasia, and physician-assisted suicide, I am happy to embrace
those implications.120 One should see my position as resonating with the ethical forecast
given by G.B. Giertz at the 1966 Ciba meeting (see Chapter 1). As he saw it, “respect for
the value of the human being and hence democracy is in danger” when a society
embraces social practices that deny “that every human life, even the most wretched, has a
meaning” — or human dignity, as I put it (Giertz 1966, 140).
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Though I should also say that “liberals” ought to deny that the permissibility of voluntary
euthanasia entails the permissibility of voluntary “organ donation” euthanasia. Standard euthanasia
practices are typically justified by an appeal to the patient’s “dignity” in death (a dignity that is grounded in
autonomy), and that one must respected as an end in the choice to die by a painless lethal intervention. But
if dignity is grounded in autonomy, then a “paradox of autonomy” remains for mortal harvesting policies,
since they require the donor to consent to being used as a “tissue bank” that can be killed for utilitarian
benefit, and not purely for the patient’s own sake.
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Nonetheless, the view that human beings have some sort of non-instrumental
worth by virtue of what they are, and what they are is determined by their ultimate
capacities for rational action, shares a surprising amount of common ground among
philosophers of divergent political persuasions. The so-called “capabilities approach” that
recognizes the moral significance of the freedom to pursue one’s flourishing, and that
one’s opportunity to do so is best understood in terms of their capabilities (or capacities),
is one that is interpreted in various ways through Rawlsian and Aristotelian lenses
(Robeyns 2016). Early in her development of the relation between human capabilities and
human rights, Martha Nussbaum (a political liberal) notes that one of the senses of
“capabilities” she is working with is called “basic capabilities” — “the innate equipment
of individuals that is the necessary basis for developing the more advanced capability”
(1997, 289).121 Similarly, to account for the notion that each of us possesses an
ineliminable human dignity, Robert George and Patrick Lee (political conservatives)
appeal to the notion of a “basic natural capacity” for conceptual thought that “human
beings have in virtue of the kind of thing they are” (Lee and George 2008b, 185). While I
tend to side with Lee and George regarding the implications for the ethics of killing, it is

121

Nussbaum has since dropped this conception of basic capability, because, in her view, it does not
adequately secure the political equality of those with severe mental and cognitive disabilities. She says,
“that it is quite crucial not to base the ascription of human dignity on any single ‘basic capability
(rationality, for example), since this excludes from human dignity many human beings with severe mental
disabilities” (Nussbaum 2008, 362). Yet she makes the same mistake Singer and McMahan make; concepts
like “severe mental disability” cannot attributed to human beings unless the human form essentially
includes the basic capacity for rationality and so forth. Another problem is that she posits some arbitrary
and unspecified minimal threshold one must meet for being capable of engaging in “major human lifeactivities” (Ibid., 363). Hence, PVS patients and anencephalic children don’t make the cut in her view,
“since it would appear that there is no striving there, no reaching out for functioning” (Ibid.). Yet if we are
just going by appearances, the same could have been said of Terry Wallis, someone who clearly had equal
dignity while in his non-responsive state. Therefore, Nussbaum’s revised view of human dignity should be
rejected for the same reasons McMahan’s and Singer’s should be rejected: it is arbitrary, unfair, and rests
upon metaphysical confusion.
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striking how prominent the agreement is that basic capacities (or “capabilities”) for
rational action are foundational to our egalitarian principles. And it is a good thing too.
For it gives us a principled reason to care for a healthy orphaned newborn infant, and
soundly reject as impermissible the proposal to kill it for its organs.
4.5 Mortal harvesting is incompatible with human equality
What often goes unnoticed in cases for mortal harvesting is how inimical they are
to the notion of human equality. Common to every proposal is the proposition that the
organs inside a potential donor are more valuable than the life of the donor. For example,
although Miller and Truog believe no one would be made dead by mortal harvesting who
would not otherwise be made dead by withdrawing life-support, they readily
acknowledge that some patients will die by transplant surgery who would otherwise
continue to live because of our imperfect ability to prognosticate death after the
withdrawal of life-support (2012, 116). They are willing to accept this risk, however, in
light of the benefits that would come to organ recipients as well as the respect for the
wishes of the donor to donate. What they are not willing to risk, however, is possibly
damaging the organs from warm ischemia in a protocol that would begin surgery after
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and waiting for asystole to occur (Ibid., 121).
Consequently, their view implies that the risk of harming the organs outweighs the risk of
harming the donor, something that is at odds with the longstanding norm that protecting
the donor from harm should take precedence over protecting the organs from harm. Of
course, the only senses of “harm” they care about is the experience of pain or a setback to
one’s interests; intending the destruction of another’s being is of no concern to them. This
should not be the case.
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To be sure, the value of the organs in proposals like Miller and Truog’s is derived
from the value the donor and recipient places on them. Yet this just reveals that one’s life
may be medically sacrificed for the sake of another, owing to the assumption that the
donor’s life is not worthy of protection from being instrumentalized to the point of death.
Potential donors, who are deemed “terminally ill” (Verheijde, Rady, and McGregor
2007), or “as good as dead” (Miller and Truog 2012, 144–47), or to have “no hope of
meaningful recovery” (Glannon 2013), are empowered to consent to their deaths via
transplant surgery while those who fall outside these categories, are not. Since we expect
people to be rational, those who refrain from undergoing mortal harvesting must give
some reason to do so upon pain of irrationality, which is an intellectual burden no healthy
person has to bear, and is therefore unfair (see the argument of Velleman 1992 again).
The choice to refrain is not only burdened intellectually, but also morally. Given
that every argument for mortal harvesting references the dire need for organs, this
empowerment to die by transplant surgery quickly moves to an imperative that is all too
easy to justify. One could use the framework of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and
Morality” (1972) argument to reasonably conclude that you act immorally if you are
“terminal” or “hopeless” or “as good as dead” and you refrain from “organ donation
euthanasia.” Formulating the argument makes this clear:
1.   Suffering and death from the lack of a transplantable organ is bad.
2.   If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without giving up
anything as equally important, it is wrong not to do so.
3.   If you are “terminal” or “hopeless” or “as good as dead” and if you refrain from
donating, then it is in your power to prevent suffering and death by donating a
transplantable organ, without sacrificing anything nearly as important.
4.   Therefore, if you are “terminal” or “hopeless” or “as good as dead” and if you
refrain from donating, then it is wrong to do so.
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All parties to the debate agree with the first premise. Nearly everyone agrees with the
second, as it seems perfectly wasteful to forbid transplants from freshly-dead bodies (e.g.
Fletcher 1968); yet, the third is precisely what is at issue. Mortal harvesting could not be
justified as a matter of public policy without affirming it, and potential donors would be
saddled with its moral stigma despite being permitted to refrain from sacrificing their
lives. Now, a potential donor could invoke what I have argued for here, that there is
something that would be sacrificed that is just as important, that is, the inherent dignity of
the individual human person. While I believe this is a good reason for a potential donor to
refrain from undergoing mortal harvesting, the point is that no potential donor should
have to bear the weight of rebutting this (question-begging) argument, which just
assumes, as a matter of policy, that this not a good reason.
Worse yet, policy makers who would establish mortal-harvesting practices seem
indifferent to the fact that a certain set of quality of life judgments along with their lethal
implications would become a systematic part of the transplant enterprise. No doubt, these
judgments are already tacitly involved, but it does not follow that they should be involved
as a matter of policy and that this would somehow be an improvement over the status quo
(being honest about an evil practice is no virtue). For if we were to adopt these proposals,
then there is no reason why we should not be able to lethally experiment on the same
class of people, so long as they consent to being used lethally for the sake of gaining
medical knowledge. This, of course, would undo the fundamental ethical principles laid
down by the Nuremburg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Belmont Report. To
allow mortal harvesting is not to just “rethink” the ethics of death, dying, and organ
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transplantation, but the whole bioethical enterprise itself. Are advocates of mortal
harvesting prepared to go as far as their principles will take them? If not, why not?
4.6 Conclusion
I opened this chapter with two epigraphs, one from Joseph Fletcher (Bard and
Fletcher 1968, 64) and the other from John Paul II (1995, 102) so as to contrast the
implications of two very different views of human life. On the one hand, there is
Fletcher’s view, which makes life’s worth wholly dependent upon the likelihood of
actualizing certain psychological capacities constitutive of (neo-Lockean?) “personhood.”
What degree of instantiation is required for personhood is anyone’s guess, but it is clear
that one can be born an “idiot” — Fletcher’s charming term for people with Down’s
Syndrome — and be kept from living. To allow for such a life, on his view, would be to
incur some vague and unspecified sort of guilt. On the other hand, there is the Pope’s
view, which simply identifies human animals with “persons” and ascribes “absolute
equality” to every one of them. The opportunity to flourish for an eighteen-year-old man
matters no more (or less) than it does for a day-old female human embryo. One might be
tempted to think of these views as two unacceptable extremes, and that there should be
some safe middle ground that avoids the moral implications of each. It is a reasonable
thought. Certainly, a view like McMahan’s does not automatically count babies with
Down’s Syndrome as being life unworthy of life.122 Nonetheless, such views place a
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Though I have been critical of him, I must draw attention to his admirable courage in confronting
the case he describes in the following:
I recall once being consulted by a hospital’s ethics committee about a similar case. A woman in the
late stages of pregnancy had been told that her fetus had been discovered to have Down’s syndrome
and a heart condition that would be fatal within the first year unless it underwent a major surgery that
would have a reasonably high probability of success (I think, though my recollection is dim, around
70%). The parents were opposed to abortion on religious grounds and thus said that they preferred to
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burden of proof on such babies as to whether they will likely display a sufficient amount
of “psychological connectedness” to merit some form of respect. This is precisely what
we should expect of views that make one’s moral status depend on the instantiation of
certain psychological properties that can only come in degrees. Nor can we avoid the
problems of arbitrariness and injustice by positing some threshold of respect to make
moral status an all-or-nothing category. Even if we could draw the line in a reasonable
place, some are in and out on the basis of negligible differences with grave consequences.
The just alternative is to identify moral status with something that does not come
in degrees, that is, a being’s nature, specifically a rational nature.123 On this view, our
dignity is bound up with our way of being rather than our way of becoming. If you are an
individual substance with a rational nature, you have moral status; every human being is
such a substance, so every one of them has moral status. Concomitant to this belief is that
our dignity is ineliminable, which makes it the case that our suffering always matters no
matter how terrible it may be or how insentient we may become. The deep implication of
this view is that we are not merely receptacles of “value” whose claim to life wholly
depends on whether we can be the subject of some good state of affairs or pleasurable

continue the pregnancy; but they also wanted to decline the surgery, allegedly because they wanted to
spare the infant the suffering that would be involved. The other members of the committee —
physicians, a nurse, a priest, a rabbi and a lawyer — all thought this was an acceptable solution. I
pointed out that no one would think it acceptable to forgo the surgery if the infant did not have Down’s
syndrome or if a similar heart condition requiring similar surgery were not diagnosed until the child
was a year or two old. I suspect that it was because I had implied, especially in the presence of a
lawyer, that the committee was endorsing the view that an individual could be allowed to die because
of a disability that I was never again invited to serve as an ethics consultant at the hospital (2013, 275).
Of course, his wisdom in highlighting this case of ableism is only meant to serve his broader point, that all
infants are equal candidates for infanticide so long as some set of relevant conditions are met — like being
orphaned and a perfect tissue match for those who are in need of a healthy organ, and healthy enough to
supply them.
123
For a fine argument along these lines see Lee (2015).
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sensation. Modern accounts of killing tend to reduce human worth to the degree of happy
properties one contingently exemplifies, and leave our natural, intrinsic dignity behind.
“They are,” as Timothy Chappell says, “metaphysically superficial, because these
accounts focus on what’s secondary, the properties of the individual person, while
ignoring or bypassing the primary thing, the person herself” (2004, 108). Perhaps this is a
consequence of our culture’s move towards secularization, which leaves behind the idea
that human beings are made in the image God. Geirtz certainly thought this when he
remarked at the Ciba meeting that “The concept of unconditional human worth cannot,
however, be justified rationally” (1966, 144) — the implication being that it could only
be accepted as a matter of blind faith. My hope is that the reader will see, that after
examining the contents of this chapter, that it can be accepted rationally. Once it is
accepted, we can see that killing someone for their organs is disrespectful of the worth of
the one being killed.
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Chapter 5: In Defense of the Absolutist’s Answer
Abstract: This final chapter concerns the nature of respect as it
appears in the fourth and fifth premise of my master argument. I
assume, as a formal matter, that no act that disrespects the worth of
a person is permissible, because what counts as a material act of
disrespect depends on the value theory and fundamental moral
principles we assume. In any case, those things are violated if an
act of disrespect occurs. Hence, a consequentialist whose idea of
respect is bound up with giving due consideration to everyone’s
interests could affirm the fifth premise while denying the fourth.
By contrast, I defend the Absolutist’s Answer: we should always
and everywhere refrain from intentionally destroying the donor,
someone who is an innocent subject of dignity.
“I am concerned not so much with what rights people have, but with what we ought to do. It may be that
we ought not respect rights if the cost of doing so is this high or, perhaps, that we ought to revise our
system of rights.”
—John Harris
“Tell me yourself, I challenge your answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with
the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and
inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature—that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance—
and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?
Tell me, and tell the truth.”
—Fyodor Dostoevsky

5.0 Introduction
One should be forgiven for thinking that this chapter would follow the pattern of
the previous ones, and that I would offer a defense of the last premise in my master
argument, that no act that disrespects the worth of a person is permissible. It would seem
that this would be the hardest premise to defend, since it is a moral absolute. Merely
imagining that we could avoid some horrible catastrophe simply by disrespecting
someone should be enough to put the matter to rest, should it not? Perhaps this is why
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formal defenses of the permissibility of disrespect are hard to come by — it is just
obvious that treating someone with disrespect is sometimes justified. Yet this is too
quick. What exactly counts as an act of disrespect? We might think that torturing the
innocent would be a good example. Is it supposed to be obvious that any defense of such
an action is thereby also a defense of an act of disrespect? I, for one, do not think it is
obvious because it does not answer the question of just what constitutes an act of
disrespect in the first place.
I submit that the reason no one formally defends the permissibility of disrespect is
that norms of respect are grounded in the theories of value embedded in fundamental
moral principles like the principle of utility, the Categorical Imperative, or the First
Principle of Practical Reason. They are not norms of precepts which require, in addition
to their normative ground, a description of a kind of action.124 Rather, they are norms of
principle. The difference is subtle, but significant and made evident when we consider the
moral absoluteness of a universal principle, like the principle of utility (i.e. we must
always maximize the good) versus the moral absoluteness of a precept concerning an
action type (i.e. we must always refrain from torturing the innocent). The formal
character of our norms of respect are wholly determined by the normative grounds we
assume, particularly the theory of value which shapes our ideas about the moral status of
individuals; these assumptions provide the identity conditions for material acts of
disrespect. Formally, then, disrespect is always prohibited, since disrespect is always
incompatible with the moral worth of the individual involved.
124

The paradigm example of a norm of precept is the norm against murder, which is derived from a
normative premise (the intentional killing the innocent is wrong) and a descriptive premise (murder is the
intentional killing the innocent).
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What evidence is there for this thesis? Consider someone charged with
disrespecting someone else. One usually does not reply, “My act of disrespect was
justified” as if there were such things as justified and unjustified acts of disrespect that
could be specified apart from a fundamental theory about one’s moral considerability.125
Rather, the response is one of denial and perhaps a claim that the object of the action was
treated in accordance with its worth, and that the action was somehow appropriate or
deserved or that the recipient “had it coming.” Indeed, to treat something with respect is
to treat it in accordance with its worth; to disrespect something is to treat it as having less
worth than it actually has.126 This is part of what we find wrong with disrespect — it is a
failure to appreciate things as they really are. We could not rationally treat a thing we
know to have a certain worth as if it had less worth, and then defend our actions as
“justified” as if the object in question were somehow worthy of unworthy treatment. Such
a practice is simply unintelligible. Any moral justification we could offer for the subpar
treatment of the object in question depends on a correct assessment of the worth of the
object, something we already know and willingly disregard. What is at issue, then, are the
moral theories that determine the worth of things in question, and the underlying moral
principles that give shape to our norms of respect, not whether disrespect is permissible.
For these reasons, I forgo a formal defense of the claim that no act that disrespects the
worth of a person is permissible and instead turn to an investigation of moral theory.127
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Indeed, a fundamental theory will ultimately determine whether one is worthy of respect or not.
Here I am influenced by Wolterstorff (2008, chap. 13).
127
If the reader thinks what I’ve said here is far too quick and underdeveloped, I can only plead for
patience; a better sense of why I frame things this way will emerge throughout the rest of the chapter.
126
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What is of particular interest to me is what the extent of the norm against
disrespect implies and whether it can be “outweighed” or “overridden” by some other
moral consideration. The problem is a familiar one. There is wide agreement that the
autonomous choices of patients should be respected. There is also wide agreement that
such choices should not be honored if they would cause great harm to oneself or others.
Take participation in a Phase I drug trial, for example. Suppose Sally gives valid consent
to participate in the trial, but is forbidden to participate because she would be greatly
harmed by doing so. Has her autonomy been respected or not? One could characterize the
investigators as disrespecting Sally’s autonomy for the greater good, something that
implies a sense of moral disapproval. Yet it is hard to believe that what the physicianinvestigators do is wrong; in fact, there is a more charitable way of evaluating their
actions. We can say they took Sally’s interests into consideration, weighed them against
the risk of harming her, and judged that the risk of harming her was of greater concern
than honoring her wishes. This does not imply that they disrespected her autonomy. That
they took her wishes into consideration and weighed them carefully against other relevant
moral factors appears to be sufficient for treating her autonomy with respect.
This could have devastating implications for my argument. One might object to
my claim that killing the donor for their organs disrespects the intrinsic worth of the
donor by giving the following argument:
I acknowledge the intrinsic worth of human life and the dignity inherent in every
human being and I have taken those things into consideration. However, I have
also taken into consideration the interests of donors who would consent to dying
by transplant surgery, and the lives of the recipients who would benefit from
receiving a healthy organ. Indeed, I have given equal consideration to all these
things, something you have failed to do. On balance, I have determined, that the
concern for the intrinsic worth of the donor’s life can be overridden for the sake
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of respecting the donor’s autonomy and benefitting the lives of the recipients. By
contrast your narrow commitment to respecting the intrinsic worth of the donor
above all else fails to respect donor autonomy and harms potential recipients. In
fact, you could say that I have a greater sense of respect for human life than you
do, because I factor the individual lives of the potential recipients into my
evaluation, and you do not. If anything, you are committing an act of disrespect
toward the worth of human beings, not me.
One issue here is the nature of respect. The question is whether A treats B with respect
provided that A gives B due consideration. We can grant that giving due consideration is
necessary for respect; but is it sufficient? Or is something more required? Specifically,
must we, in some cases, refrain from destroying the object of respect? Another issue is
whether human worth adds up. Does the intrinsic dignity each individual possesses
“count as one and no more than one,” as Bentham might say (quoted in Rosen 2005,
228), so that we are permitted to destroy Sally (assuming she consents to being
destroyed) to save Tom, Dick, and Mary? The loss of three dignity-bearing human beings
clearly seems worse than the loss of one. At least from an economic standpoint, no one is
made worse off and everyone involved gets what they want. Sally gets to give up her life,
a life she no longer wants to live, and Tom, Dick, and Mary get to go on living lives they
want to live. This raises yet another issue: how should the interests of everyone involved
be counted and can they be weighed against the worth of human beings themselves?
I intend to defend what I will call the Absolutist’s Answer: we should always and
everywhere refrain from intentionally destroying the donor, someone who is an innocent
subject of dignity.128 The goal of this chapter, then, is to offer a clarification of what I
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One might reasonably wonder why non-innocence should make a difference to a view that bases
moral status on the possession of a rational nature. If non-innocence makes a difference, then having
dignity and having moral status are not coextensive. I accept the point. Here, I follow Craig Paterson (2008,
83), who suggests that it is not the intrinsic status of a good that determines whether an instance of the good
should be intentionally destroyed or not; rather, it is the nature of the demands imposed on us by the

160

think respect for human worth entails, and defend the fourth and fifth premises of my
master argument from being read ambiguously. I will begin by examining whether giving
due consideration is sufficient for showing respect, and argue that such a conception of
respect is essentially consequentialist in character. Second, I will argue that principlism,
the reigning paradigm in bioethics today, is a species of consequentialism and that it is
committed to this inadequate form of respect. Thirdly, I give some reasons why
consequentialism is inadequate as a moral theory, and explore anti-consequentialist
options for grounding the Absolutist’s Answer. The purpose of doing so is to support the
DDR as a rule that admits of no exceptions. Yet it turns out that the case for supporting
the DDR as an exceptionless rule need not logically depend on the falsity of
consequentialism. In the last section, I will explain how a rule-consequentialist could
reasonably hold that the DDR is a “virtual absolute” because it is reasonable to believe
that upholding it as an exceptionless rule would produce better outcomes for organ
donation than not upholding would.
5.1 Equal treatment v. consideration
To summarize what I said in the last chapter, I concluded that mortal harvesting is
incompatible with human equality. Some people are candidates for lethal transplant

particular good in question. The life of an innocent human being, which ought to be respected in virtue of
its dignity, demands that it not be intentionally destroyed. The life of a non-innocent human being cannot
make that demand, since the action of the non-innocent threatens the being and integrity of others who pose
no threat. To protect non-innocent human life as much as innocent human life is to not protect innocent
human life at all. Thus, the demands of human dignity are ordered to the protection of human beings who
pose no threat to others, and the immunity from killing one enjoys in virtue of having dignity disappears
when one becomes a lethal threat. We should not think, however, that the non-innocent loses their dignity
by virtue of their threatening behavior. Indeed, the respect the non-innocent are due requires that the means
undertaken to defend against their threat must be proportional to the threat they pose.
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surgery on the basis of their health status, which is something that can only come in
degrees. Those deemed “terminally ill,” or as “good as dead,” or “hopeless” are
empowered to give up their lives for those who are not, and those who choose not to do
so must be able to give a reason for their choice if they are to be counted as rational,
something no healthy person has to do. Such a policy is not only unfair, but also
inegalitarian in the sense that it values the lives one set of people over another set by
virtue of a property that can only come in degrees — one’s health status. Some would be
in or out of the sphere of protection from being killed on the basis of arbitrary and
negligible differences. Or so it seems to me.
Perhaps, however, I am wrong to think there is a lack of recognition of our human
equality in proposals for mortal harvesting. The reason why is similar to the reason why I
may be wrong about what respect entails: perhaps only due consideration of everyone
involved is sufficient for equality and a further a prohibition against intending actions
that would destroy them is not necessary. As Peter Singer explains, the “principle of
equality” does not require giving equal treatment or granting the same rights to two
different groups; rather, the principle requires giving each equal consideration (1975, 2).
What we ought to do is take into account the interests of the being before us, whatever
those might be. If we want to expand our circle of moral concern beyond the interests of
sentient beings to include the objective worth of things like human dignity, the point
remains the same: if a being has worth or interests there is absolutely no moral
justification for refusing to take those things into consideration. Those that fail to do this
do so out of ignorance, bias, or prejudice. It is only when we rid ourselves of these things
and take everything into account that can we say we are satisfying the principle of
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equality. Once we do that, we can begin to make decisions about what ought to be done
and it may be the case that implementing policies of mortal harvesting is the right thing to
do, all things considered. In any event, satisfying the constraint of equal consideration is
sufficient for treating people equally since it is an application of giving due consideration
to everything involved. It is a form of respect that has a maximally broadened circle of
moral concern.
What this means is that human worth is only one thing among many to consider.
It occupies no privileged place in our moral deliberation. The so-called “hopeless” person
who wants to go on living cannot appeal to her ineliminable dignity as a sufficient reason
to go on living in the face of the option to die by transplant surgery. Since the principle of
equal consideration enjoins her to consider all things, including people just like her who
need her organs, she cannot just assume that her life counts more than theirs. The same,
however, is true for healthy people; everyone must consider the interests of those who are
in need of vital organs, not just the sick. From the physician’s side of things, refusing to
perform lethal surgery cannot be justified simply on the basis that doing so would violate
human dignity. More has to be considered. Now it may be the case that human dignity
weighs very heavily. But it can be “balanced off” just if another object of human dignity
is at stake. To settle “ties” one must consider the weight of the competing interests of
everyone involved and the overall effect our actions will have on them.
With these things in mind, let us consider Gilbert Harman’s patient in Room 306:
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You have five patients in the hospital who are dying, each in need of a separate
organ. One needs a kidney, another a lung, a third a heart, and so forth. You can
save all five if you take a single healthy person and remove his heart, lungs,
kidneys, and so forth, to distribute to these five patients. Just such a healthy
person is in room 306. He is in the hospital for routine tests. Having seen his test
results, you realize that he has the right tissue compatibility. If you do nothing, he
will survive without incident; the other patients will die, however. The other five
patients can be saved only if the patient in 306 is cut up and his organs
distributed. In that case, there would be one dead and five saved (1977, 3).
What is to be done? To be sure, the autonomy of everyone involved here has not been
considered, and so we might think that the option of cutting up the one is off the table.
But suppose it is considered, and we learn that the one has no problem with dying, and
the five could care less about where the organs come from. What is the problem with
cutting him up? Or suppose the five are the pitiless sort; they think the one should be cut
up for their sake regardless of what the one wants. Why should the one’s will to live be
respected more than the wills of the five to live? Each of their desires to continue living
can be just as strong if not stronger than the one’s. Perhaps, however, the patient in Room
306 should not be killed, because it would be unfair to him; after all, he just happened to
show up for a routine visit. Perhaps, then, we should adopt John Harris’ proposal of a
“survival lottery” in which sufficiently healthy people are selected at random to be killed
and have their organs redistributed to the sick (1975). More human life would be saved if
we did this. Complying with an exceptionalness norm against killing in organ donation,
which presumably is in place to safeguard human life, actually results in greater loss of
life. Therefore, it is irrational. Instead, we ought to overcome our squeamishness and be
willing to approve of mortal harvesting, even if the victim is innocent, healthy and
unwilling, so as to minimize the loss of multiple beings of such great worth. A truly equal
consideration of these things makes this a morally serious position.
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Nonetheless, this position is not taken seriously. Only the most committed
consequentialists seriously entertain and debate the merits of such proposals (Tännsjö
2015, chap. 9). The majority of transplant ethicists are loath to embrace the tough-minded
conclusions of such consequentialist reasoning (e.g. Veatch and Ross 2015, 209). No one
writing in the DDR-related literature today would endorse the decision to kill the patient
in Room 306 even under circumstances in which no nasty side-effects would result. An
anti-consequentialist commitment to the ethics of respect for patient autonomy weighs
considerably in the minds of many. Yet, as we have seen, this commitment is regularly
qualified so as to only empower the sick to choose death by transplant surgery. To kill a
healthy donor for her organs would harm her, and so we do not honor her wishes. To do
such a thing, it is thought, would produce a bad outcome for the donor (the loss of
“worthwhile” life); hence, the ethics against doing harm weigh considerably in the minds
of many. Yet what about those who are in need of healthy organs? The ethics of
contributing to the welfare of others motivates us to find efficient solutions to the
problem of the organ shortage, and the ethics of justice constrain us to do so fairly.
Ethicists who take all four of these ethical commitments seriously try to strike a balance
between them, which somewhat predictably appeals to the ethics of informed consent to
permit the sick to autonomously choose death by transplant surgery so as to benefit those
who need healthy organs. Yet what should we make of this “balancing” act? Why should
we seek to do it?
5.2 Principlism’s balancing act
Before answering this question, we should examine in more detail the moral
reasoning that motivates the need to balance these four commitments. Obviously, the four
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commitments I referenced are constitutive of the reigning paradigm of biomedical ethics
called “principlism,” a moral framework developed most comprehensively by
Beauchamp and Childress (2013). Part of what is attractive about principlism is that it
purportedly condenses “morality to its central elements” (Beauchamp 1995, 181) and
does not require commitment to any single comprehensive moral theory (like Kant’s,
Sidgwick’s, or Aristotle’s). The central elements of our ‘common morality’ they identify
are beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, and respect for autonomy. These are meant to
provide a framework for ethical decision-making in circumstances that require action.
They are not to be understood as axioms from which one can deduce any hard and fast
rule of conduct. Rather, one is to specify the principles as much as possible and balance
them against one another in any given case. In one case, we may have reason to respect
autonomy over the pursuit of beneficial effects (people don’t have to get flu shots); in
another, we may have more reason to avoid harm rather than respect autonomy (we
should disclose relevant information to an HIV patient’s partner against the HIV patient’s
expressed wishes). No principle occupies a privileged place above the others; each of
them only has a prima facie weight that always gives us a reason to consider them when
deciding what to do. Taking their cues from W.D. Ross (1930), who distinguished
between prima facie and actual duties, Beauchamp and Childress believe their
framework helps agents “determine their actual obligations in such situations by
examining the respective weights of the competing prima facie obligations (the relative
weights of all competing prima facie norms)” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001, 14–15).
Norms of justice and respect, then, only count so much — they do not absolutely
constrain the decision-maker. Yes, one must consider them in a decision about what to
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do, but if the circumstances are such that great harm would come by honoring them, they
can be appropriately discharged, or “balanced off” by considerations of beneficence or
nonmaleficence.129
5.2.1 Principlism is a species of consequentialism
While it is not presented as being committed to any comprehensive ethical theory,
there are some good reasons to think principlism is a species of consequentialism, albeit
one that gives regard to “principles” rather than rules. This is bound to be surprising. We
have already noted principlism’s indebtedness to Ross, and it is a common belief that
Ross was an anti-consequentialist. Why, then, should we think that principlism is a
species of consequentialism? By “consequentialism” I do not mean the standard view that
only the consequences of our action matter in determining the rightness or wrongness of
the action. Rather, I have in mind Anscombe’s idea that there are no identifiable types of
action that are automatically excluded from our practical reasoning “simply in virtue of
their description,” and “regardless of any further consequences” they might produce
(1958, 10). In this sense, Ross is very much a consequentialist, since he would permit any
action, no matter how offensive to rightness it is in itself, provided that the consequences
of not performing it were bad enough. Although this is at odds with the standard view of
Ross being an anti-consequentialist, because of his distinction between good and right
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Principlism need not be committed to the problematic view that disrespecting people’s autonomy is
sometimes justified; rather, the principlist can coherently hold that an appropriate measure of respect has
been given by considering the importance of patient autonomy in ethical deliberation. It’s worth noting,
however, that Beauchamp and Childress do speak of “infringements” on the principle of respect for
autonomy and that such infringements are sometimes justified (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 22–23,
108). It would seem that, by this language, they would allow for “justified acts of disrespect.” If this is the
case, then this just counts against the intelligibility of their position for the reasons I gave at the beginning
of this chapter.
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actions, the standard view is superficial because it fails to recognize that even the right
actions Ross lists — actions of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence,
nonmaleficence, and self-improvement — can be construed as being constitutive of the
overall Good, and therefore treated as possible objects of maximization (Diamond, 1997).
If this were not the case, then his ingenuous argument that there cannot be two worlds of
equal value, which contain the same amount of welfare but not the same amount of
virtue, would be unintelligible (Ross 1930, chap. 6). Ross is interested in broadening our
scope of what is intrinsically good, not in specifying inviolable constraints on our actions.
This should be no surprise since Ross explicitly denies any form of absolutism. Hence,
Anscombe’s punchy, but accurate comment about Ross and those like him whom she
calls “Oxford Objectivists,” who in her words,
of course distinguish between ‘consequences’ and ‘intrinsic values’ and so
produce a misleading appearance of not being ‘consequentialists.’ But they do not
hold — and Ross explicitly denies — that the gravity of, e.g., procuring the
condemnation of the innocent is such that it cannot be outweighed by, e.g.,
national interest. Hence their distinction is of no importance” (Anscombe 1958,
9n1).
In these respects, principlism is no different from “Oxford Objectivism,” and therefore
can be legitimately classified as a form consequentialism.
For the principlist as much as the Rossian, the goal of engaging in a balancing act
between competing principles is to produce the best overall balance between prima facie
rightness over prima facie wrongness. This is evident in Beauchamp and Childress’ six
conditions that “constrain” our balancing judgments:
1.   Good reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm rather than the
infringed norm.
2.   The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect of
achievement.
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3.   No morally preferable alternative actions are available.
4.   The lowest level of infringement, commensurate with achieving the primary goal
of the action, has been selected.
5.   All negative effects of the infringement have been minimized.
6.   All affected parties have been treated impartially (2013, 23).
As others have noted, none of these can be used to justify a balancing judgment; rather, as
Tomlinson puts it, “they are criteria for comparing courses of action with respect to
selecting the one which entails the least infringement of norms, without regard to which
norm is the weightier” (1998). What makes for a “good reason” for the purposes of
“outweighing” a competing principle is left unspecified and remains a matter of
unprincipled moral judgment. In any event, we are to act so as to produce states of affairs
in which there is more overall rightness rather than wrongness in the world.
Much of the criticism of principlism follows the criticism of Ross’ theory in that it
seems to be merely a matter of personal preference that decides which principle, in a
given circumstance, outweighs the others (e.g. Davis 1995). While I think this is a salient
criticism, there is a deeper one that further exposes its consequentialist character. Either
principlism’s notion of respect is unintelligible (there are justified acts of disrespect) or it
comes cheaply (all we have to do is give due consideration). The reasons for why it may
be unintelligible have already been given. The reasons for why it may come cheaply is
that giving due consideration does not require any specifiable action beyond giving due
consideration. This is clearly evident within act-utilitarianism. Returning to our patient in
Room 306 with the assumption that cutting up the patient will produce the best overall
consequences, the utilitarian transplant team could honestly say to the patient,
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Rest assured, you and your worth have been counted. Unfortunately, the scales do
not tip not in your favor. Though we wish it weren’t so and it is not your fault, we
must secure your death for the greater good. Despite how you may feel, you must
believe that you have been respected and that killing you does you no disrespect
— after all, we have taken the value of your life and your interests into account.
Such claims simply ring hallow. The reason why is that the utilitarian transplant team
does not properly recognize the patient’s dignity for what it is, something that is
incalculable. Rather, it is just counted as one good among others that can, in principle, be
impartially considered within a calculus that takes everything into account for the sake of
producing the best overall state of affairs. The same is true in principlism. While the
principlist would forbid cutting up the patient in Room 306 to secure an additional drop
of welfare, he would nevertheless recommend cutting him up so as to avoid what Nozick
calls a “catastrophic moral horror” (1974, 30n). The fact remains that both moral
frameworks treat human worth as a calculable good that can be weighed and found
wanting in the face of competing goods. If this were not the case, then giving due
consideration would not be sufficient for showing respect. We would have to do more
such as refusing to calculate goods that have an “incalculable” worth. To “weigh” such
things would not only be conceptually mistaken, it would also fail to treat them in
accordance with their worth. In other words, it would be to disrespect them. A discussion
of the moral status of the object of respect, then, is unavoidable, and I have already given
my reasons in the previous chapter for thinking that every human being, no matter their
condition of disability or development, has an ineliminable dignity. What is meant by this
is that our worth is incalculable and that weighing our lives in some utilitarian calculus or
Rossian balancing act against other desirable goods is simply not an option.
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5.2.2 Against consequentialism
Before we leave this topic and move to our exploration of the options that could
ground moral absolutes, we would do well to revisit some of the reasons why we should
reject consequentialism as a moral theory in the first place. A salient criticism of the
standard view of consequentialism is that it assumes every human action is, by itself,
morally neutral and cannot be evaluated independently from the consequences it
produces. But it is hard to believe that an action like rape could be morally neutral in this
sense. We need not check the results of an act of sexual violence perpetrated on the
victim without the victim’s consent to know if it is morally wrong (Shafer-Landau 2015,
148–49). That the victim must be conscious (at some point) to experience the harm or
whether other people will find out about the rapist’s behavior is beside the point. It is just
obvious that a stranger who has sex with a woman in a coma unbeknownst to her or
anyone else does something seriously wrong.130 So much the worse for actconsequentialism, then; human actions can have a moral character all on their own.
What about Rossian-style principlism? On this view, at least some of our actions
are not morally neutral in and of themselves. Indeed, there is a set of intrinsically right
130

The typical response from consequentialists is to attack this sort of claim as being grounded in mere
“intuition” and that our cognitive ability to track moral truth has been shown to be unreliable given a
number of psychological studies that have shown how our judgments are influenced by epistemically
suspect heuristics and biases. Whatever the merits of this claim (see Berker 2009 for a critical response),
the upshot is that we need a sound epistemic method to track moral truth (moderate versions of this claim
make room for a “reflective equilibrium” between our methods and judgments). Yet how does one go about
deciding which method is best apart from making judgments about the quality of its fundamental
principles? Is there a further method one can appeal to show that it is never wrong to maximize the good? If
so, why should that method be trusted? Indeed, an infinite regress threatens. Generally, the problem (as
noted by Chisholm 1973) is that “methodism” falls on the horns of a dilemma: either the methodist claims
to know her method is the right one or not. If not, then the adoption of some method, M, is arbitrary. If she
claims to know, then she makes a judgment about M apart from M. To deploy M to claim M does not get
us very far and is unacceptably circular. Assuming that moral skepticism is unacceptable, the
consequentialist is in the same boat as the “intuitionist” when it comes to the status of our moral
epistemology.
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actions we always have a reason to perform, and we have a decisive reason perform one
of them if and only if that action will produce the best balance of prima facie rightness
over prima facie wrongness. Nonetheless, this view assumes, like every other form of
consequentialism, that moral impartiality is just a function of accurately ranking the
impersonal value of possible outcomes — value from “the point of view of the universe”
as Sidgwick would say (1981 [1903]). But consider the normativity of things like justice
and respect for autonomy, which are constitutive of principlism. Though they are
impartial, they are not impersonal as they are just what we invoke so as to limit the
efforts of others to produce the best overall consequences. Indeed, the normative function
of justice and respect for autonomy as being constraints on our action cannot be derived
from consequentialism. The only kind of normative function justice and respect for
autonomy can have within consequentialism is that of being conditions on our action,
provided that it is true that satisfying them tends to produce the best outcomes from an
impersonal standpoint.131 This standpoint is inadequate for making sense of our moral
experience of these norms, because it leaves out an indispensable characteristic of both.
Justice and respect for autonomy are “inter-personal” and yield what Paul Hurely calls an
“interpersonal conception of impartiality” whereby we recognize “the equal moral
significance that each person has independent of whatever moral significance she has
from the impersonal standpoint” (Hurley 2009, 169). What other than human dignity
could ground this moral significance we share equally with one another and independent
from the value of the states of affairs we inhabit at a given moment? Indeed, it is hard to
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I borrow the condition/constrain distinction from Nozick (Nozick 1974, 28–29)
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make sense of the moral significance of justice and respect for autonomy without the
preeminent basis of human dignity. Yet in the reigning paradigm of biomedical ethics,
this preeminence has to be rejected or downplayed so that justice and respect for
autonomy can be balanced against concerns of beneficence and nonmaleficence. Under
the influence of this kind of thinking, bans on euthanasia, destructive embryonic stem cell
research, or mortal harvesting practices are sometimes thought to be problematic just
because they conflict with the goals of healing, relieving suffering, and advancing
scientific research.132 As Gilbert Meilander wryly observes, it is as if bioethicists are
surprised to learn that such bans conflict with these goals; he sardonically reminds us that
the point of the bans is prohibit unacceptable ways to achieve them (2001, 9). To be sure,
we should not beg the question against these practices; but neither should we assume they
are acceptable or that we could make them acceptable just because they would achieve
beneficial goals. To do so betrays a consequentialist mindset, which cannot adequately
account for our widely accepted norms of justice and respect.
The reason why norms of justice and respect are not adequately accounted for in
consequentialism is that they cannot do the work we want them to do when we assert
them. They can only give us a ‘boost’ in our claim against others so that others have to
consider them to some degree, but they do not give us a “trump,” as Dworkin (1984)

132
For example, Miller and Truog are bemused by the belief that it is acceptable to relieve suffering
with strong palliative care medicine at the risk of hastening death, but unacceptable to administer
euthanasia for the same reason (2012, 28). President Clinton’s National Bioethics Advisory stated that the
ban on embryonic stem cell research “conflicts with several of the ethical goals of medicine, especially
healing, prevention, and research—goals that are rightly characterized by the principles of beneficence and
nonmaleficence, jointly encouraging the pursuit of each social benefit and avoiding or ameliorating
potential harm” (1999, 1:69). Sade and Boan complain that “By observing the DDR, substantial numbers of
organs have been lost to transplantation” (2014, 21). As a general matter, Beauchamp cannot accept
absolute rules, because they paralyze “our capacity to promote the common good by more collective public
polices…” (1995, 185). It is as if absolutists are supposed to be scandalized by these claims.
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would say, over whatever counter-claims others might marshal against them. Although
this feature provides moral flexibility in place of rigidity, and thereby makes
consequentialism attractive to some, it is also what makes its conceptions of justice so
inadequately thin. Take rights-talk, for example. “Rights,” says Wolterstorff, “are
introduced into our practical reasoning when we go beyond taking the relative worth of
life-states and life-events into account and bring the worth of human beings and social
entities into consideration” (2008, 304). The primary reason we assert them is to prohibit
others from bringing states and events into our lives that do not befit our worth. The
significance of rights would be greatly diminished if they merely “gave our opponents a
reason” not to bring those states and events into our lives, but did not outright require
them not to do so. What they are supposed to do when we invoke them is automatically
override whatever reason our opponents have for bringing those states and events into our
lives. We can reasonably do this only if the worth of human beings always overrides the
worth of states of affairs we might want to bring about. Only if it is the case that, as
Wolterstorff says, “A fundamental feature of how the human-being system interacts with
the life-goods system is that former always trumps the latter” (2008, 305). Those who
deny this will find Dostoevsky’s question, quoted in the epigraph, agonizing (2004, 227).
Those who affirm this will find it easy to answer and any thought to the contrary
repugnant; such an act would gravely wrong the child.133 What is the best reason to
believe that the human being system always trumps the life-good system? The answer has
already been given: human beings have a worth (or dignity) that is incalculable.
133

What is interesting about Dostoevsky’s question is that he grants that Utopia is at stake; but on the
form of consequentialism he has in view, torturing the child is no less required if a mere drop of the total
overall welfare is at stake.
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We should pause for a moment to reflect on just what is meant by “incalculable”
here. To ascribe incalculable worth to human beings is not to necessarily ascribe “infinite
value” to them or a worth that cannot be counted as it is sometimes assumed.134 Indeed,
the whole category of “value” may be inadequate to express what is meant by the notion
of incalculability: that the human person is of such a worth (or status) that she is “not able
to be calculated,” not that it is “too great to be calculated.” Calculability in this context is
a metaphor for describing a finite amount of worth that can be factored into a calculation
which will determine whether one can be treated as a mere means to some end or not. To
have an incalculable worth in the relevant sense is to be inadmissible to such a
calculation. This is part of what of what it means to be an end, not merely a means to an
end. Our talk of “value” often misleads us to think that our worth is (finitely) additive
(Stith 2004).135 If our worth is merely additive, then we can be offset by whatever states
of affairs are judged to have more worth, and we can be instrumentalized for the sake of
obtaining them. This “additive fallacy” (to borrow the phrase from Kagan 1988 who uses
it in a different way) is most clearly revealed in the writings of those who think that the
wrongness of infanticide entails the wrongness of contraception, and therefore, so the
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For example, Young’s (National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1999, 1:69) reading of Dyck
(2002, chap. 4) conflates Dyck’s idea of incalculability with infinitude.
135
Stith aptly points out that if anyone really thought that innocent human life had an infinite value,
then their attitude towards the proposal to kill 50 people to save one would be no different from their
attitude towards the proposal to kill one to save fifty (2004, 172). The reason we care about not killing the
50 to save the one, is that each of the 50 has a trumping-right against being killed as a means to saving the
one, just as the one has a trumping-right not to be killed as a means to saving the 50. Whether adding up
the number of trumping-rights changes the respect-disrespect import of our actions is controversial.
Wolterstorff thinks that if we were to be responsible for torturing three people, and had to choose between
torturing one as opposed to two, we could torture the one without committing an act of disrespect (2008,
303). But it is at least paradoxical if not self-contradictory to do precisely what the right against torture
rules out in order to honor it. It would seem that if one must disrespect someone, one must minimize the
number people one disrespects if one can. This is not to say that disrespect is “justifiable” however; it is
only to say that it is something we should minimize if he must do it.
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argument goes, if the former is to be ruled out, then so should the latter — which, of
course, is taken to be absurd (e.g. Glover 1977, 162–63; Tooley 1983). The argument
goes like this: since in either case there is one less valuable person than there might have
been, there is no measurable difference in value between placing an obstacle between
sperm and egg and killing a newborn (side-effects notwithstanding).136 Yet without
presuming that contraception is licit, this argument just falsely assumes that human
beings have an additive value rather than a worth that is incalculable. It is as if there
could be no alternative to this view, and that it is somehow impossible to coherently
believe that we have a worth independent of the impersonal states of affairs in which we
inhabit, a worth that generates a norm of respect that entails we are not to be treated as
some fungible good that can be weighed against other competing goods. The reticence we
may feel about bringing more children into the world, and our deeply held belief that they
should be protected and cared for if they happen to come along is not a fundamentally
incoherent state of mind. Nor is a parent’s grief, which may sense the loss of a child as
being an irreplaceable loss. Indeed, these are attitudes that any good axiological theory
should be able to explain, and not simply reject as confused. The problem with the
additive view is twofold: (1) it wrongly assumes the moral significance of impartiality is
impersonal rather than inter-personal, and (2) it wrongly attributes a quantifiable (non-
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“Valuable person” here can be taken in whatever way is preferred. The Glover citation is worth
quoting in full as it succinctly puts the additive fallacy on display:
The argument that it is wrong to destroy worthwhile life holds in most cases, although not always, and
in some extreme cases the predictable quality of someone’s life works as an argument the other way.
But even where the worthwhile life argument does hold, it is no stronger against infanticide than not
against conceiving a child. In either case, there is one less person with a worthwhile life. And,
considering this reason in isolation, babies are replaceable (Ibid. 162–63).
The argument is valid but unsound, because it falsely assumes that our worth is wholly determined by the
states of affairs of which we are constituents, i.e. whether or not a “worthwhile life” attaches to us.
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zero) value to human beings, which makes them possible objects of maximization. These
faulty assumptions entail a symmetry principle that produces absurd results: it is not the
case that taking a human’s life, considered all by itself, is morally on par with not
creating one any more than breaking a promise, considered all by itself, is on par with not
making one (Kaczor 2011, 26). What is common to both promises and human beings is
that they are to be respected in their own right; violating them is simply to be avoided.
5.3 Options for grounding the Absolutist’s Answer
As I have argued, having a rational nature endows one with a special dignity that
is incompatible with being instrumentalized to such an extent that one should be
destroyed for the sake of retrieving healthy organs. To do so would violate that dignity
even if the donor consents. I also argued that Kant’s morality could not be used to justify
mortal harvesting without begging the question as to whether the incapacitated individual
at the end of life retains this dignity. It would seem, then, that Kant’s normative system of
ethics is a good candidate for grounding the Absolutists Answer. “Act so that you treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never
as a means only,” he says (Kant 1990 [1785], 46). To be an end in the Kantian sense is to
be an object of respect, to be something that the practical reason of others should always
recognize as requiring treatment that accords with its worth for its own sake. “In the
realm of ends,” Kant writes, “everything either has a price or a dignity. Whatever has a
price can be replaced by something else as equivalent; on the other hand whatever is
above all price and therefore admits no equivalent, has dignity” (Ibid., 51). Certainly,
Kant’s system is the obvious choice for my project is it not?
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Well, yes and no. As enduring as his ‘humanity formula’ is, what is less enduring
is Kant’s belief that it could derived from his ‘universal law’ formula, and that the basis
of our dignity is only a practical value internal to the exercise of (an idealized) rational
agency, not an objective worth exemplified by actual rational animals themselves. I also
share Anscombe’s criticism of his idea that we legislate the moral law for ourselves, all
by ourselves, without recognizing that the concept of legislation requires that the
legislator be of a superior power. There is also the problem of relevant description.
Anscombe correctly observes that Kant is unable to usefully apply his ‘universal law’
formula, especially in his ethics against lying, since one could adhere to a maxim to lie in
such-and-such circumstances without creating any problem for the achievement of one’s
goals if everyone else were to adopt that maxim (1958, 2).
With these complaints noted, a contemporary Kantian could follow the work of
Alan Donagan outlined in his The Theory of Morality (1977), which rejects Kant’s
universal law formula and restates Kant’s humanity formula as “It is impermissible not to
respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature” (Ibid., 66
emphasis original). This makes room for what Donagan calls a “twofold teleology in
human action,” one that directs us to form a rational life plan for the sake of producing a
good and happy human life, and one that directs us to act for sake of others as ends-inthemselves (Ibid. 229). This second type of teleology is the teleology of respect. Once we
know that a description of an action is incompatible with this form of respect in all cases,
we know by way of deduction that that action is always impermissible. Of course, there
can be disagreement over whether compatibility is achievable, but that is a debate that
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absolutists can have amongst themselves about which prohibitions really are absolute.137
In the face of a non-absolutist critic, there may or not be a heavy burden of proof on the
absolutist to show why a given action or a practice is incompatible with respect for
rational creatures. Lethally experimenting on human subjects against their will is
obviously always incompatible with the respect we owe to them as rational creatures.
Killing medically ‘hopeless’ donors for their organs with their consent is not obviously
always incompatible with this respect. Hence, my goal in the previous chapter was to
give the reasons why it is always incompatible: such a practice always places more value
on the organs than the one who has them. In any event, the formal process of arriving at
the Absolutist’s Answer is as straightforward as rehearsing an argument in the form of
modus ponens. The difficulty is found in giving a non-evaluative description of an action
in the minor premise that is always incompatible with the relevant norm of respect in the
major premise.138
While Donagan’s project is both interesting and attractive (and the one I am
inclined to agree with), the absolutist need not assume that morality stands wholly
independent from ‘the good’ and must be wholly described in terms of ‘the right.’ Those
who see a strong connection between our capacity for rational action and our capacity for
human flourishing will find it hard to believe that the imperatives of morality could only

137
For his part, Donagan thinks that, on the one hand, some acts of suicide are compatible with this
form of respect; on the other, he thinks that every act that impairs one’s health is incompatible (Ibid. 76). I
leave it to the reader to decide if he could make room for lethal transplant surgery.
138
Placing an evaluative description of an action in the minor premise results in a tautology. For
example, we should not define murder as unjustified killing, because that would yield a conclusion that
unjustified killing is impermissible, which is something we already know. Defining murder as the
intentional killing of the innocent is meant to describe the action without loading an evaluative term into
the definition. We can then derive a substantive conclusion that murder is impermissible, and if this holds
in every case, then murder is always wrong.
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be “categorical” and never “hypothetical” — to use Kant’s terminology — quite the
opposite, in fact (Foot 1972). Nonetheless, the Absolutist’s Answer can be defended in a
system of “hypotheticals” as the (New) Natural Law theory effectively demonstrates.
Every view that goes by this name begins with the First Principle of Practical Reason,
which, in Aquinas’ words, says, “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided” (I-II, q. 94, a. 2). From there one could analyze what it means to satisfy the First
Principle in terms of a pre-moral action theory, which stipulates that no action is a human
action unless it is aimed at some good or intends to avoid some evil (Grisez 1965). Even
wrong actions, which are after all human actions, are all done under the guise of the
good, or in pursuit of what seems good. What is good is an objective rather than
subjective matter; there are goods that are desirable quite apart from whether they are
desired or not. When one considers the various ways one can live well and flourish as a
human being, one recognizes there is a plurality of fundamental or “basic goods” that are
both constitutive of human flourishing and worth pursuing for their own sake. Such
goods include things like life itself, friendship, health, knowledge, aesthetic experience,
and play.139 Yet there is no highest good; all the basic goods are incommensurable with
one another in terms of their “rational desirability” (Boyle 2009, 81; cf. Finnis, Boyle,
and Grisez 1987, 254–60). To do evil, then, is to intentionally damage these goods, in
your own person or in that of another. In light of our knowledge about basic goods, it is
strictly incompatible with morality to intend the death of a human being, as it would
intentionally damage the good of human life, which is characterized by a dignity rooted
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The formal list of basic goods varies from thinker to thinker, but all of them include the good of

life.
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in its fundamental capacities for rational action (Lee and George 2008b). As Lee and
George say, “To choose to destroy one instance of a basic good for the sake of other
instances of goods is to adopt the attitude that human goods, including human lives, are
only conditionally [not intrinsically] good” (Lee and George 2008a, 156). What about
intending the death of someone convicted of a capital crime or who is unjustly attacking
the innocent? One must never do it. The end of self-defense must come by way of means
that only intend to “stop the attacker” and which would only accept the attacker’s death
as only foreseen side-effect of one’s action in a fair and proportionate way; capital
punishment ought to be avoided (Grisez 1970). As controversial as these outcomes may
be, this version of Natural Law theory adequately grounds the Absolutist’s Answer in that
neither the surgeons nor the donor may ever intend the donor’s death.140 In either case,
and therefore every case, the manner in which mortal harvesting is pursued fails to
uphold an upright will towards the good.
A final option that could ground the Absolutist’s Answer comes from traditional
medical ethics itself, which is perhaps best articulated by the late Edmund Pellegrino
(2005). While he too begins with the First Principle of Practical Reason, he argues that
the fundamental good medical professionals are to safeguard and pursue is the good of
healing, or as he puts it, “healing particularized in this patient here and now” (Ibid., 474).
Particularizing the practice of healing in this way honors the fact that the patient is
suffering, vulnerable, and in need of help. Embedded in the doctor’s intention to help the
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Traditional Natural Law theorists deny that the First Principle is “pre-moral” and hold that there is a
highest good (e.g. the Beatific Vision). Nonetheless, they too would rule out mortal harvesting as murder
(i.e. the intentional killing of the innocent), and further claim that the mortal harvesters are not using
practical reasoning (i.e. satisfying the First Principle), but are rather abusing it (Jensen 2015, 182).
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patient is a “covenantal promise” to use the tools of the healing art in the best interests of
the patient — not in the best interests of third parties like those who need the patient’s
organs. As such, the healing art is one aimed at safeguarding and promoting the patient’s
health, that is, “the well functioning [sic] of the human organism, body, mind, and soul,
to the degree possible” (Ibid., 475). Consequently, physicians must never kill; “Nothing
is more contrary than killing to the ends of medicine as a healing art,” Pellegrino says
(Ibid.). Medicine is transformed into something else if killing is allowed, perhaps some
sort of humanitarian practice concerned with safeguarding and promoting “quality of
life” concerns, but not one that is primarily concerned with healing. What matters more
than the particular patient before us in euthanasia and assisted-suicide practices is the
patient’s suffering, because it is assumed that this suffering can only be relieved by
eliminating the patient himself. Organ donation euthanasia practices, of course, are not
only concerned with the suffering of the patient before us, but also the suffering of others
who need the patient’s organs. In either case, obtaining or avoiding certain states of
affairs is more important than destroying the human being before us. This is morally
problematic because human beings have, according to Pellegrino, an “inherent dignity”
that is more fundamental than having an exercisable capacity for autonomous choice that
might authorize its own destruction (Ibid., 478). Compromising this dignity in any way is
simply out of the question for doctors, who are to treat the patient before them regardless
of their race, sex, class, or degree of disability. The sad history of medical atrocities from
Mengele’s to those of Marion Sims is a history of compromising human dignity with the
assumption that the worth of human life varies with its circumstances and accidents of
birth. Part of avoiding evil, then, is to categorically reject any proposal that would allow
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us to kill some patients for their organs (with their consent?) on the basis of their
diminished health status.
In all three of these ways, then, whether it be through Kantian-style respect,
Natural Law theory, or traditional medical ethics, the Absolutist’s Answer is defensible.
Their unifying theme is that human dignity is of primary importance in each, and cannot
be acted against to secure some desirable state of affairs.
5.4 Can consequentialism support the Absolutist’s Answer?
The forgoing arguments conclude that consequentialism of all stripes should be
rejected. But many very smart philosophers are not as eager to do so as I am, and I
suspect many bioethicists who are more or less committed to the framework of
principlism would hesitate to embrace any one of the absolutist systems suggested here.
There is also a serious argument that just about every moral theory can be
“consequentialized” — that is, given a consequentialist interpretation (Portmore 2009) —
due to the difficulty of denying the claim that right action should be constitutive of the
overall goal of our action, and not merely a constraint on our action. All of this raises an
important question: must the defender of the Absolutist’s Answer be committed to the
falsity of consequentialism? While I am inclined to think so, I am going to suppose I am
wrong for the sake of argument, and put on the hat of a consequentialist in order to give
an argument in favor of the claim that the DDR is “virtually absolute.”141 By this I do not
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One might object why I frame things this way, since it is possible for a “threshold” deontologist to
deny the Absolutist’s Answer too, and therefore putting on the hat of a consequentialist does nothing to
illuminate the true nature of the problem. The main idea of threshold deontology is that one should not
violate the rights of individuals even if it would produce bad outcomes, but only up to a point. When some
number of lives are at stake, the rules against things like rape, torture, and murder can be set aside and we
can do those things in order to save the relevant number of lives. The principle problem with this view is
that it generates contradictions, as it assumes the norms of deontology (don’t treat people as mere means)
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mean that it must not be overridden by some other moral concern, but that, for good
contingent reasons, it weighs so heavily that it will not be overridden by some other
moral concern. Rules against rape are a paradigm example of this sort of “virtual
absolute” that principlists are happy to embrace (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 19),
since it is very unlikely that some moral catastrophe would occur if rape were not
permitted in some case.
Hence, my strategy will be to deploy some version of rule-consequentialism, and
defend the claim that the rule against killing donors for their organs is in place because it
is optimific — that is, it helps produce the best overall consequences.142 If this is true,
then consequentialism does not entail that the DDR can be relaxed or broken, because
doing so would bring about less than optimal results. As is well known, there is some
support for this idea in Mill with regard to rules of justice that preserve peace and
security — “the very groundwork of our existence,” as he puts it (1863, 80). Of these
rules Mill says,
They have also the peculiarity, that they are the main element in determining the
whole of the social feelings of mankind. It is their observance which alone
preserves peace among human beings: if obedience to them were not the rule, and
disobedience the exception, every one [sic] would see in every one else a probable
enemy, against whom he must be perpetually guarding himself. What is hardly
less important, these are the precepts which mankind have the strongest and the
most direct inducements for impressing upon one another (Mill 1863, 87–88).

and the norms of consequentialism (maximize the good) are commensurable and they are not. For example,
if the threshold number is 100 lives, we can torture someone to save them, but if just one is released, we
must stop torturing — 99 isn’t enough to cross the threshold. This implies that, at least in some
circumstances, it is permissible to torture one person to save a single life, which is contrary to the
assumptions of threshold deontology (for further argument along these lines see Alexander 2000). In any
event, I do not accept this objection, because threshold deontology, if it does not collapse into
consequentialism all on its own (for details, see Alexander and Moore 2016; Sen 1982), is perhaps the
easiest form of deontology to consequentialize.
142
The gold-standard defense of this view of consequentialism can be found in Brad Hooker’s book
Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality (2000).
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While Mill allows for the rules against interference with one’s freedom to be abrogated to
save a life, he is averse to the idea that we could take one’s life to save another. Such an
act would be contrary to the “social feelings of mankind” that are essential to our
peaceful existence.143 Mill’s idea is an enduring one and even shows up in the writing of
the late Harriet McBryde Johnson. While she was certainly no utilitarian, she was a
practical thinker, as lawyers tend to be, and had this to say in her afterword regarding her
justly famous debate with Peter Singer:
Throughout history, certain categories of people have been excluded from the
polity, often based on ideologies that define some human lives as worthless or not
worth living, unduly burdensome or burdened, or otherwise problematic. Laws
that address problems by killing problematic individuals subvert the social
commitment to justice—giving each member what he or she needs, striving to
hear all voices. As a matter of policy, I favor an irrebutable legal presumption that
every human life is inherently and uniquely valuable. I think this presumption is
so useful toward building a just society that I just don’t worry about whether it
can be validated or is ultimately “true” (McBryde Johnson 2009, 204 emphasis
added).
This idea of “usefulness” regarding principles of dignity and equality is one that we can
exploit for defending the Absolutist’s Answer and by extension the DDR within a
consequentialist framework.
In particular, for our purposes, the basic claim to be defended is that we should
not allow, as a matter of public policy, someone to be killed for their organs because of
the bad side-effects it would produce. Because organ transplant is performed on an
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It will be objected that rule-consequentialism is a non-starter due to J.J.C. Smart’s “irrational rule
worship” objection (Smart and Williams 1973, 10). If we know that violating the DDR will produce the
best overall outcome for everyone involved, following the rule is irrational. Smart’s criticism is penetrating,
but it is open to the rule-consequentialist to reply that we are never in a position to know for sure that
violating the rule will produce the best overall outcome, because (1) we lack detailed knowledge about an
action’s remote effects, (2) obtaining such information would overburden the decision-maker, (3) decisionmakers are often biased and fallible. Avoiding the risk of being wrong explains why the rule should be
accepted by society.
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institutional basis, it must accord with a policy aimed at achieving the best results for
everyone involved now and in the future. If the side-effects undermine the policy’s
intentions or harm other social goods (like justice) that are conducive to the overall Good,
it ought to be rejected. The case of the “survival lottery” proposal illustrates this problem
clearly. Harris imagines what some of the negative side-effects would be when he says,
“Every post might bring a sentence of death, every sound in the night might be the sound
of boots on the stairs,” and that the procurement process would “prove distressing to all
concerned” (1975, 84–85). Noting this difficulty, Harris thinks that our aversion to the
proposal can be overcome by “only a long period of education or propaganda”
(propaganda!). Nevertheless, he acknowledges what he takes to be an insurmountable
difficulty: “The lottery scheme would be a powerful weapon in the hands of someone
willing and able to misuse it” (Ibid., 87). Even if the problems of distress and abuse were
surmountable, the proposal would still incentivize people to live unhealthy lives so that
they would be excluded from the set of healthy organ sources (Singer 1977). Since this is
contrary to the goal of maximizing the number of healthy people as possible, the
argument for the survival lottery is self-defeating.
A similar strategy can be deployed against policies that require the donor to be
killed through the mechanism of informed consent at the stage of life when the donor’s
death is “imminent” (Truog, Miller, and Halpern 2013, 1288). While revisionists
acknowledge that some potential donors uphold values that preclude such an approach
(Ibid., 1289), the negative effects this could have on donation rates is not taken as
seriously as it should be. If Miller and Truog are right, and vital organ retrieval cannot
standardly proceed without killing the donor, then vital organ donation is on the same
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moral plane as voluntary euthanasia. While Miller and Truog would be happy to accept
this as progress, many will not. Roman Catholic theology would have to change its
endorsement of organ donation from a praiseworthy act of charity to a crime against
humanity, which would have no small impact on a sizable portion of potential donors.
The same would be true of many traditional Protestants, Jews, and Muslims. This is not
to say that no one from these faith traditions would be willing to donate, but that their
decision to do so would be morally burdened in a way it is not now. The same would be
true for the majority of donors, who are only willing to donate vital organs after death.
(DuBois and Anderson 2006).144 Morally burdening if not excluding such large portions
of the public from donating would be disastrous for donation rates.
Not only would the donors feel this moral burden, but so would the transplant
teams themselves. Medical schools would have to teach transplant surgeons that they
should be willing to kill their patients on the operating table, and accept responsibility for
their deaths. Yet since no one has a duty to kill and medical professionals do not go into
medicine to take life but rather to save it, there is a good chance that the transplant
enterprise will most likely suffer a loss of competent professionals who are willing and
able to facilitate organ transplants. Empirical support for this claim comes from a study,
which found that agreement with the donation procedure “significantly decreased” among
health professionals when they were pressed to consider procedures lethal to the patient
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To be sure, how death is defined is crucial in that there is some support for donating organs when
one criteria for “higher-brain” death is satisfied. Be that as it may, DuBois and Anderson report, “69%
agreed that they would only allow donation after the patient was taken off the ventilator and his or her heart
stopped beating, which would require use of a DCD protocol and reduce the number of procurable organs”
(Ibid., 69). In any event, the majority of potential donors are not willing to violate the dead donor rule, even
if members of a substantial minority are (Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner 2004).
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(Bastami et al. 2013, 902). Specifically, the authors report,
Fewer than 5% of respondents answered strongly agree/agree to allow donation
after cardiac death while also answering disagree/strongly disagree that the patient
is definitely dead, suggesting little support to abandon the dead-donor rule”
(Joffe, Anton, and deCaen 2008).
This is hardly ever considered in such proposals. Rather, worries about a public backlash
and their unintended consequences on the medical profession are just dismissed as
“facile” presumptions; whatever worries there may be can be remedied with “education”
(Miller and Truog 2012a, 148). Presumably, this “education” is one in which we all
collectively learn (without begging any questions) that (1) brain death does not entail
death, (2) that there is no difference between killing and withdrawing life-support, and
(3) that killing for organs is compatible with respecting persons and having professional
integrity in the medical profession. Even if we generously assume the probability of
“educating” members of our society to hold just one of these views is, say 0.75, the
probability of someone being re-educated to hold all three views, which is necessary for
the acceptability of their proposal, dwindles to 0.42. Miller and Truog’s optimism in the
re-education project is nothing short of astonishing.145
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It is also worth pointing out that Miller and Truog’s requirement of informed consent dramatically
changes our standard procedures, which is contrary to their assumptions. James DuBois (2011, 46) is worth
quoting to see why:
Complicating matters further, deceased organ donation is not currently predicated upon informed
consent […]. It rather depends on the notion of gifting, which requires significantly less information
and simpler processes. Informed consent requires providers to communicate to individual patients
significant information about procedures, risks, benefits, and alternatives, and it requires individuals to
understand, appreciate, and reason with the information prior to making a voluntary decision. Within
the post-DDR era, we would need to scrap our current registries entirely and rebuild them slowly after
completing a formal informed consent process with each individual or their proxies, because “formerly
deceased” organ donation would now be a lethal form of living organ donation. […] In 2010, my local
organ procurement organization (OPO) had a consent rate for deceased donation exceeding 80%.1
Good luck maintaining that, local donation coordinators!
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Of course, not all revisionists have the same view of death as Miller and Truog
do, and some are content to endorse death declarations on the basis of neurological
criteria. They just want to expand the pool of potential donors to those who are
imminently dying, or those who request the withdrawal of life-support. Yet it is not clear
just how big of an expansion this would be. Some advocates of “organ donation
euthanasia” admit that such a substantial policy change would have a “small impact upon
the organ shortfall” and that this undermines the case for it “to some degree” (Wilkinson
and Savulescu 2012, 47). Nevertheless, the significance of allowing this practice is not
only related to lessening the organ shortfall, it is also about expanding the good of patient
autonomy. What sort of negative consequence could follow from that?
The answer is that trust in the transplant enterprise may be harmed as well and
perhaps the doctor-patient relationship in general. Why think that allowing a few people
the choice to be killed on the operating table would erode public confidence in the
transplant enterprise? What is the connection between trust and permitting doctors to kill
for organs? James DuBois gives the standard answer when he writes:
Some scenarios in which organ harvesting would begin before death sound fairly
harmless to some: consent has been given, conscious life is not cut short, and
death is imminent. However, such scenarios are not what most people are likely to
imagine—no matter how much they are educated. Surveys already show that a
significant portion of the population fears that, by agreeing to become organ
donors, their health care will be compromised in an emergency situation. Images
will arise of organs being harvested when one is critically injured and perhaps still
within the realm of recovery. Moreover, the public and the medical community
know that informed consent is tricky. Numerous studies show that advanced
directives are not consistently understood or implemented as patients wish.
Saying that organ harvesting will only proceed with consent simply does not
amount to saying that harvesting will not happen unless the patient explicitly
wants it to happen in a specific situation. Proxies and advanced directives may
legally achieve ends that are not desired by patients (1999, 132 emphasis added).
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The fear of compromising one’s end-of-life care by virtue of identifying as a donor may
not sound rational to revisionists or caring medical professionals, but it remains a fact
that many people feel it. Better education will not change the fact that the patient, who
will be languishing in the ICU and empowered to die by transplant surgery, will be in the
hands of doctors, who will be laboring under pressure from hospital administrations,
organ procurement organizations, and basic triage concerns. Under such circumstances,
being able to trust one’s doctor to value one’s life and act in an unbiased manner with
respect to all the available treatment options goes beyond what education can enable in a
patient; it will take no small amount of courage to trust one’s doctors in such
circumstances, and there is no reason given as to why we should expect patients to rise to
the occasion.
I, for one, think that there would be a reinforcement of something rational behind
the fear of the transplant community, due to what I emphasized in the last chapter:
patients at the end of life would be judged to have less worth than the rest of us by virtue
of being empowered to give up their lives in organ donation euthanasia. It is rational to
fear being judged by one’s health care providers that one no longer has a life worth
living, and thereby judged as a low priority for treatment. Add to that the background
assumption that there are those in need of organs who are judged to still have a life worth
living, and it is easy to understand why people would be afraid to identify themselves as
donors: their fear would be borne out of a sense of social inequality based on how much
“worthwhile” life one is perceived to have left. As is well-known, the experience with
social inequality is correlated with fear of the transplant system. It has long been
observed that African-Americans are less willing to donate than their white
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counterparts.146 Instead of working to alleviate those fears, we would compound them by
giving underprivileged groups yet another reason to believe that their doctors would be
less committed to their healthcare interests if it were known that they were registered
organ donors. No one wants to be viewed primarily in terms of being a potential donor,
rather than a patient.
Even advocates of voluntary euthanasia should be concerned as to whether “organ
donation euthanasia” will have harmful effects on the primary aim of their practice,
which is to secure the most comfortable death for the patient possible. Euthanasia via
transplant surgery will require procedures and protocols that limit the time spent with
loved ones in the final moments of life and perhaps the degree of comfort one is entitled
to in the events leading up to death, since one must he prepped for surgery. In a normal
case of voluntary euthanasia, the physician’s efforts are concentrated on relieving
suffering and causing the most comfortable death possible. Physicians who facilitate
organ donation while performing an act of euthanasia cannot be solely committed to this,
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One study found that African-Americans were more likely than whites to agree with the claim “If
doctors know I am an organ donor, they won’t try to save my life,” and would be more willing to donate if
they knew their organs would go to other African-Americans (Siminoff, Burant, and Ibrahim 2006). That
members of this community might fear that they would receive less than adequate end-of-life care so that a
white person might benefit from one of their organs, is not an irrational one. As Siminoff, Burant, and
Ibrahim explain:
African Americans disproportionately have end-stage kidney disease, yet, they are less likely than
whites to receive kidney transplantation. While 39% of people on the kidney waiting list are African
American, only 23.0% of deceased donor organ recipients are African American. African Americans
needing a kidney transplant wait, on average, 1,335 days, compared with 734 days for whites (Ibid.,
995).
Also note the following report from an African-American survey respondent to get a better sense of
how this fear manifests:
[Y]ou heard this rumor that especially with the younger, 16- or 18-year-olds, bodies were still in
healthy prime but they got shot up, shot to death. And there was that nasty rumor going around that
they were purposely letting young boys die so that they could recover the heart, the lungs, the kidneys,
because these were basically healthy children who hadn’t had another disease. And there was a rumor
that the health care workers were checking the box on the back of their driver’s license (DuBois et al.
2009, 2396-7).
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however; they must also consider the interests of third-parties in attaining the healthiest
organs for transplant possible, and therefore must act upon the patient’s body for the sake
of the wellbeing of the organs, and not only for the sake of the wellbeing of the patient.
Adequate anesthesia may secure an acceptable degree of comfort, but the promise of it
cannot change the fact that one must spend one’s final moments in the company of
masked strangers rather than with one’s family and friends. While these drawbacks may
be outweighed by the “psychic benefit” of donating, they nonetheless remain drawbacks
that have to be overcome. In any event, the conflict of interest between providing the
most comfortable death possible and harvesting the healthiest organs possible is enough
to unsettle any potential donor’s mind. There is already concern that requests for consent
to donate after euthanasia in Belgium “cause a breach of trust with the treating physician”
because the patient “might get the impression that the physician is only willing to
perform euthanasia because the patient will donate organs” (Bollen et al. 2016, 488
emphasis original). While this may not be the case for the Belgian euthanizer, it has to be
the case for transplant-euthanizer, because his professional role requires him to be willing
to perform an act of euthanasia only if the patient is willing to donate organs. All the
rarified talk about promoting self-determination and patient autonomy through organ
donation conceals a clear and compelling social pressure to get on with the business with
dying so healthy organs can be extracted for those who are deemed worthier of them.
This should not be what advocates of voluntary euthanasia should want if they care about
euthanasia being truly voluntary.
Finally, while revisionists are optimistic that their policies will be made
acceptable to the public through an honest and forthright informed consent process, they
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tend to ignore how easily the public can be manipulated by propagandists in opposition to
their cause (DuBois 2011, 46). If someone like Sarah Palin was able to deeply harm
public trust in President Obama’s health care legislation by falsely claiming that it would
create bureaucratic “death panels” (Gonyea 2017), how much more will the transplant
enterprise be harmed by (fake?) media outlets that will seize upon the fact that transplant
teams will literally kill you for your organs? To be sure, if the goal of our policy is to
expand patient autonomy or to be more honest about killing in transplant surgery, then
these considerations do not matter as much. But if our goal is to maximize the organ
supply, the risk of creating such a controversy should give us pause.147 Indeed, there is
good reason to think the best way to do that is to respect the dignity of human persons by
not killing them for their organs.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that norms of respect are ultimately shaped by the
fundamental principles of conduct and the theories of value we assume, and that some of
these are inadequate for making sense of our moral experience of justice, respect for
autonomy, and respect for the dignity of the human person in its nascent and waning
forms. In particular, I argued that merely giving due consideration to people and their
interests is not sufficient for showing respect as certain consequentialist theories of
morality would have us believe. One of these theories is W.D. Ross’s which underlies the
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What is often ignored in the debate over the DDR is the dubious assumption that the only way to
really increase the organ supply is to abandon the rule; yet there may be better ways of increasing the
supply through less controversial means. For example, we could fund and construct more Intensive Care
Units (ICUs). Because most donors die in the ICU, the more ICUs we have on hand, the more donors of
vital organs there would be (Wilkinson & Wilkinson, 2011). This would have the beneficial effect of not
offending large portions of the population who affirm that human life is inviolable.
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moral framework of principlism, the reigning paradigm of today’s biomedical ethics. Its
commitment to non-absolutism would permit, under certain unusual circumstances,
killing an innocent and unwilling person for their organs. To explain what is wrong with
this outlook, I argued that it was a mistake to assume that the worth of the human person
has an additive value that merely gives others a reason not to act against the person.
Rather, the innocent human person has a worth that always outweighs whatever reason
we might have for bringing about some desirable states of affairs, which entail the
intentional destruction of the person. This worth accounts for our moral experience of
justice in the form of rights that trump, not rights that merely give others a reason to
consider them. The trumping import of rights is best explained by the fact that we have a
certain dignity that is above all price, one that makes us the sort of thing that cannot be
weighed and found wanting in some utilitarian calculous or Rossian balancing act.
While I did not commit myself to any one moral system that grounds the norm
that we should never, under any circumstances intentionally destroy innocent subjects of
dignity (what I called the Absolutist’s Answer), I explored three options that could
provide such grounds with a view to supporting an exceptionless interpretation of the
DDR. We also saw that the Millian tradition of rule-consequentialism can support such
an interpretation because it is able to prioritize norms of respect for human dignity on the
basis that they are believed to produce the best for everyone involved. While I think this
is less plausible on a theoretical level than the others views I surveyed, there are good
practical reasons to think that abandoning the DDR rule would have negative effects on
the overall goals of the transplant enterprise. Contrary to what John Harris says in the
epigraph (1978, 100), we should be concerned with what rights people have, especially if
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they include an inalienable right not to be killed, for such things constrain our answers
with respect to the (sometimes insidious) question “What is to be done?”.
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Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation has been to give a systematic justification of the DDR
in transplant ethics. Along the way, we have surveyed the rule’s history and development,
how it is related to our ethics of killing, as well as the nature of the human being that is
the object of our actions in medical practice. The argument I’ve advanced is a deductive
one, which supports a morally absolute conclusion:
1.   Transplant protocols that would have us secure the donor’s death, would have us
kill someone for their organs.
2.   Killing someone for their organs disrespects the worth of someone, namely the
one killed.
3.   No act that disrespects the worth of someone is permissible.
4.   Therefore, transplant protocols that would have us secure the donor’s death are
impermissible.
This conclusion may be taken to be identical with the DDR or the reason behind it if the
rule is construed as an imperative statement like, “Do not cause death by transplant
surgery” or “Organ recovery must not cause death.”
Each premise of the argument has received significant attention to explain
precisely what I mean by each term, while considering the objections that thoughtful
critics might put forward. I do not for a moment think that I have satisfied the critics of
the DDR or the traditional norms against killing the innocent in a medical context.
However, my goal has not been to satisfy the critic, but to dispense with the complaints
that no systematic effort to justify rule has been made or that it is philosophically
indefensible.
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The future of the DDR remains uncertain as medical professionals the world over
are becoming less concerned about upholding the norm against doctors killing their
patients for any reason. Support for this norm may continue to erode if it is the case that
we cannot reliably determine if someone is brain-dead. The legal outcome of the unusual
case of Jahi McMath (Aviv 2018), which at the present writing is under review in the
courts, may show that our practices of declaring death on the basis of the currently
accepted tests for total brain failure cannot be trusted. Nonetheless, further empirical
research is needed to address the question of whether the transplant community would
continue to operate in standard fashion if it were to be shown that our tests for brain death
were unreliable. If it does, my hope is that the arguments given here will be taken
seriously even if they are ultimately rejected. That is the best a philosopher can hope for,
and it is the goal I have labored towards in developing and defending this argument. Yet
if my arguments are judged to be sound, and if our current death declaration practices are
totally unreliable, then we will need to have the moral courage to stand against our organ
procurement practices as they are currently practiced. While this would no doubt be hard,
it would be right thing to do.
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